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Abstract 
 
Governing International Criminal Justice: 
Managerial Practices and the International Criminal Court 
 
Richard Clements 
 
Managerial practices such as strategic planning, audit, and performance appraisal pervade 
global governance regimes, including the regime of international criminal justice (ICJ). The 
mainstream view is that such practices are objective tools which optimise institutional 
performance and thereby assist them in attaining their goals.  
 
Against this view, I offer an alternative understanding of managerial practices. Viewing 
international criminal justice as a technocratic imaginary, and defining managerial practices as 
tools of power/knowledge, I explore the discursive effects of management upon the 
contemporary project of ICJ. I problematize the assumptions inherent in the mainstream 
approach to managerial practices, relying on critical international law and critical management 
scholarship to provide a comprehensive sociology and history of management. Employing a 
genealogical method, I trace the historical journey of managerial practices from the steel 
factories of the American Midwest to the structures of the United Nations after decolonization. 
This genealogy reveals the political significance of management as a set of tools deployed to 
reinforce extant distributions of institutional power. 
 
At the International Criminal Court (ICC), I trace the expansion of managerial practices and 
find them to have certain reality- and identity-making effects on the organisation and its 
professional staff. Managerial practices produce the court as an efficient, modern institution, 
reinforcing the image of ICJ as the optimal allocation of institutional resources by experts. 
Such practices also produce the identity of the ICC lawyer as an efficient cog in the ICJ 
machine. Collectively, managerial practices enact a discursive closure around an institutional 
and expert-driven ICJ project. That discursive closure is illustrated further in two detailed 
studies: the ICC Presidency and the reorganisation of the Registry. Demonstrating the 
mechanics of managerial knowledge, the thesis reveals how international criminal justice is 
governed. 
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Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. A troubled court and the ‘mainstream’ approach 
 
 
International criminal justice (ICJ) is, for all its challenges and obstacles, a project which still 
rallies together individuals from across the globe under the common banner of ending 
impunity. As the project’s centrepiece, the International Criminal Court (ICC) remains, in the 
words of Kofi Annan, ‘a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the 
march towards universal human rights and the rule of law’.1 Even as the ICC confronts its most 
severe tests after two decades of activity, the mere existence of the court remains ‘an 
achievement which, only a few years ago, nobody would have thought possible’.2 The court 
stands as a warning to despots worldwide, and to their victims, that the international community 
will not stand idly by during mass atrocities.  
One is inclined to forget that under all the symbolism and rousing metaphors, the 
International Criminal Court is also, to put it simply, an office. Walk through the glass doors 
 
1 Statement of Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the Adoption of the Rome Statute, press release no. L/2890, 20 
July 1998, 4 https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2890.html.  
2 Statement of Secretary-General Annan, 4.  
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of the new ICC building on the outskirts of The Hague and one sees the same structural 
hierarchies, professional employees, and official documents as are likely to be found in any 
large organization, private or public, a tram-ride away in the city’s commercial centre. Look 
closely enough, and the court is filled with a raft of tools designed to manage the organisation 
and its staff, from strategic planning to audit to performance appraisal systems. Given how 
ubiquitous these practices are, this thesis asks what the effects of managerial practices are on 
the ICC and the wider project of international criminal justice.  
 For supporters of that project, the present moment is a troubling one. The anxieties of 
the ICJ community are starkly articulated in a recent intervention by four ex-Presidents of the 
ICC’s governing body, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). Though neither a legal nor a 
scholarly intervention, this brief article captures ICJ’s contemporary milieu, its challenges, and 
perceived solutions. For the former ASP Presidents, as for many, the ICC today operates in a 
climate of an eroded rule of law, and ‘attempts to undermine the international order’.3 Russia, 
China, and the United States are becoming more hostile towards the court, while President 
Donald Trump’s recent withdrawal of Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s US visa challenged the 
independence and effectiveness of her office. Conflicts rage ‘[f]rom Syria to Myanmar, from 
Yemen to South Sudan’ but the ICC is nowhere to be seen.4 Despite the best efforts of those 
involved in discharging the court’s mandate to investigate and prosecute the most serious 
international crimes, the court has begun to feel the effects of these external challenges in a far 
cry from the heady optimism of the 1998 Rome Conference.  
What appears to have precipitated this particular intervention is Pre-Trial Chamber II’s 
recent rejection of a prosecutorial investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in Afghanistan, in which the judges reasoned that such investigation would not serve 
the ‘interests of justice’.5 Beyond this problem of low-quality judicial proceedings, the 
Presidents diagnose waning state cooperation with the court and internal ‘management 
deficiencies’.6 In response, they propose various reform measures including an ‘independent 
assessment of the Court’s functioning by a small group of international experts’.7 This 
 
3 Z. Al Hussein, B. Ugarte, C. Wenaweser and T. Intelman, ‘The International Criminal Court Needs Fixing’ 
(Atlantic Council, 24 April 2019) https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-international-
criminal-court-needs-fixing.  
4 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
5 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-33, PTC-II, 12 April 2019, paras 87–96. 
6 Atlantic Council article; see A. Jones, ‘A Quiet Transformation? Efficiency Building in the “Fall” of 
International Criminal Justice’ (2019) 19 International Criminal Law Review 445, 446. 
7 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
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assessment would ‘provide Court officials and all stakeholders with a common point of 
reference’ and ‘inform the next generation of leadership of the ICC, beginning in 2020’.8  
Additionally, the Presidents recommend a ‘new deal’ between states and the court, 
clarification of the legal standards applicable in court proceedings, an end to ‘internal 
squabbles’, and other management reforms.9 Only through such measures, they say, will the 
court be able to bridge the gap between its ‘unique vision’ and its mediocre performance, and 
thereby ‘succeed in providing justice for the world’s worst crimes’.10 
  
2. Counterpoint: The technocratic imaginary of international criminal justice 
 
 
Despite taking a problem-solving approach to the court’s woes, the Presidents’ intervention 
betrays a more complex awareness of how the ICJ project works. The Presidents allude to this 
awareness when recalling the ‘indelible imprint’ of the Rome Conference on its attendees, the 
expressivist and didactic, rather than merely retributive achievements of the court,11 and the 
frequent and stirring invocations of global justice. In the ICC, so the argument goes, the 
international community has vested its hopes for a more just and peaceful world. Appreciating 
the importance of such fragments, ICJ appears less a governance tool led by law and institutions 
and more an imaginative space which guides the collective understanding of what the world is, 
what it can be, and how to get there. The collective imaginary of ICJ frames the project as a 
governance problem of ‘impunity’ defined by an ‘international community’ which is 
committed to the specifically institutionalized and expert-driven form of international criminal 
justice which has emerged over the last seventy years. 
This is an understanding of ICJ to which the Presidents actively contribute. In their 
article, but also throughout the diasporic ICJ community, the ICJ project becomes a ‘way[] 
 
8 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
9 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
10 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. See also D. Guilfoyle, ‘Part I – This is Not Fine: The International Criminal 
Court in Trouble’ (EJIL Talk!, 21 March 2019) https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-the-international-
criminal-court-in-trouble/; T. Reisman, ‘“Complete Structural Change” Needed to Improve ICC Performance: 
Part I of Interview with Phil Clark’ (International Justice Monitor, 27 March 2019) 
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/03/complete-structural-change-needed-to-improve-icc-performance-part-i-of-
interview-with-phil-clark/; M. Kersten, ‘Is the International Criminal Court Still an Aspirational Institution? Can 
it Be?’ (Justice in Conflict, 22 May 2019) https://justiceinconflict.org/2019/05/22/is-the-international-criminal-
court-still-an-aspirational-institution-can-it-be/; K. Ambos, ‘Interests of Justice? The ICC Urgently Needs 
Reform’ (EJIL Talk!, 11 June 2019) https://www.ejiltalk.org/interests-of-justice-the-icc-urgently-needs-reforms/;  
11 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council: ‘Public calls for accountability, with the ICC as its beacon, have enabled 
important innovation, such as the accountability mechanisms for Syria and Myanmar’. 
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people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’.12 Through their professional 
work, such actors help constitute ICJ as ‘an organized field of social practices’ which create 
‘globally defined fields of possibility’.13 Hence the Presidents’ vignettes about Rome, 
desperate victims, and the justice ideal capture a particular way of seeing and therefore doing 
ICJ. Below I piece together the fragments of this ICJ imaginary.14 
The defining image of ICJ as adopted by mainstream commentators is of ICJ as a 
governance problem. The Presidents are ‘driven by a belief in the central role of accountability 
for the most serious crimes of international concern and the conviction that the ICC offers a 
unique opportunity to fill the impunity gap’.15 The impunity which war criminals and others 
enjoy vis-à-vis their actions is the problem. If the ICC was created to end such impunity, then 
time and resources are best spent on improving that court and its tools as means of problem-
solving. Thus, the Presidents offer several examples of how the tools designed in 1998 have 
since become dulled. They are ‘disappointed by the quality of some of [the court’s] judicial 
proceedings’, ‘frustrated by some of the results’, and ‘exasperated by the management 
deficiencies that prevent the Court from living up to its full potential’.16 The suggestion is that 
with careful and precise interventions, these tools can acquire the potency originally intended 
by the drafters of the Rome Statute and allow the problem of impunity to be effectively 
combatted. 
Where does this problem-solving mindset come from? The ex-Presidents allude to a 
small community ‘who were present when the ICC was created’.17 Other similar accounts of 
the project’s origins look to ICJ’s ‘norm entrepreneurs’, or ‘small groups of public interest 
lawyers, jurists, and activists’ who mainstreamed the idea of prosecuting serious human rights 
violations in the 1970s.18 Yet the ICJ project today, according to the Presidents, belongs not 
 
12 C. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Duke UP 2004) 23. 
13 A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (University of Minnesota Press 1996) 
31; they create ‘imagined worlds … constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups 
spread around the globe’ (33); see also B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (Verso 1983). 
14 For other imaginaries of international law, see G. Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations 
and the Making of Modern States (OUP 2017) 10; S. Jasanoff, ‘Subjects of Reason: Goods, Markets and 
Competing Imaginaries of Global Governance’ (2017) 4 London Review of International Law 361. 
15 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
16 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
17 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
18 K. Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (Norton & Co 
2011) 11 and 24.  
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only to this grouping but to the entire ‘international community’. The Presidents reflect that 
‘[w]e’ – meaning themselves but also local, national, and global stakeholders – ‘have all 
committed ourselves to the ICC’.19 Their minds are fixed on the Statute’s preamble: the 
‘international community as a whole’ which constructed the court and the ‘present and future 
generations’ of humanity in whose name the court acts.20 
The Presidents’ collective ‘we’ appears to refer to a self-described and self-constituting 
global community of ICJ advocates, including states, NGOs, practitioners, scholars, the media, 
and the general public.21 However, that community has done more than construct the legal 
infrastructure of the ICJ project, as the Presidents suggest. This self-constituted group has also 
been responsible for imagining ICJ as a governance problem, defining its individualised and 
punitive coordinates, and deploying various legal, policy, and managerial tools to carry the 
project forward. The community has also sustained itself, creating a unique sociological field 
of experts with their own rules of engagement and rites of professional passage.22 ICJ’s 
definition as a problem-solving governance tool thus transpires as a professional sensibility. 
Another, perhaps the golden thread of the Presidents’ article, is a commitment to 
‘legalism’, that is the ‘ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following’ 
as distinct from the political sphere.23 For the Presidents, as for many ICL practitioners and 
scholars, legalism allows them to envisage the ICC as an island of law set in an ocean of 
politics, with the defining struggle of ICJ being to retain the ICC as an apolitical space against 
the potential encroachment of realpolitik. This is often summed up in the preference for ‘law’ 
over ‘war’.24 Within the ICC, many of the court’s present failures are seen as resulting from 
the ‘tension between international justice and politics’.25 For the Presidents, these include lack 
of state cooperation, insufficient funding, anti-multilateralism, and outright ‘contempt or 
hostility’ towards the court.26 The hope, expressed by the Presidents and others, is always that 
 
19 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
20 Preamble, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, entry into force 1 July 2002. 
21 D. Gaonkar, ‘Toward New Imaginaries: An Introduction’ (2002) 14 Public Culture 1, 5; see I. Tallgren, ‘Who 
Are “We” in International Criminal Law? On Critics and Membership’, in C. Schwöbel (ed), Critical Approaches 
to International Criminal Law (Routledge 2014) 71. 
22 M. Jarle Christensen, ‘The Creation of an Ad Hoc Elite: And the Value of International Criminal Law Expertise 
on a Global Market’, in K.J. Heller et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law (OUP 2019) 
(forthcoming). 
23 J. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard UP 1986 [1964]) 1; see S. Benhabib and P. 
Linden-Retek, ‘Judith Shklar’s Critique of Legalism’, in J. Meierhenrich and M. Loughlin (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to the Rule of Law (CUP 2019) (forthcoming).  
24 ICC, ‘Mr Benjamin B. Ferencz visits ICC: “Law, Not War, is Humanity’s Hope”’, press release no. ICC-CPI-
20170515-PR1303, 15 May 2017 https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1303.  
25 L. Carter et al., The International Criminal Court in an Effective Global Justice System (Edward Elgar 2016) 2 
(emphasis omitted). 
26 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
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this tension can be mitigated and ‘impartial, independent and fair justice’ achieved despite the 
‘reality’ of operating in a political world.27 Hence the constant mantra of senior court officials 
that ‘[t]he ICC is a court of law and cannot get involved in politics’.28 This bifurcation of law 
and politics, like the problem-solving mindset, is also part of the professional imagination of 
ICJ. 
Within this legalistic mindset, the Presidents reiterate the specific version of justice 
which characterises contemporary ICJ. Most in the ICJ community agree that despite its 
slipperiness ‘international justice is about accountability for victims in a fair and just process’ 
or, at the very least, the prosecution of grave crimes.29 From here it is a short journey towards 
the belief that international criminal tribunals are the most effective purveyors of justice and 
that the ICC is ‘the central institution in the fight against impunity’.30 Hence, the ICC appears 
as both means and ends in the Presidents’ imaginary. They remind us that the ICC ‘offers a 
unique opportunity to fill the impunity gap’ and that ‘[w]e have never needed the Court more 
than today’.31 For them, it is because ‘[v]ictims around the world, sadly millions of them, look 
to the Court as their best, and often only, hope’ that states parties must ‘fully embrace the 
potential of the ICC’ and strike a ‘new deal’ to rekindle the spirit of Rome.32 In this 
characterization, as much as the ICC might complement a larger system of international justice, 
the court itself remains an indispensable, perhaps the ‘only, hope’.33  
The story of ICJ’s becoming a juridical and institutional enterprise is one that appears 
in the mainstream historical reading of global efforts to end injustice. Although not mentioned 
by the Presidents, most mainstream engagements rely on a series of images, metaphors, and 
ideas to construct a narrative about how we arrived at the ICJ project of today. In a recent and 
similarly public-facing intervention in Foreign Policy, James Goldston reminds us that ‘the 
ICC remains a capstone of our centuries-long search for a world in which the law prevails over 
brute force’.34 Although nascent in past efforts to punish heinous individuals and humanize 
 
27 Carter et al., Effective Global Justice System, 2. 
28 R. Tollo, ‘ReVision Project Aims at a “Coherent” ICC Registry’ (The East African, 6 December 2014) 
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/ReVision-project-aims-at-a--coherent--ICC-Registry-/4552908-
2547086-b3wdo0z/index.html; reiterated by the Deputy Prosecutor in ICC, OTP Statement in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
18 July 2019 https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=190718-otp-statement-bangladesh.  
29 Carter et al., Effective Global Justice System, 333.  
30 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
31 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
32 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
33 Hussein et al., Atlantic Council. 
34 J. Goldston, ‘Don’t Give Up on the ICC’ (Foreign Policy, 8 August 2019) 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/08/dont-give-up-on-the-icc-hague-war-crimes/. Goldston is currently 
Executive Director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, a major human rights and criminal justice NGO. 
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war,35 the ICJ story is said to only properly take off in the trial of the Axis powers at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo. After a dormancy period during the Cold War, ‘a seismic shift in global 
governance’ occurred when the triage of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC were created in the 1990s.36 
Some have characterized this as a tipping point of norms resulting in a ‘justice cascade’, others 
as a more spontaneous ‘global justice revolution’.37 However the story goes, the ICC is usually 
the end point in the journey ‘from politics to law’, and from barbarism to civilization.38  
Of course, for that narrative to retain its rhetorical force, it cannot end, so challenges 
and failures are posited by the ICJ community to sustain the project’s forward motion. At the 
contemporary moment of unease the ICJ community still expects that a ‘finalised and well-
functioning international criminal law system will redeem the project and show it to have been 
directed in the right direction from its inception’.39 Hence the Presidents’ energetic efforts to 
get the ICC back on track through a combination of sober technicality and high optimism. 
Taken collectively, these features – ICJ as a governance problem of ‘impunity’ seized 
by an ‘international community’ committed to legalism and the specific form of international 
criminal justice which has emerged in the last seventy years – form what I call a technocratic 
imaginary. The ICJ project, as presently and historically constituted, manifests as a highly 
engineered project conducted through the ICC institution and its professional ICL experts. The 
substantive coordinates of the project are, as outlined by the Presidents, a juridical, 
individualized, and retributive version of justice. With that definition in hand, the only question 
left is how best to smooth the path, to paraphrase Koskenniemi.40 In a kind of goal-
displacement, the ends fade from view as the ICJ community becomes enmeshed in the 
everyday practicalities of a sophisticated bureaucratic machinery. As a now institutional 
project, ICJ is as much about the allocation and arrangement of institutional resources (legal, 
financial, human, etc.) in the most optimal fashion as the ‘mission’ which forms the end-point 
 
35 The most common references for both being the 1474 trial of Peter von Hagenbach and the 1863 US Lieber 
Code, see T. McCormack, ‘From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee: The Evolution of an International Criminal 
Law Regime’, in T. McCormack and G. Simpson (eds), The Law of War Crimes: National and International 
Approaches (Kluwer Law International 1997) 31, 37 and 42. 
36 P. Akhavan, ‘The Rise, Fall, and Rise of International Criminal Justice’ (2013) 11 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 527, 528. 
37 Akhavan, ‘Rise, Fall, and Rise’, 528. 
38 L. Sadat, ‘The Journey from Politics to Law’, in D. Crane et al. (eds), The Founders: Four Pioneering 
Individuals Who Launched the First Modern-Era International Criminal Tribunals (CUP 2018) 19; Sikkink, 
Justice Cascade, 97. On the continuation of this progress narrative after 1998, see R. Clements, ‘From 
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153. 
39 F. Mégret, ‘The Politics of International Criminal Justice’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 
1261, 1266. 
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of its bureaucratic targets. Similarly, as a professional project, ICJ’s raison d’être is no longer 
visible at the everyday level, so ICJ professionals instead see their roles as efficient ‘cog[s] in 
the regime-machine’ who must carry out their specialized function within the production line 
as efficiently as possible.41 It is this vision of a technocratic imaginary, fleshed out in the 
following chapters, which allows us to make sense of reformist calls like that of the Presidents. 
The anxiety they display arises not only from their characterization of the ICC as a governance 
tool but as the very culmination of the modern and optimal rendering of ICJ.  
Theorising ICJ less as a solution to the impunity problem and more as a collective, 
professional imaginary also allows us to downplay some central features of the Presidents’ 
framework and better account for more peripheral ones. First, placing professional discourses 
at the centre of the enquiry allows us to decentre the state as a wielder of power.42 Looking to 
what Michel Foucault termed ‘governmentality’, we can visualize a more capilliary network 
of power.43 Power does not reside in states or institutions but flows through ‘the complex of 
mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures’ to 
regulate the world.44 Similarly, ‘global governmentality’ notices how spaces ‘above, beyond, 
between and across states’ are constituted and governed through these minute practices.45 
Second, looking to ‘a range of multiform tactics’ rather than the central sites of state 
decision-making allows for a much broader understanding of where power lies and what are 
its effects.46 Rather than locating power in the formal decisions and actions of states and 
 
41 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education’ 
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42 O.J. Sending and I.B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power’ (2006) 
50 International Studies Quarterly 651. 
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institutions, as the Presidents do, power may be understood as emerging in and flowing through 
myriad and minute spaces.47 Power might be visible in a court judgment, but it is equally 
present in the ICC’s outreach activities with victim communities, in scholarly theorisations of 
ICJ, and, as we shall see, in efforts to optimize institutions. As this understanding of power 
suggests, states and institutions are not rulers themselves but are the ‘complex and mobile 
resultant of the discourses and techniques of rule’.48 An institution such as the ICC can thus be 
understood as a web of strategies, calculations, tactics, procedures, and documents converging 
to form what the ICJ community labels ‘the International Criminal Court’. 
Third, the ICC – but also other components of the ICJ project such as ‘core crimes’, 
‘victims’ and ‘the international community’ – emerge through the knowledge which techniques 
of rule produce about them. In the ICJ setting, a scholarly theorization of defence rights or a 
victim application form ‘categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, 
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him … It is a form of power which 
makes individuals subjects’.49 The ‘subjects’ or other actors of ICJ do not come to the project 
fully-formed, but in the process of being studied, recorded, categorized, and evaluated, come 
into being as ‘victims’, ‘defendants’, or indeed ‘ICJ professionals’ ready to be put to the 
project’s ends. The same goes for the institution, which also takes on the character of a modern 
organization with structures, functions, and goals as a result of the practices which produce that 
reality.50 
Fourth, having centred knowledge as a constitutive force, experts and expertise now 
emerge as pivotal to the construction of ‘international criminal justice’ and the world in which 
it is said to reside. As Martti Koskenniemi has said of international law generally, ICJ ‘is what 
international lawyers [and other ICJ actors] do and how they think’.51 Like international law, 
ICJ is ‘a field of people sharing professional tools and expertise, as well as a sensibility, 
viewpoint, and mission’.52 As much as those experts are produced by that field through formal 
training and professional experience, they are also bound up in the reproduction of that field as 
 
47 M. Barnett and R. Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’ (2005) 59 International Organization 39. 
48 Rose and Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the State’, 178. 
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a way of governing situations of mass atrocity. In looking to managerial practices, I widen the 
aperture to analyse non-legal experts and expertise operating within ‘legal’ spaces.53 
This understanding of ICJ as an assemblage or network of power which produces a 
particular reality and set of identities extends our conception of an ICJ imaginary. Thus, the 
technocratic imaginary of ICJ can be said to coalesce around ‘institutions’ and ‘experts’ as 
devices for understanding and managing the world. Those devices emanate from many sites, 
whether diplomatic, institutional, activist, or academic. And they fix patterns of expert 
engagements with and within the project over time. How, then, do managerial devices of 
efficiency implicate that project and affect the technocratic imaginary? 
 
3. Methodology: Practices, archives, documents, and me 
 
 
As the notion of governmentality suggests, the range of sources to which one must look when 
considering managerial practices and the technocratic imaginary go beyond traditional legal 
texts. Asking how governing takes place rather than what government is brings the discussion 
down to a more local level. This allows us to set our methodological sights on ‘mid-range 
concepts … that can be used heuristically to interrogate specific constellations of power’.54 For 
us, those concepts might include ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’, but also ideas of 
‘performance’, ‘strategy’, and ‘oversight’. In some ways, if I focused entirely on such mid-
level concepts, the thesis would take a very similar approach to that adopted by David Kennedy 
in World of Struggle. There, Kennedy opts for ‘midlevel observations’ on the political economy 
of law and expertise as a compromise between ‘bird’s-eye accounts of the structures of the 
world system … and ground-level anthropology of people and things as they move in the 
world’.55 Yet while I am concerned with the turn to efficiency and performance measurement, 
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these concepts are transported within the receptacle of more quotidian and ground-level 
practices of management. It is therefore these practices with which I am principally concerned. 
At this stage, it is worth pausing to consider what practices are. Foucault rarely used 
the term, preferring instead the terms ‘technology of power’56 and ‘technology of the self’57. 
Scholars inspired by Foucault have used terms like ‘governmental technologies’58 or 
‘discursive practices’59. I opt for the term ‘practices’ to avoid the theoretical distinction 
between different kinds of technologies. Practices, to quote Robert Gordon, are simply 
‘techniques and practices for the discipline, surveillance, administration and formation’ of 
subjects – in our case, the ICC institution and the ICC professional staff member.60 In this 
rendition, practices are not to be confused with practices as understood in practice theory. 
Though both governmentality and practice theorists ‘zoom in on the quotidian unfolding of 
international life’, practice theorists are much more concerned with the intentionality and 
degree of agency ascribed to those who perform them.61 I am less concerned with questions of 
intent or agency than with how practices in fact produce those who ostensibly perform them.62 
Appreciating their constitutive power, I thus adopt a definition of practices as technologies of 
knowledge production which govern reality and subjectivity.63  
All this is not to say that law is any less a part of the ICJ story once we turn our gaze to 
practices. Law is plainly ubiquitous throughout the ICJ project. But its significance lies not in 
its capacity to interpret statutory provisions and thereby to determine whether a chamber should 
convict or acquit an accused. Rather, law is itself a practice or technique of rule, deployed as a 
mode of governing reality and subjectivities.64 ‘Law’, explains Anthony Beck, ‘is constantly 
growing as the exercise of power and the accretion of knowledge’.65 The ICC’s core legal texts, 
principally the Rome Statute and the Regulations of Court, are thus important nodes in the 
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63 Rose and Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the State’, 175. 
64 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, 95. 
65 A. Beck, ‘Foucault and Law: The Collapse of Law’s Empire’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 489, 
501. 
25 
 
ICC’s managerial network. So too are the peripheral texts dealing with internal administration 
such as Administrative Instructions and Presidential Directives as the gateways through which 
managerial practices often take effect. The details of the interaction between legal and 
managerial practices will become apparent in the subsequent chapters.  
By far, managerial practices form the majority of the sources relied upon in this thesis. 
These practices include  
 
techniques of notation, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and 
assessment; the invention of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as 
tables; the standardization of systems for training and the inculcation of habits; the 
inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabularies.66  
 
For this study, I focus only on those practices which are most frequently deployed in the ICC, 
namely strategic planning, mission statements, performance indicators, performance appraisal, 
auditing, and restructuring.67 There are also a host of related though less common practices 
such as models, statements, reports, and meetings to which I refer throughout the thesis as 
offshoots of the foundational practices. Similarly, there are closely connected budgetary 
practices such as the court’s annual budget or budget planning tools, but these I consider only 
when they interact with managerial tools. 
I have gone about finding managerial practices – most of which exist in documents and 
reports – in the ICC’s online repositories. They reside either in the ICC Legal Tools online 
database or the records of the Assembly of States Parties, ASP working groups, and other ICC 
bodies, also available online. As described by its creators, the ICC Legal Tools are a database 
of legal decisions and documents as well as policy and administrative reports in ICL, 
humanitarian law and international human rights law. The database is a valuable source of 
information on the everyday life of the ICC and ICJ, having been ‘developed by lawyers with 
expertise in international criminal law and justice’.68 The ASP database is also a useful record 
of institutional developments, particularly those concerning matters of budget, finance, and 
administration.  
As the only publicly available record of ICC and ASP proceedings, these online 
databases represent the ICC’s official archive. A few words are thus warranted on the status of 
 
66 Rose and Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the State’, 183. 
67 See further ch 2.2. 
68 ICC Legal Tools, https://www.legal-tools.org/what-are-the-icc-legal-tools/.  
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this ‘archive’, as well as its functions and limitations. The archive is an important method by 
which ‘the institutional fabric of modern societies captures traces of individuals, organizations, 
and social movements in a variety of complex ways’.69 In the ASP’s online records, one 
witnesses a gradual accumulation of more and more decisions and reports from different parts 
of the ICC as the institution gains maturity. When looking to the ICC’s managerial records 
such as periodic efficiency reports, one sees how some singular efficiency measure took root 
and multiplied into three or four other managerial processes, each captured in their own report 
over subsequent years. The archive thus provides a source of relevant managerial materials 
and, as a chronology, tells a story about how early decisions and priorities paved the way for 
certain data to be captured while leaving other data out of the official record.  
This brings us to the reliability of the archive as a complete record of events. One might 
assess the archive’s value as a source based on the comprehensiveness and accuracy of its 
records. Thus, the fact that the online archives do not contain what we might call the ‘drafting 
history’ of the court’s managerial reports could be a reason for treating such archives with 
caution. It would be helpful to have these documents, if only to give some indication of how 
ideas and solutions may have changed in the process of internal deliberation. For this particular 
archival omission, then, I sought to capture some of the more ‘undocumented’ institutional 
events and dynamics through conversations with current and former ICC staff members. Given 
that management cuts across all professional specialisms within the court, I intentionally spoke 
to lawyers and non-lawyers located throughout the court’s organs. In keeping with my enquiry 
into the phenomenon and effects of managerial practices within the court, these conversations 
were designed to gauge employees’ familiarity with and attitude towards managerial ideals and 
tools, and to understand how those ideals and tools may have shaped the professional self-
understanding. These conversations helped to clarify the extent of managerialisation beyond 
the official archive. 
This is the only way in which I sought to enrich the archival materials, even if some 
gaps remained. For example, the demands of professional confidentiality are such that the court 
does not place individual staff performance results on the public record. Aside from 
confidentiality, though, there is another reason why the incompleteness of the archive should 
not be taken as an indication of unreliability. This is because what officials have chosen to store 
in the archive, as well as what has not been stored, provides an insight into what is deemed 
worthy of storage. In addition to acting as a repository of institutional knowledge, the archive 
 
69 M. Hill, Archival Strategies and Techniques (SAGE Publications 1993) 2. 
27 
 
is – like the managerial documents inside it – a mechanism for producing the structures and 
professionals which it records.70 Hence the importance of seeing ‘gaps’ in the archive as 
institutional, and ultimately, political choices. As an example, hard though one might try, it is 
difficult to find in the court’s many efficiency reports any sense of the potential long-term 
damage that excessive austerity might do to the institution. Appreciating the political 
significance of such knowledge, this could be said to result as much from the desire not to cast 
the court’s existing practices or administrative choices in a negative light as from any 
unintentional failure to record their effects. Moreover, the very fact that the archive is ‘freely 
available in the public commons’ serves to legitimize the court as a transparent institution 
seemingly unafraid of external scrutiny.71 And yet, in the act of recording only the benefits of 
efficiency measures, the openness of the archive is simultaneously an act of revelation and 
occlusion. As a site of politics bound up in the (re)production of the institution, the archive 
deserves to be studied not only for its contents but anthropologically as ‘a floating array of 
forces, texts and things that, individually and collectively, call for interpretation’.72 
Once one has trawled the archives and found examples of managerial tools, the question 
is how those tools are to be treated and observed. As suggested above, managerial practices are 
overwhelmingly represented in a material form, whether as strategic plans, audit reports, or 
appraisal forms. Like other techniques of rule, these documents bring into being that which 
they represent, both in their content and in their material form as pieces of paper.73 Managerial 
documents enforce certain rules of engagement, capture and direct individual activity, and 
establish their own lifecycles.74 I thus adopt Annelise Riles’ definition of managerial 
documents as ‘paradigmatic artifacts of modern knowledge practices’.75 By critiquing these 
artefacts, that is by observing what they take as ICJ’s underlying purposes and capabilities, 
how they direct institutional energies, and who they implicate, we can better appreciate ‘how 
the various facets of international law actually work’.76 The same applies to ICJ, which can be 
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understood just as much through these seemingly peripheral artefacts as through the 
conventional sources of treaties and judgments.  
Building on Riles’ ethnography of documents, I offer an ethnographically-informed 
way of seeing managerial documents within the ICC.77 Seeing ethnographically allows one not 
only to ‘describe what the people in some particular place or status ordinarily do’, but also to 
understand ‘the meanings they ascribe to what they do’, thereby revealing the sentiments on 
which the project relies. This may be straight-forward enough when observing individuals, but 
looking at documents ethnographically requires some additional insights. Despite the ubiquity 
of documents in international law, anthropological and ethnographic studies of the discipline 
often overlook this object.78 The ICC’s managerial documents, like any, demand engagement, 
communication, transportation, verification, filing, and storage by a range of actors within and 
without the institution. Many of the aesthetic features of documents help produce and sustain 
the institution through crests, letterheads, organigrams, tables, flowcharts, boxes, lists, and 
bullet-points.79 Appreciating the material qualities of managerial documents, then, is also a 
way to tease out some of management’s more subtle discursive effects in ways that cannot be 
gauged through textual analysis or interviews. 
It is not enough, however, to analyse these managerial practices and documents in a 
vacuum, however much we might situate those practices in a wider context of meaning. Instead, 
to properly answer the question of how managerial practices take effect within and on ICJ, I 
consider the circumstances of their deployment and navigation at the international level in 
general and at the ICC specifically to understand how managerial practices have ‘come to be 
binding and universally applied at all’.80 This requires a genealogy of management in order to 
‘trace the forces that gave birth to our present-day practices … and identify the historical 
 
77 On an ethnographic ‘way of seeing’, see H. Wolcott, Ethnography: A Way of Seeing (Altamira Press 1999) 66 
and 68. In international law, see especially L. Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of 
International Law and Development (CUP 2015), and the ‘quasi-ethnography’ in F. Johns, Non-Legality in 
International Law: Unruly Law (CUP 2013) 31. 
78 The most notable exceptions include R. Harper, Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology 
and Organisational Action (Routledge 1998); A. Riles, ‘Models and Documents: Artefacts of International Legal 
Knowledge’ (1999) 48 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 805; A. Riles, The Network Inside Out 
(University of Michigan Press 2001); B. Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat (John 
Wiley & Sons 2010); J. Billaud, ‘Keepers of the Truth: Producing “Transparent” Documents for the Universal 
Periodic Review’, in H. Charlesworth and E. Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: 
Rituals and Ritualism (CUP 2015) 63. For a more recent ‘turn’ to artefacts and objects in international law, see 
the London Review of International Law special issue on ‘History, Anthropology and the Archive of International 
Law’ (2017) 5 LRIL 3–196; J. Hohmann and D. Joyce (eds), International Law’s Objects (OUP 2019).  
79 See Riles, Documents, contibutions by Brenneis and Strathern; M. Mathur, Paper Tiger: Law, Bureaucracy and 
the Developmental State in Himalayan India (CUP 2016) ch 4. 
80 R. Geuss, ‘Genealogy as Critique’ (2002) 10 European Journal of Philosophy 209, 212. 
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conditions upon which they still depend’.81 The point is not to discover the origins of 
management in international institutions or to discern how far contemporary officials might 
have strayed from their original intent.82 Rather, and quoting Garland,  
 
[g]enealogical analysis [allows us to] trace[] how contemporary practices and 
institutions emerged out of specific struggles, conflicts, alliances, and exercises of 
power, many of which are nowadays forgotten. It thereby enables the genealogist to 
suggest … by presenting a series of troublesome associations and lineages – that 
institutions and practices we value and take for granted today are actually more 
problematic or more “dangerous” than they otherwise appear.83  
 
Thus, genealogy looks to the past to determine the effects managerial practices have on the 
present. Applied to the ICC, genealogy allows us to see the familiar differently, even 
unrecognizably.84 It prompts us to ask why words such as audit, appraisals, and performance 
outputs have come to fit so seamlessly beside the language of mass atrocity and victim 
protection. Why, at a time when efforts towards ‘global justice’ encompass such a broad range 
of agendas and communities, do so many see the answer to injustice in the restructuring of an 
international criminal tribunal? By doing a double-take on those practices which are so close 
that we have failed to notice them, genealogy helps to make sense of, but also to challenge, the 
accepted parameters and historical unfolding of the contemporary ICJ project.  
Given my aspiration to make that which is familiar to the ICJ community appear 
strange, it is also worth recognizing my own role as a researcher and international (criminal) 
lawyer in mediating the descriptions which emanate from this study.85 For one, in order to 
appreciate management’s effects on ICJ, I ‘take an analytical distance from my own affiliation 
to law’.86 This has already been apparent in the preceding pages. Instead of seeing statutory 
provisions or court decisions, I see legal technologies which govern the world through 
international criminal justice. Instead of seeing the court qua judicial institution with organs 
and bounded spheres of competence, I see it as a constellation of power relations. One must 
 
81 D. Garland, ‘What is a “History of the Present”? On Foucault’s Genealogies and their Critical Preconditions’ 
(2014) 16 Punishment & Society 365, 373; M. Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in P. Rabinow (ed), The 
Foucault Reader (Pantheon Books 1991) 82. 
82 Thus, the genealogical method does not assist the mainstream enquiry into whether managerial practices 
actually make the ICC more efficient and effective – an enquiry which itself ignores the historical context and 
settled ‘givens’ on which the ICC was built. 
83 Garland, ‘History of the Present’, 372. 
84 A. Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’ (2012) 25 LJIL 609, 617–8. 
85 M. Chaim et al., ‘History, Anthropology and the Archive’, 3. 
86 Eslava, Local Space, Global Life, 37. 
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also, however, attempt to take a distance from the very logic of managerialism itself. As legal 
researchers, by the time we come to analyse the court many of us have already adopted the 
notion that for the court to do good it must be efficient. This position I seek to constantly 
challenge throughout the thesis.  
Similarly, as a European-trained international lawyer used to seeing Western experts 
and expertise deployed in international institutions and cited in universities, it would be easy 
to gloss over the particularities contained in expert claims to universality. Hence, I often have 
cause throughout the forthcoming chapters to ask who has advocated managerial practices and 
reforms, who has carried them to fruition, and who/where is left out of the process or 
marginalized in the results.  
One final way to achieve a distance from the subject of enquiry – while accepting the 
impossibility of fully extricating oneself from it – is by considering the institutional setting in 
which I and other ICJ scholars conduct our research. Although this thesis considers a somewhat 
peripheral set of practices within the ICC, this institution is not the first in which researchers 
will have encountered mission statements, rankings, and performance evaluations. The 
university is a typical example of the managerial institution in modern (Western) society. Since 
its reorientation towards national economic growth in the 1980s, universities and academics 
have increasingly come to see their work through the lens of quantifiable outputs and 
‘impact’.87 In the UK, research and more recently teaching is evaluated through ‘excellence 
frameworks’ as the basis for government funding allocations.88 In some ways, my own 
experience in a British higher education institution over the last three years has often provided 
opportunities for observing my own experiences ethnographically when attending compulsory 
workshops on how to create impact as a young scholar.89 As a result of these encounters, this 
thesis is an attempt to come to terms with a trend inside the ICC – and in most international 
law institutions – which already affects the professional and personal lives of many academics. 
It is hoped that the forthcoming chapters will allow international lawyers and scholars to notice 
the patterns which cast across these seemingly isolated institutions.  
 
 
87 K. Lynch, ‘Control by Numbers: New Managerialism and Ranking in Higher Education’ (2015) 56 Critical 
Studies in Education 1, 5. 
88 A. Bradney, ‘The Quality Assurance Agency and the Politics of Audit’ (2001) 28 Journal of Law & Society 
430. 
89 See also the self-reflective mode adopted by Strathern in her enquiry into the audit cultures of the same 
university in which this researcher was based when conducting this research, M. Strathern, ‘Introduction: New 
Accountabilities’, in M. Strathern (ed), Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the 
Academy (Routledge 2003) 3. 
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4. Outline 
 
 
To introduce, apply, and develop the notion of managerial discourse in the ICC context, this 
thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 is devoted to conceptualizing managerial practices. This 
introduction already offers some of the conceptual tools needed to do so, including by outlining 
the notion of ICJ as a technocratic imaginary. I also flesh out which practices will be the focus 
and what features – historical, institutional, epistemic, and material – I will be looking out for 
in the following chapters. Chapter 1 places the forthcoming study in the wider context of 
relevant international law scholarship on technocracy and expertise. While chapter 1 reviews 
the relevant literature, it also assesses some of the assumptions guiding the mainstream view 
of managerial practices. This analysis allows some of the more critical contributions on 
technocracy, namely those of Martti Koskenniemi and David Kennedy, to be used in response 
to the mainstream view while also elaborating on the gaps in that critical literature. 
Chapter 2 proceeds on a genealogical journey through managerial practices which take 
us right up to the pre-ICC international scene. Beginning with Taylor’s methods of scientific 
management at the turn of the 20th century, the chapter latches to these methods and their 
successors as they travel and expand from the steel mills of the American Midwest to the post-
war reconstruction of Europe to, ultimately, the bodies and programmes of the United Nations. 
In this journey, we see less of a natural unfolding and extension of management to new 
frontiers. Instead, managerial practices in the UN setting were applied as a result of sustained 
and often hostile efforts by (primarily) Western states and experts to ‘optimise’ the UN as a 
counter-strategy to Third World calls for democratization. This offers an historically-informed 
understanding of managerial practices as techniques of rule which shape organizational reality. 
Part 2 offers a more detailed enquiry into the effects of managerial practices on the ICC 
organisation and the ICC lawyer. Chapter 3 traces the conditions prompting management’s rise 
within the court and how individual practices peddling the efficiency logic produced a refined 
court in the mode of optimal institution. Chapter 4 follows a similar trajectory albeit at the 
individual level by considering how professional interactions with managerial practices 
construct the ICJ professional as an efficient cog in the machine. Together, both chapters reveal 
the discursive closure which managerial practices enact to reinforce the technocratic 
parameters and aspirations of ICJ. 
Part 3 delves deeper into specific sites and events within the ICC to piece apart the 
dynamics of discursive closure. As a result of the preceding chapters, this final part is able to 
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provide two comprehensive responses as to why and how managerial practices affect (and 
effect) ICJ’s technocratic imaginary. Chapter 5 deals with the court’s smallest organ, the ICC 
Presidency. It demonstrates how the Presidency’s unique location within the court’s managerial 
network has allowed it to extend the managerial apparatus and shape the court and itself in the 
image of the optimal justice mechanism. Chapter 6 considers the largest reform exercise in the 
court’s history, namely the ‘ReVision’ of the Registry. This chapter shows that in its pre-reform 
expert work and in the project’s tools and documents, ReVision positioned managerial reform 
as the exclusive means towards improving ICJ. Both chapters reveal how the ICJ discourse 
becomes closed off through managerial knowledge, preventing other types of knowledge from 
defining the imaginative landscape of ICJ. A brief conclusion draws the findings together. 
 
5. Why it matters 
 
 
Although this thesis will speak to those interested in the historical contingencies and future 
possibilities of ICJ, there are three specific reasons why it matters at this juncture. First, the 
inner workings of the ICC – its structural changes, bureaucratic processes, and professional 
lives – remain largely concealed as objects of enquiry, not to mention legal enquiry. Some 
scholars have already established a critique of the everyday life of international law, but this 
often focuses on the encounter with target populations. Yet the everyday of ICJ, as well as 
being experienced by victim communities and defendants, is also experienced and regulated 
within and through judicial institutions. ‘Administrative procedures, subject formations, spaces 
and artefacts that are usually identified as expressions of other normative orders, social spheres 
or simply innocuous technical or commercial things, are the very material sites in which 
international disciplines are at work’.90 Failing to look at what is right in front of us as 
practicing or academic lawyers, overlooks a vast network of activity, subjects, and meanings 
which are ubiquitous throughout the ICC, and which shape what it means to do international 
criminal justice.  
Why might it matter if managerial practices reinforce a technocratic version of ICJ as 
led by criminal law institutions and professional experts? Surely if that version works, then it 
should be supported rather than critiqued? Indeed, despite their anxieties, the underlying 
 
90 Eslava and Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform’, 109. 
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message of the ASP Presidents is that for the most part the ICC functions well. Yet this 
assumption is premised on broad agreement as to the aims of the ICC and the ICJ project. For 
all the certainty they project onto the project, the Presidents fail to recognize the paradoxes at 
the heart of ICJ. It has been a near constant refrain of scholars since the 1990s that the 
fundamental goals of ICJ are at odds with one another.91 Is ICJ simply about punishing 
wrongdoing, or also about deterring future atrocities? Is it a forum for giving the voiceless a 
voice, or a means towards an historical record of events? What is clear is that it cannot be all 
things to all peoples, as a punitive court, didactic tool, participatory forum, and historical 
archive all prioritise different actors, activities, and resources in their respective quests. 
At a more structural level, Darryl Robinson poses the internal contradictions within ICL 
which have caused this ‘liberal system of criminal justice … to embrace such illiberal 
doctrines’ as joint criminal enterprise.92 Robinson attributes this paradox to the influence of 
humanitarian and human rights law principles such as teleological reasoning and utopian 
aspirations which operate ‘at cross-purposes to fundamental criminal principles’.93 These are 
contradictions which the ex-Presidents ignore (and entrench) in discussing ‘human dignity’ and 
‘sustainable peace’ in the context of an international criminal tribunal. The issue that arises 
from these contradictions, then, is whether a turn to managerial practices and efficiency can 
adequately address these more structural problems, or only entrench them. 
On a similar albeit more fundamental note, one is prompted to ask whether technocratic 
ICJ – however defined and whatever its goals – is desirable at all. This taps into a critical 
literature on ICJ which queries the structural arrangements of the entire project and its own 
potential complicity in ‘injustice, conflict, exclusions and selective responsibility’.94 In contrast 
to the largely celebratory – if momentarily uneasy – reading of ICJ offered by the ex-Presidents, 
a different reality can and has been posited with the result that technocratic ICJ looks far less 
appealing. From this angle, the ‘success’ of the ICC has been to investigate atrocities mostly 
located on the African continent, and to prosecute and convict only Africans.95 It has been to 
construct a legal architecture which focuses the institutional gaze on the kind of direct, 
physical, and immediate violence experienced predominantly in the Global South while 
 
91 See M. Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
329, 331–2. 
92 D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’ (2008) 21 LJIL 925, 927. Similarly, see M. 
Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1. 
93 Robinson, ‘Identity Crisis’, 929. 
94 C. Schwöbel, ‘Introduction’, in Schwöbel, Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law, 1. 
95 T. Krever, ‘Africa in the Dock: On ICC Bias’ (Critical Legal Thinking, 30 October 2016) 
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/10/30/africa-in-the-dock-icc-bias/.  
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ignoring the structural and economic violence often meted out by the West, and the historical 
violence of imperialism and colonialism which are the root causes of many political conflicts 
in the Global South today.96 Similarly, this reality points to how the ICC has installed a class 
of predominantly Western-trained lawyers in the ‘professional centre[s]’ of international law 
with the role of ‘administering justice to the periphery’.97  
What results from this interpretation is technocratic ICJ as a woefully inadequate way 
of imagining justice; in addressing simple binaries of guilt and innocence, it occludes the many 
problems and ideals that foment violence in the first place and contributes indirectly to 
conditions of oppression and misery experienced by much of the global population. On this 
reading, anything that strengthens the technocratic project of ICJ is a move towards more bias, 
exclusion, and violence, and thus a step in the wrong direction. If managerial practices 
reproduce an undesirable status quo, then one must care when so many institutional and 
intellectual energies are directed towards advocating, applying, and improving them. One 
might also care that such practices obscure potential alternative imaginaries of justice-seeking 
which exist beyond the confines of the bureaucratic tribunal and the minds of its legal experts. 
What these chapters do, individually and collectively, is build up a theme through 
repetition. Though often approaching the same materials in different chapters, by doing so from 
different institutional standpoints, I hope to build up a picture of something which deserves 
much greater scholarly attention than has been given it thus far, and to make both practicing 
and academic international lawyers within the ICJ community and beyond look upon these 
strange but ever-present practices always with an eye on the grand narrative of justice within 
which such practices operate. 
  
 
96 A. Anghie and B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law 77, 88. 
97 J. Reynolds and S. Xavier, ‘“The Dark Corners of the World”: TWAIL and International Criminal Justice’ 
(2016) 14 JICJ 959, 965. 
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1 Mainstream and Critical 
Managerialism in International Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In this first chapter I situate the thesis within international law scholarship on managerialism 
and technocracy. The term ‘managerialism’ has been used to describe an array of legal and 
sociological tools and developments in international law, including a flexible model for 
enhancing rule compliance,98 a style of judicial activism,99 a concern with the effectiveness of 
law and its susceptibility to (judicial) reform,100 and a tool for minimising jurisdictional overlap 
between international courts101. For others, managerialism is a term which seems able to 
capture everything that is wrong with contemporary international law, from mainstream 
lawyers’ ‘unreflective pragmatism’102 to the global rule of experts103 to international law’s 
 
98 A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Harvard UP 1995) 3.  
99 J. Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374, 376. 
100 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (OUP 2011 [1933]) 354. 
101 L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Plurality in the Fabric of International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a 
Managerial Approach’ (2017) 28 EJIL 13. 
102 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 2005, 
reissued) xiv. 
103 D. Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy (Princeton 
UP 2016). 
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complicity in the miserable condition of much of the global population104. Without attempting 
to map and understand all utterances of the word, I seek to make sense of some of these 
definitions in order to illuminate the present study of managerialism as the efficiency discourse 
of managerial practices. 
 To make the extant literature relevant for this thesis, I structure this chapter around the 
mainstream view of managerial practices as adopted by the international criminal justice (ICJ) 
community. Only a handful of scholars have written about managerial practices at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Yet their views should not be treated as a minority position 
but as an articulation of the conscious or unconscious views of many working in and on the 
ICC. The mainstream understanding of managerial practices offered here is a definition 
produced and refined through numerous conversations with current and former ICC officials 
and scholars in The Hague and elsewhere. In teasing out some assumptions inherent in the 
mainstream definition, I open it up to evaluation and contrast through some of the more 
critically-oriented international law literature on technocracy. Thus, each of the four 
assumptions I identify in the mainstream approach – assumptions as to management’s 
effectiveness, objectivity, functionalism, and ahistoricity – are assessed through the critical 
writings of Martti Koskenniemi and David Kennedy, among others. Through this dialogic 
engagement with the literature, I arrive at what management is not, and how the thesis is 
situated within international law (and by extension ICJ) scholarship on expertise. 
 Two clarifications are warranted here. First, because of the frequency with which the 
term ‘managerialism’ is used, and because of my own distinct conceptualisation, I use the label 
‘technocracy’ throughout to distinguish extant definitions from my own. This does not pose 
any problems given scholars like Koskenniemi and Kennedy have always used the terms 
managerialism, technocracy, and expert rule synonymously in their writings on international 
law and global governance.105 Second, it is worth asking what the writings of some critical 
international lawyers have to contribute to the study of practices deriving from another 
discipline with which they have never overtly engaged. On one hand, some might rationalise 
that management has a different form, logic, and purpose to law, so it would be incongruous to 
assess it from the standpoint of law, however critical. On the other hand, it would be easy to 
use critical international law scholarship to analyse management if one removes all distinctions 
 
104 See C. Miéville, ‘The Commodity-Form Theory of International Law: An Introduction’ (2004) 17 LJIL 271, 
302, for whom ‘[t]he chaotic and bloody world around us is the rule of law’ (emphasis in original). 
105 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern 
Law Review 1, 29; D. Kennedy, ‘Introducing A World of Struggle’ (2016) 4 LRIL 443, 443. 
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between law and management: both are forms of expert knowledge which seek to regulate the 
world in their own image. Between these two stances – the impossibility of cross-disciplinary 
critique and the colonisation of one discipline by another106 – lies a posture of critical 
adaptation in which many insights from international law can be used to illuminate the 
phenomenon of management on the international plane, and vice versa. 
 The following review shows that while mainstream scholars have grappled with the 
specificities and challenges wrought by managerial practices within ICJ, their empirical 
insights have not been matched by a convincing account of management’s epistemological, 
sociological, or historical underpinnings. Conversely, ‘crits’ and others have largely ignored 
managerial practices in their writings albeit to the benefit of a grounded sociology and history 
of global governance which is more theoretically illuminating in the long run than mainstream 
accounts. Nevertheless, critical international law scholarship leaves some crucial gaps 
precisely because it does not seek to bring management expertise into the broader conversation 
on international legal managerialism. To begin the review, I sketch the main contours of 
managerial practices as seen by the ICJ community. 
 
1. Management in the mainstream 
 
 
In the mainstream reading, managerial practices are objective tools which enhance 
organisational efficiency. This definition is loaded with several assumptions which I 
problematise below, using a recent scholarly intervention on the topic for illustrative purposes. 
In his recent article in the International Criminal Law Review, Philipp Ambach considers the 
managerial practice of performance indicators, analysing the exercise which led to their 
adoption at the ICC, and evaluating their capacity to increase institutional legitimacy ‘through 
enhanced transparency and accountability’.107 Ambach, who has served in a range of senior 
positions at the ICC, played a pivotal role in implementing managerial practices within the 
institution. I isolate his specific contribution because it offers a comprehensive picture of all 
 
106 See the debate on interdisciplinarity between international law and international relations, J. Klabbers, ‘The 
Relative Autonomy of International Law or The Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity’ (2004-05) 1 Journal of 
International Law & International Relations 35; N. Rajkovic, ‘The Space Between Us: Law, Teleology and the 
New Orientalism of Counterdisciplinarity’, in W. Werner et al. (eds), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading 
Martti Koskenniemi (CUP 2017) 167. 
107 P. Ambach, ‘Performance Indicators for International(ised) Criminal Courts – Potential for Increase of an 
Institution’s Legacy or “Just” a Means of Budgetary Control?’ (2018) 18 ICLR 426, 426. 
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managerial tools in addition to performance indicators as viewed from a mainstream 
perspective.  
 As Ambach recounts, performance indicators were only systematically implemented 
throughout the court in 2015. By then, court officials and bodies such as the Committee on 
Budget and Finance (CBF) ‘accepted that the current system [did] not provide a clear picture 
of the Court’s performance over time in key areas’.108 Consequently, and under instruction 
from the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), the court devised qualitative and quantitative 
indicators to measure court performance on topics including the expeditiousness and fairness 
of proceedings, victims’ access to court, and effective court management.109 Given the need to 
build up an accurate picture of performance over time, indicators would institute a process of 
collecting ever more refined data, which would be used to fashion additional and more accurate 
indicators. ‘[W]ith a few technical adjustments’, indicators would allow the court to detect 
long-term performance trends and specific areas in need of improvement to enhance the court’s 
effectiveness and legitimacy.110 
 Ambach’s intervention is a classic exposition of managerial practices as objective 
optimising tools. He defines indicators as ‘a measurable value that demonstrates how 
effectively a company is achieving key business objectives’.111 The purpose of indicators is not 
just to benchmark performance and enhance efficiency, but to increase institutional legitimacy. 
Thus, indicators have been applied across all types of private, public, and international 
organisations to help achieve their diverse aims. In the context of an international criminal 
tribunal, Ambach’s concern is how to assess the quality of indicators, and how to balance 
demands for efficiency against the ‘cornerstone’ principles of judicial independence and a fair 
trial.112 After taking stock of the ICC’s current set of indicators, Ambach observes that ‘[i]t is 
undisputed that in order to measure the performance of an institution, robust and well-defined 
indicators provide an essential tool for an objective and fact-based evaluation’.113 Indicators 
‘do not only follow the ideal of steady improvement and innovation’, but also allow the court 
to ‘make the business case in a strategic dialogue with external actors that international justice 
is a good investment area’.114 
 
108 ICC, Report of the Court on the Development of Performance Indicators for the International Criminal Court, 
12 November 2015, para. 2.  
109 ICC, First Indicators Report, para. 7.  
110 ICC, Third Court’s Report on the Development of Performance Indicators for the International Criminal Court, 
15 November 2017, para. 2. 
111 Ambach, ‘Performance Indicators’, 427. 
112 Ambach, ‘Performance Indicators’, 428. 
113 Ambach, ‘Performance Indicators’, 457. 
114 Ambach, ‘Performance Indicators’, 458. 
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 This intervention by a senior ICC official offers a valuable description of the 
background and operation of indicators within the court. It also displays at least four 
assumptions about indictors, and managerial practices in general. First is the assumption – more 
an empirical claim – that managerial tools actually work. For example, indicators measure the 
expeditiousness and fairness of proceedings by collecting data on the duration of each phase; 
number of party motions, court orders, and decisions; and volume of evidence admitted.115 
They are said to work because they focus attention on the most important components of 
judicial expediency and allow more resources to be put into those components to improve 
expediency over time. Other practices are said to be effective in different ways: mission 
statements create a common institutional purpose while performance appraisal systems 
evaluate staff performance. In discharging these immediate goals, managerial practices 
ostensibly enhance organisational efficiency and effectiveness. 
 Ambach’s second assumption is that managerial practices operate like scientific 
instruments to neutralise the dysfunctional part of an organisation. They rectify the 
administrative apparatus and do not impact on the court’s core legal activities. Ambach 
showcases the objective quality of indicators by looking at the circumstances in which they are 
devised. According to him, the ICC’s performance indicators were implemented ‘[w]ith the 
expert advice of an external consultant (Open Society Justice Initiative)’ and with the input of 
internal and external stakeholders.116 The independence of these participants ensured that 
indicators were free from bias. Another way in which indicators remain objective is by making 
them ‘qualitatively meaningful’.117 By this, Ambach means that indicators which suffer from 
a lack of data, resources, or sufficient contextual framing are likely to offer a distorted view of 
court performance. To mitigate the risk of distortion, indicators must benefit from 
comprehensive, reliable, and up-to-date data. The assumption, however, is that only external 
factors – biased experts or unreliable data – could undermine the objectivity of the indicator, 
rather than anything inherent in the indicator itself.  
 Thirdly, Ambach adopts a positivist understanding of how managerial practices 
function when applied. To discern how indicators operate one must observe their results 
empirically. Only by observing and verifying these results can one arrive at a valid conclusion 
as to the effects (or lack thereof) of indicators. The assumption here is that effects which cannot 
 
115 ICC, Second Court’s Report on the Development of Performance Indicators for the International Criminal 
Court, 11 November 2016, para. 39. 
116 Ambach, ‘Performance Indicators’, 433. 
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be verified or attributed directly to indicators, are invalid, or at least not as reliable or valuable 
as empirical findings.   
Lastly, the mainstream approach to managerial practices relies on a particular 
conception of history. On the one hand, Ambach points to the corporate origins of performance 
indicators before tracing their gradual move from private business to national public sectors 
and finally to international criminal tribunals.118 Scholars are thus broadly aware of the 
historical context in which indicators and similar practices emerged.119 On the other hand, the 
historical conditions in which managerial practices emerged are said to have no bearing on the 
effects of such practices in contemporary settings. This draws on the positivist notion that facts 
can be detached from their sociological context. From this simultaneous acceptance and 
rejection of history, mainstream scholars are able to mark indicators as generalisable practices 
which have been successfully applied in a number of settings while also posing the irrelevance 
of management’s historical development to its modern-day effects.  
 Armed with these assumptions, Ambach and others offer a reading of managerial 
practices as objective tools whose optimising effects within organisations like the ICC can be 
empirically verified and decontextualized. In the following section, I explore these claims, 
relying in particular on the critical contributions of international law scholars Martti 
Koskenniemi and David Kennedy. 
 
2. Challenging assumptions 
 
 
More than once, Martti Koskenniemi has recalled that ‘the effort to reimagine international law 
in purely managerial terms appears intellectually shallow and politically objectionable’.120 By 
managerialism, Koskenniemi means the very ‘fate of public international law’ as an instrument 
applied by experts within the governance regimes of ‘trade’, human rights’, ‘international 
justice’, and so on.121 This is objectionable to Koskenniemi because those regimes all already 
 
118 Ambach, ‘Performance Indicators’, 427–9. For more critical reflection on indicators’ origins, see B. Kotecha, 
‘The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Limits of Performance Indicators’ (2018) 15 JICJ 544. 
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have their own policy goals – ‘free trade’, ‘ending impunity’, etc. – which international lawyers 
can only hope to realise more efficiently, rather than challenge at a structural level.  
Despite this prescient analysis, on which more below, the managerialism of which 
Koskenniemi speaks is of a different flavour to the managerialism with which I am concerned. 
Neither Koskenniemi nor Kennedy have considered the mechanics of management tools in the 
way Ambach has. Yet their legal contributions to what I hereinafter refer to as technocracy are 
highly apposite when considering managerial practices. For one, these critical scholars have 
been at the forefront of efforts to challenge the objectivity of international law, its positivist 
tools, and the story of its linear progression. These insights can equally be applied to managerial 
expertise. In doing so, this section offers a more nuanced theoretical scaffolding on which to 
build a concept of managerial expertise than that posited by Ambach and others. I begin with 
the first mainstream assumption that managerial practices work. 
 
2.1. The claim to effectiveness 
 
 
Determining whether managerial practices work or not depends on the available evidence. As 
it turns out, this evidence appears not to support a finding of management’s effectiveness either 
way. To empirically analyse the effectiveness of managerial practices, the court needs a 
conceptual model through which data can be fed and the isolated effects of these practices 
determined against otherwise fixed variables.122 However, there is an inherent limitation in any 
attempt to capture, whether qualitatively or quantitatively, the complete ‘reality’ of 
management’s impact.  
 First, many data cannot be captured empirically. Data on historical or structural 
injustice, or on psycho-social suffering cannot be represented in measurable forms, and yet 
their importance is not disputed by ICL practitioners.123 Second, for those data that can be 
captured, court officials have recalled the difficulty of collecting sufficient and reliable data. 
At one level, it is difficult to measure success when the court itself has multiple and often 
conflicting goals. Yet even focusing all institutional energies on one goal – prosecution of 
international crimes – does not solve the problem. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor is itself 
 
122 The ICC has instituted such a methodology in its court capacity model, see ICC, Report on the Court Capacity 
Model, ICC-ASP/5/10, 21 August 2006, para. 13.  
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unclear as to the scope and rank of various prosecutorial sub-goals: ‘[t]o evaluate the (cost-
)effectiveness of the Office requires first determining what outcome the Office is supposed to 
produce: prevention of crimes, complementarity achieved, justice (seen to be) done, etc.’.124 
Selecting one of these sub-goals, for example prevention of future atrocities, quickly exposes 
a problem of unverifiability all the way down the court’s activities. As was laid bare in the 
court’s activities in relation to Colombia, it is difficult to isolate and measure the precise 
contribution of the ICC towards the prevention of future hypothetical atrocities, especially 
when no OTP investigation was ever opened into the situation, and when the OTP’s activities 
were conducted alongside a range of other peace-building measures.125  
 Accordingly, to attempt to isolate management’s contribution to organisational 
performance may be to decontextualize it so thoroughly that it loses its explanatory force. The 
OTP has grappled with the toss-up between accurate isolation and reliability in context: ‘one 
needs to determine how to measure the impact of the Office on the outcome which comes with 
challenges of isolating its impact from that of many other actors and factors and with the 
challenge of organizing a reliable measurement’.126 Using indicators and assessing their 
specific effects within the ICC may also be hindered by ‘the relatively limited number and 
great diversity of its cases as well as the different underlying contexts and country situations 
that the Court … may need to address’.127 Together these empirical obstacles make it difficult 
to evaluate management’s effectiveness: at best they are a proxy for court success; at worst, 
they offer a distorted picture based on statistically insignificant data. 
 Third, and barring these general obstacles, management in the ICC context harbours 
another empirical challenge, namely the frequency and volume of managerial reform. Court 
officials note that since efficiency is ‘an ongoing process’ it is difficult to take a snapshot of 
their effects in isolation.128 The volume of managerial practices introduced within the ICC over 
its first two decades attests to the never-ending character of reform. Yet this has meant that 
critical evaluation is routinely deferred. The narrow timeframe within which managerial 
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practices are proposed, introduced, implemented, and subsequently altered or discarded, 
militates against genuine evaluation. By the time the court has collected all reliable data, 
managerial bodies have already moved on, rendering the conclusions the court makes obsolete. 
The CBF has a penchant for such breathless reform, often advocating reform at one stage, then 
further information and refinement at the next, even while the original reform is still being 
implemented. Such hastiness offers little hope of measuring the effectiveness of managerial 
practices and suggests an institutional indifference as to their success. 
 As a last resort, the court has often affirmed management’s effectiveness by assertion. 
Thus, the OTP has claimed that ‘[t]he introduction of a revised strategic planning process, of a 
systematic lessons learned process as well as the review of the investigative and prosecutorial 
strategies and standards have and will further improve the performance of the Office’.129 Yet 
the various empirical obstacles which militate against the claim to effectiveness leave such 
assertions as these and Ambach’s to ring hollow. 
 
2.2. The claim to objectivity 
 
 
Mainstream scholars like Ambach proceed on the basis that management has no inherent 
normative posture which might tilt it towards one set of outcomes over another. Managerial 
tools are merely a neutral means by which organisational performance may be enhanced. Yet 
this claim to objectivity is barely upheld by institutions themselves. The court has often alluded 
to the potential for administrative actions to interfere with the judicial function. In 2010, the 
court stated that 
 
[t]he competence of the Registry, the Office of the Prosecutor or Presidency for 
administrative matters may overlap with the competence of a Chamber in so far as an 
issue concerns the judicial functions of the Court. While the organs may take action 
within their respective competences, they must also comply with the Court’s judicial 
decisions.130 
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The same potential for overlap between administrative and core mandate is visible in the 
Presidency’s functions: 
 
As the members of the Presidency are also judges, care must be taken to ensure that 
they are able to exercise their responsibility for overseeing all of the Registry’s 
activities, even those related to Court proceedings, without prejudging specific issues 
which may be brought before them in their judicial capacity.131 
 
As for the impact of managerial tools, another international(ised) court has already exposed 
the serious policy consequences which such tools can have on the court’s work. In June 2017, 
the Co-Investigating Judges of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
requested submissions from the parties on a possible stay of proceedings arising from 
budgetary underfunding. Having implemented ‘results-based budgeting’ to scrutinise court 
spending, the ECCC was confronted with a financial shortfall. The judges found the 
‘application of RBB [results-based budgeting] or “milestones” as a measure of success and/or 
progress to judicial decision-making processes incompatible with judicial independence’.132 
The judges also reflected that the ICC’s more recent uptake of managerial tools ‘are a telling 
example of the difficulties a court faces when trying to reconcile managerialist demands around 
effectiveness and efficiency from the donor community with those arising out of fair trial 
principles’.133 The judges conclude with the warning that ‘applying managerial criteria to the 
core judicial activity is either bound to end as an exercise in futility or risks making dangerous 
inroads to the judicial self-perception’.134 This example reveals that managerial practices may 
carry within them a capacity to alter how institutional actors discharge core activities, if not 
their broader understanding of the role of an international judge. 
 Building on this practical example, the claim of objectivity on which mainstream 
scholars rely has already been unmasked by critical theorists, first in the social sciences and 
subsequently in law. In international law, this has been occurring at least since the 1970s. The 
critical interventions of Roberto Unger, and later Kennedy and Koskenniemi, have exposed the 
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inherently political nature of international law.135 The most relevant of these interventions are 
Koskenniemi’s notion of structural bias and Kennedy’s concept of background norms.  
 Beginning in his seminal work, From Apology to Utopia, Martti Koskenniemi disrupted 
law’s claim to objectivity by positing its structural indeterminacy within otherwise formally 
determinate conditions.136 More recently, though, and in a foil to his original indeterminacy 
thesis, Koskenniemi articulated a ‘structural bias’ which permeates international law’s 
functional regimes, and which ascribes them a set of policy goals.137 While appearing to 
provide a platform for debating openly between competing interests, each regime tilts in favour 
of a certain set of priorities while downplaying or excluding others. In the human rights regime, 
political and civil rights prevail over social, economic, and cultural rights; in the international 
criminal justice regime, individual responsibility for direct, physical violence prevails over 
corporate responsibility and historic or ‘slow’ violence.138 Thus, the structural configuration of 
the regime conditions its legal practices. 
 The idea of structural bias is helpful in challenging management’s objectivity as posited 
by Ambach. Like law, managerial practices are implemented across the diverse regimes of 
global governance. They are also often used to achieve whatever priorities those regimes have 
in mind. Like law, then, management’s objectivity relies on the obfuscation of certain 
underlying policy goals. Audit and auditors may not affect the ICC’s selection of cases or 
judicial decisions, but by making the court appear financially accountable, they entrench the 
court’s capacity to carry out particular policy objectives at the expense of others and boost the 
court’s reputation among states parties. By exposing a structural bias, Koskenniemi allows us 
to challenge the objectivity of managerial practices within specialised regimes. 
 Yet just as Koskenniemi’s indeterminacy thesis has been criticised for its failure to 
account for how arguments are historically produced,139 his structural bias thesis swings the 
pendulum too far in the opposite direction. If managerial practices are deposited into 
structurally biased frameworks, then are they not entirely determined by the prior shape of that 
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framework? If so, then what do managerial practices add to the hegemonic tilt of the regime? 
In fact, Koskenniemi’s structuralist tendencies mean that he downplays the additional 
contribution of different expert vocabularies within the same regime. Given that such regimes 
are, as Koskenniemi depicts, ‘knowledge systems’, the prospect of distinct knowledge practices 
altering the existing regime to create a different, even narrower, version of the regime should 
be countenanced.140 
 In contrast to Koskenniemi’s macro-analysis of hegemonic governance regimes, 
Kennedy’s rebuttal of objectivity is grounded more in the performances of professional experts. 
As such, Kennedy offers a different set of tools for tracing the twists and turns of expertise in 
global governance. For Kennedy, no less than Koskenniemi, international law – or global 
governance as he prefers to call it – is an expert discipline. Yet rather than positing a structural 
bias as the reason for law’s politics, Kennedy identifies the expert as crystallising so-called 
‘background norms’ against which decisions are made in the foreground.141 
 Applying that analysis to international criminal justice, for example, one might identify 
individual criminal responsibility, the scope of ‘core’ crimes, and the 
consequentialist/deontological functions of criminal trials all as norms which are upheld and 
on which basis decisions as to investigations, charges, and sentencing are made. In this reading, 
experts perform the crucial role of solidifying these norms, thereby narrowing the space for 
contesting such decisions in anything other than technical, legal terms.142 In ICL, one can look 
to the practical and scholarly focus on, and policing of, the parameters of criminal liability or 
fair trial rights, which accept and solidify the need to deal with perpetrators through criminal 
adjudication in the first place. 
 For Kennedy, as for Koskenniemi, solidifying the background would not be an issue 
were it universally accepted. But it is not; the ‘demands’ of the free market have never been 
fully accepted as fact despite the best efforts of international financial institutions. Likewise, 
many of those affected by mass atrocities dispute criminal trials as the best response, offering 
alternative conceptions of justice instead.143 But because of the juridification of such areas, the 
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possibility to challenge givens and pose alternatives is reduced. Arriving at the negotiating 
table, previously marginalised actors find that the political challenge they hoped to mount has 
been made impossible by the slicing up of political issues and their repackaging into technical 
‘problems’, each having their own menu of available solutions.144 Actors can only partake in 
the bureaucratic tweaking of a pre-arranged system – streamlining a process here, making 
decisions more transparent there – as invoked by Ambach. From all this, it emerges that if one 
can call such examples of fine-tuning ‘objective’, then this denies the penumbra of political 
choices which have already taken effect and which tweaking exercises do nothing to challenge. 
 Kennedy’s account of the politics of expertise is valuable when critiquing managerial 
knowledge. The dynamics of a reified background, managerial expertise, and the channelling 
of debate into technical issues is prescient in the context of ICC reform. When advocating 
efficiency measures, states and internal experts like Ambach take the court’s jurisdictional 
limits, whether substantive, temporal, or geographic, as fact. The possibility that the court’s 
problems might lie in those very structural arrangements, rather than in sub-optimal 
performance, is not considered. Ambach and others thereby proceed to entrench a given 
‘politics’ by expressing it in technical terms while foreclosing the opportunity of mounting a 
political challenge to what are now bureaucratic issues. This insight, made possible by 
Kennedy’s analysis, allows us to appreciate the politics of any register, legal or managerial, in 
the ICJ regime. It refutes the claim to objectivity on which the ICJ community relies when 
conceptualising managerial practices.  
 
2.3. What actually happens?: The positivist claim 
  
 
As noted above, proponents of management tend to eschew the question of how its tools 
operate. Instead, they look to verifiable outputs as compared against inputs to make various 
deductions. Applied to the ICC, the argument is that if the court is inefficient and under-
performing and if managerial practices improve efficiency and performance, then once those 
practices are implemented the organisation will perform more efficiently. This simple problem-
solution logic permeates the mainstream, Ambach-style approach to management.145 
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 However, this assumption fails to account for the fact that the scientific nature of the 
process – its controlled conditions, variables, and observable results – is itself socially 
constructed. The idea that only empirically verifiable outputs are all that matter when assessing 
management’s organisational consequences derives from the application of a positivist model 
which cannot account for untraceable and immeasurable effects. It also denies the fact that the 
‘variables’ which are applied, including human resources, are not fixed values but are altered 
by the very process of measurement itself. The ICC has accepted this possibility, even 
implicitly, when considering the effects of the mission or mission statement. The mission is 
designed to shape professional beliefs and create a unified internal culture. In this sense, its 
effects are both unquantifiable and constitutive of the court’s professional staff.  
 The paucity of mainstream sociology on management contrasts with the rich, critical 
account of how expertise works. Indeed, both Koskenniemi and Kennedy construct their own 
sociological ‘theories’, such as they are, around the expert’s power to describe the reality in 
which decisions are made. For Koskenniemi, as we have seen, international lawyers as experts 
are housed within specialised regimes, each of which operates like an island on the international 
plane to further its own policy goals. How those regimes operate and interact depends on the 
articulation of expert vocabularies like Ambach’s to optimise and extend the regime.146  
 In Koskenniemi’s world, the lawyer’s fidelity to legal rules is transcended by their 
commitment to policy objectives. For him, the modern international lawyer has set down the 
language of rules, government, responsibility, disputes, and above all lawfulness, picking up 
instead the fuzzy language of regulations, governance, compliance, management problems, and 
legitimacy.147 Lawyers operate, according to Koskenniemi, by ‘look[ing] behind rules and 
institutions’ to ‘assess costs and benefits. Streamline, balance, optimize, calculate’.148 Ambach 
comes to mind. Becoming ‘context-sensitive, short-term, market-oriented and ad hoc’,149 his 
knowledge tools do not only solve a problem but impose an ‘empirical political science, 
thoroughly instrumental and committed, as a world tribunal assisting whoever is in charge’150. 
The lawyer becomes a ‘cog in the regime-machine’,151 deploying their expertise to secure 
concrete results which can ‘smooth the prince’s path’152. Not just professional lawyers but 
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scholars, too, have put their theories to work in order to enhance the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of regimes and institutions.153 This is how expertise works. 
 While Koskenniemi does much to populate the sociological wasteland left by 
mainstream accounts of expertise, he nonetheless seems ‘ill-inclined to map this managerialist 
expanse except in the broadest of strokes’.154 Thinking about the lawyer’s toolkit, Fleur Johns 
already notes how, in From Apology to Utopia, Koskenniemi overlooked the ‘techniques of 
calibration and prediction on which international lawyers (alongside others) have come to 
rely’.155 We might count management among these. Moreover, Johns regrets Koskenniemi’s 
failure to trace the ‘patterns of mutual invocation, cross-reference and dependence between the 
“boxes” he ascribes to the managerialist imagination’, that is the inter-regime fertilisation of 
knowledge.156 Although Koskenniemi eagerly charts the hegemonic struggles between regimes 
and some of the techniques deployed in those skirmishes, the regime boxes he imagines give 
little insight into how they change or become settled. Nor does he consider how, in borrowing 
from one another, such regimes embed their own particular discourses. Admittedly, 
Koskenniemi does cite the growing use of ‘treaty bodies, committees [and] compliance groups’ 
to ‘guarantee the optimal realisation of the [regime’s] purpose in practice’.157 But this reveals 
the crossover only of legal practices. 
 Relatedly, Koskenniemi’s sketch of regime struggle reveals the hegemonic uses of legal 
knowledge. Yet the notion that regimes want their vocabulary to become the authoritative 
language for solving global problems portends to a somewhat unidirectional (and inevitable) 
expansion of regimes as their defining functional logic. The examples Koskenniemi provides 
of the MOX Plant case at the European Court of Justice or the tussle over effective and overall 
control between the International Court of Justice and the Yugoslavia Tribunal suggest that 
regimes will only ever want to expand.158 ‘This is managerialism’, asserts Koskenniemi, in 
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which ‘[e]ach regime [is] understood as a purposive association and each institution assumed 
to have jurisdiction wide enough for realising it’.159 This essential dynamic may be a reflection 
of Koskenniemi’s latent structuralism. Yet the risk is that managerialism here quickly collapses 
into imperialism. Its dynamics and future become fixed as every moment of expert articulation 
becomes an act of expanding one’s professional turf. Koskenniemi’s solution to such a 
totalising trend, what he terms a ‘culture of formalism’, appears ill-equipped as a response to 
this seemingly structural pathology.160 
 Is it the case that regimes inevitably expand? To be sure, the ICC has, on numerous 
occasions, articulated or positioned an ICL response to mass violence through expert 
manoeuvres. The invocation of ‘no peace without justice’ is a perfect illustration. After peace-
building efforts began to rub up against the ICC’s activities, particularly in Uganda, scholars 
began to ask whether peace should be prioritised and the ICC’s justice-seeking efforts put on 
the backburner.161 Yet instead of stepping away from national peace-building efforts, the ICC 
instead formulated the position that peace itself would not emerge unless the ICC intervened, 
thereby sustaining ICL and the ICC as a response to conflict.162  
Nevertheless, the ICC has equally, even if less subtly, not sought to extend its gaze to 
other activities. Corporate exploitation and ecocide are generally not criminalised, nor has the 
trading of arms been brought under the court’s rubric. This is not only because the Rome Statute 
has no jurisdiction – the OTP recently published a policy paper on how it would tackle 
environmental crimes despite lacking jurisdiction over them.163 Rather, expansion is contingent 
because other contextual factors shape institutional parameters by enacting inclusions and 
exclusions. In the ICC’s case, tackling the arms trade would bring it into direct conflict with 
the interests of its largest financial contributors. Such ‘externalities’ preclude the complete 
representation of the lifeworld through the vocabulary of atrocity and criminality. This usefully 
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illustrates how Koskenniemi’s map of managerialism, while revealing the hegemony of 
expertise, omits the kind of topographical contouring which might allow us to determine why 
expertise covers certain activities but not others.164 
 Johns observes that in contrast to Koskenniemi, David Kennedy ‘has done much to shed 
light on the manoeuvres, mannerisms and multivalence of the disciplinary voice that 
Koskenniemi would have us hear, more or less univocally, as managerialism’.165 For a start, 
Kennedy begins with a global governance rather than international law lens, hinting at a less 
lawyer-centric analysis of expertise. Kennedy observes in global governance ‘a diffuse global 
public policy capacity to aggregate interests, resolve conflicts, manage risks, address common 
problems, and promote prosperity’.166 Like Koskenniemi, Kennedy also sees the bulk of this 
work being conducted by technical experts. Kennedy’s expert is trained to think and act in 
terms of ‘best practice, practical necessity [and] efficiency’.167 Such expertise is not merely 
functionally applied but is ‘a type of intellectual and practical work that links analysis of the 
context for a decision with people and places marked out as the locus for decision’.168 Expertise 
works by identifying context, solidifying background practices, and so on. Articulation is the 
name of the expert game and experts ‘govern when their articulations are performative: when 
what is articulated comes to pass’.169 Ambach’s position that indicators ‘generate a better 
understanding of the tribunal’s/court’s achievements and challenges’ itself articulates and 
extends a particular vision of what those challenges and achievements are.170 
 Kennedy’s account of experts solidifying the background illustrates how international 
lawyers govern through ‘a modest practice of eclectic social and institutional management’.171 
But Kennedy’s ‘counter-disciplinary’ location, as Johns calls it, also avoids the self-imposed 
constraints of Koskenniemi who isolates the legal experts. This is visible in Kennedy’s most 
recent work, A World of Struggle, where, positing a social theory of global expertise as struggle, 
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Kennedy uses international legal expertise to flesh out the concept rather than to demarcate its 
limits. Kennedy has elsewhere shown how lawyers interact with and build on the expertise of 
others including economists in the trade regime and military strategists in international 
humanitarian circles.172 In such interactions, lawyers solidify givens and ‘gains in global 
economic, political, or cultural life’.173  
 This appreciation of expert interactions is apposite when thinking about managerial 
knowledge in legal surroundings. Like the economist’s models of comparative advantage or 
market failure, the manager’s tools are taken up by lawyers, specifically in situations of 
institutional renewal. In that moment, the historical, contextual, and professional preferences 
are also embraced. That uptake of knowledge is apparent in Ambach’s indicators, but also in 
the ICC’s restructuring exercises, in which external consultants are recruited to assist in 
organisational reform. These expert ascriptions of the institution, though not belonging to the 
lawyer, nonetheless set the conditions of institutional possibility.  
 Despite his cartographic sensibility, Kennedy provides a general theory which misses 
the everyday practices through which lawyers govern.174 A concern for global governance as 
a whole, illustrated with stories from the economic or humanitarian regimes, is somehow 
insufficient ‘to connect to the mundane work in which many international lawyers see 
themselves engaged today, whether they be mired in the politics of the academe or enmeshed 
in another institutional setting, public or private’.175 Others, including Johns, have sought to 
trace international legal work in more detail. 
 Indeed, Kennedy’s most recent theory of a world of experts struggling for authority is 
afflicted by the same substantive ambivalence as Koskenniemi’s notion of hegemonic regimes. 
Through his cartography, Kennedy imagines ‘people coming to their engagements with little 
backpacks of entitlements and vulnerabilities, and having at it’.176 And whilst recognising that 
‘[m]ost struggles have already been won or lost’, Kennedy perhaps does not go far enough to 
dispel the notion that parties are more or less equal in struggle.177 As Krever noted in review, 
this thereby prevents Kennedy from appreciating how ‘material forces in the real world might 
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determine the relative power of various discourses’.178 Krever himself is quick to point to 
economic structures, but there are others besides which bolster certain discourses while 
occluding others. Such exogenous factors contribute to a more holistic account of how 
expertise works without finding the answer exclusively in economic relations. 
 Before moving on, I consider two further interventions which help map out a more 
practice-oriented sociology of expertise. This is the ‘managerial judging’ literature led by 
Judith Resnik and Guy Sinclair’s genealogy of international organisations reform.  
 During the 1980s, Resnik began to articulate a trend within US federal courts.179 The 
demands of increasing litigation over the previous decades, and the knock-on disenchantment 
with slow and expensive proceedings had prompted a shift in the way judges operated. From 
‘uninformed, passive umpires’, judges had graduated into ‘active managers’ involved in the 
preparation, timing, and settlement of disputes, all in the interests of enhancing judicial 
efficiency.180 Resnik’s is a sociologically rich story of how practices like ‘controlled calendars, 
disposition statistics, and other trappings of the efficiency era’ not only alter litigants’ 
behaviour, but also the judicial function – so much so that adjudication has become 
administration.181 At international criminal tribunals, notably the ICTY, Langer and Doherty 
have identified the same shift in judicial styles. They list the techniques imported to expedite 
proceedings, which include a mix of legal and managerial tools. The ICTY closely monitored 
procedural rules, amending them where it saw fit, but also took other measures like appointing 
ad litem judges, introducing case management plans, and holding pre-trial conferences.182  
 However, Langer and Doherty appreciate the discursive effects of these techniques 
more than Resnik. They note that whether courts adopt adversarial or managerial judging, such 
models will ‘impact on how the Tribunal work[s], including how it [is] organized and 
administer[s] its human and material resources’.183 Going further, Langer comments on how 
managerial judging techniques create ‘different structures of interpretation and meaning 
through which the participants in the criminal adjudication process (prosecutors, judges, 
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defence attorneys, etc.) understand criminal procedure and their respective roles’.184 Adopting 
such practices, they ‘become part of actors’ internal dispositions’ to shape their ‘legal 
identities’.185 This literature therefore provides concrete insight into the identity-making effects 
of managerial judging practices to presage some of the effects of managerial practices among 
other professional staff. At the same time, such analysis does not account for the role of external 
and internal discourses in shaping such identities, nor of discursive closure in settling them. 
 A more critical account of institutional practices is offered by Guy Sinclair. His study 
traces IO reform through ‘processes of discourse, practice, and (re)interpretation’ of 
institutional missions.186 This granular sociology focuses on ‘the discursive and material 
practices of international organizations, the rationales and techniques of power they utilize, and 
the specific historical circumstances within which they operate’.187 As such, Sinclair manages 
to combine parts of the critical big picture on the workings of expertise with the biographical 
tendencies of Koskenniemi in Gentle Civilizer, and the everyday practices studied by Resnik. 
He is thereby able to avoid some of the charges previously laid against each. 
 Unlike Koskenniemi, Sinclair does not shy away from charting the influence of non-
legal discourses within IOs. Addressing the role of management knowledge in the International 
Labour Office, he already fills some of the gaps in the managerial history of international 
institutions which I continue in later chapters.188 Also unlike Koskenniemi, Sinclair’s 
genealogical method allows him to appreciate the contingent and never-ending process of IO 
reform and ‘counter-reforms’.189 Sinclair also avoids Kennedy’s somewhat surreal account of 
expertise by journeying through the corridors of selected organisations at particular historical 
junctures. Moreover, his critical posture allows for a deeper appreciation than Resnik and 
Langer of the workings of power through such practices and for ‘thinking differently about the 
possibilities and perils of international law’.190 
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 My study therefore attempts in relation to managerial practices at the ICC what Sinclair 
has done vis-à-vis selected institutional practices. It does so with the same critically inflected, 
Koskenniemi and Kennedy-inspired understanding of the politics of expertise. Most 
concretely, if Sinclair’s is a critique of the international legal imaginary as refracted through 
IOs over the last century, then this study articulates and contests the international managerial 
imaginary which has emerged around, inside, and through the ICC and its staff over the last 
twenty years. As such, it takes up Mégret’s plea for ‘scholarship, notably of an ethnological or 
anthropological sort, that seeks to better understand what is actually going on in international 
criminal tribunals beyond the dominant fascination with rule-following’.191 Such a project  
 
will seek to understand how the power of international criminal tribunals is manifested, 
wielded and maximised. It would put at the heart of such a study a series of practices 
operating on the margin of the law, and which include the consolidation of the field, 
alliances, and shaming tactics.192 
 
Having left such marginal practices mostly on the margins of his study, Sinclair has created a 
space for the full-fledged centring of those practices in the international criminal justice setting 
as advocated by Mégret. 
 
2.4. The claim to ahistoricity 
 
 
The mainstream invocation of management often takes place in an historical vacuum. This is 
not because practitioners or scholars do not appreciate management’s history. Rather, such a 
vacuum is consistent with the scientific understanding of management that history is irrelevant 
to the uses to which managerial tools are put. Officials like Ambach are aware of management’s 
corporate beginnings, its spread to the public sector in the late-twentieth century, and thence to 
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IOs. But the fact that management’s principles and practices transcend specific historical and 
organisational contexts means that such factors can be put to one side in any assessment of its 
effects. This affirms Frederick Taylor’s interdiction when devising his principles of scientific 
management in the early 1900s. He hoped ‘to show that the fundamental principles of scientific 
management are applicable to all kinds of human activities, from our simplest individual acts 
to the work of our great corporations’.193 Similarly, the fact that performance indicators can be 
applied to the ICC reflects their steady expansion ‘into an array of different businesses … [and] 
the judicial sector has been no exception’.194 Indeed, to exempt the judicial sector from this 
managerial turn would, Ambach declares, ‘span … judicial independence too far’.195  
 Yet the suitability of applying managerial practices in the international context has only 
recently become received wisdom. More importantly, to accept management’s historical 
origins without appreciating how those origins might have influenced management’s trajectory 
ignores how expertise always exists within and reinforces a vision of the past. In the ICJ setting, 
both legal and managerial expertise posit a view of what is wrong with the world, namely a 
lack of optimal institutions to govern away the problem of impunity. While rejecting the effects 
of history, then, court officials paradoxically play into a ‘quiet confidence’ that the project 
‘would work better if only it could be implemented more effectively’.196 It also positions the 
ICC at the end of an institutional history which began at Nuremberg, and even the end of 
humanity’s long journey towards international justice.197 With the heavy-lifting completed and 
permanent institutions built, all that remains is routine pruning and general upkeep. Managerial 
practices are indispensable to keeping the project in shape, and therefore trade in that ‘arc of 
justice’ narrative. 
 This narrative has, however, been roundly rejected for its linearity and selectivity. 
History does not naturally unfold but is a struggle to construct the past and present in a 
particular way. Thus, the Nuremberg-Hague-Rome narrative offers one story of international 
criminal justice; the failed trial of the Kaiser, the Moscow show trials and, now, the ICC’s 
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decision not to investigate alleged US crimes in Afghanistan, offers another less virtuous 
one.198 Less attractive still is a history of the project from a Third World perspective, which 
reads less as the failure of the liberal promise than the successful and forcible realisation of 
it.199 From these positions, the orthodox history of international criminal justice reads as a 
history of elite institutions in Europe which managerial practices have helped to prop up. 
 Nevertheless, mainstream scholars are correct to trace the spread of management in 
recent decades, even if they do not quite go back to its origin point at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Indeed, if the mainstream were to notice the growth of managerial principles and tools 
within modern organisations over the last century, they might better appreciate management’s 
proximity to international law’s own institutions over the same time span. Critical interventions 
already allude to such a connection beginning with the pragmatic idealism of the post-1918 
period.  
 The pragmatism that fuelled modern international institutions began at least a century 
ago with the ‘move to institutions’ after World War 1.200 As far as the architects of institutions 
like the League of Nations were concerned, they were set up to address ‘problems of situated 
and pragmatic management’.201 That much is supported by contemporary scholarship which 
focused on ‘capturing the functional relationship between institutions and states and the details 
of institutional design on paper’.202 Representing a break with past chaos, bodies like the 
League were designed as beacons of ‘maturity’ and ‘integration’ which would sustain an as-
yet inchoate international system.203 
 Through this historical sample of international law’s nascent managerialism, Kennedy 
cuts through some of the more laudatory and ahistorical takes on institutionalisation. But he 
also allows managerial practices to be cast in a different historical light. Such a story of 
institutional pragmatism sets the scene for an institutionalised global sphere in which 
managerial tools are not only useful but vital. Management’s purpose changes, then, from an 
efficiency-optimising tool to a technique for nurturing and perpetuating the project of 
institutionalised international law. 
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 Another flashpoint in this alternative history of management is the emergence of 
international relations as a discipline distinct from international law. Condemning the naïve 
idealism of international law scholars in the 1930s, theorists like Hans Morgenthau and Carl 
Schmitt turned their attention instead to how international politics actually worked. They 
advocated the study not only of law but of ‘economic interests, social tensions, and aspirations 
of power’ to retain a healthy pragmatism when analysing global politics.204 That pragmatism 
has defined the discipline ever since, even in its more recent liberal institutionalist guise of the 
1970s.  
 It has often been the liberal institutionalist strand of international relations which has 
sought to apply economic analyses to the study of institutions in a precursor to the managerial 
mindset adopted by institutional actors in the UN and elsewhere. Stephen Krasner, for example, 
was among the first to treat institutions seriously as an object of political science after years of 
realist scepticism about the importance of institutions within global realpolitik. His colleague, 
Robert Keohane, built on Krasner’s work to identify institutions as crucial sites for managing 
the complex problems faced by interdependent states.205 Keohane reasoned that because the 
transaction costs of sharing information and cooperating are high for states, they rationally 
choose to create institutions to reduce those costs.206 Once set up, institutions must continue to 
be ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’ if they are to remain a worthwhile investment for stakeholders.207 
Such a rationale is already recognisable today as an argument made by senior officials about 
the ICC, as in Ambach’s reference to the court as a good investment. In developing his analysis, 
Keohane and others relied on microeconomic theory to describe institutions as contracts or 
‘firms’ which emerge pursuant to a ‘cost-benefit calculation’, and which must retain a 
competitive edge in a crowded institutional market if they are to remain profitable for 
stakeholders.208 Seeing how managerial thinking surfaced through this scholarly stream, one 
can partly explain the diffusion of such ideas and language through international organisations 
rather than positing their natural emergence.209 
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 Although Kennedy helps us locate the seeds of management in institutions, he is less 
interested in historicising expert rule in global governance. Even while World of Struggle looks 
beyond the inner workings of expertise to appreciate a wider political economy, the book still 
leaves ‘historical experts to ponder what the main phases of the rise of expert rule have been 
and what its specifics look like across space’.210 To be sure, an exposé of expert struggle alludes 
to what has been previously struggled over and has become settled, but for Kennedy these are 
more the theoretical mappings of hypothetical pasts than stories of historical unfolding.211 Did 
‘the end of the Cold War, US hegemony, and legalism’, for example, have any part to play in 
consolidating technocracy?212 If such questions remain unanswered vis-à-vis legal expertise, 
then the same applies for other knowledges. 
 Luckily, Koskenniemi is a better historian of managerialism than Kennedy. His history 
of the European discipline of international law in Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and 
Fall of International Law 1870-1960 says as much. Indeed, the fall to which Koskenniemi 
refers is, for him, directly related to the managerialisation of the international law discipline. 
Specifically, he locates the decline of international law in lawyers’ fall from Victorian and 
liberal cosmopolitanism to American political science, resulting in the instrumentalization of 
legal rules for political ends.213 Koskenniemi contends that the discipline ‘never really 
recovered’ after 1945.214 Rather, in the final chapter of Gentle Civilizer, he sketches the birth 
of a specialist, technical craft which he would before long flesh out in a series of articles 
dedicated to the concept of managerialism.215 
 Despite detecting technocratic tendencies in the move to professionalisation and the 
influence of International Relations,216 Koskenniemi’s post-Gentle Civilizer scholarship 
attributes managerialism less to these factors than to the after-effects of the Cold War. 
According to Koskenniemi, détente and the burst of multi-polar energy in the 1990s accelerated 
international legal managerialism. Cooperating as never before to address their collective 
problems, states and transnational actors designed their new governance regimes. These 
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included the trade regime, the environmental regime and, of course, the anti-impunity regime 
for criminalising serious human rights violations. The uniform field of public international law 
fragmented into a patchwork of sub-specialisms.217 While these formally revolved around legal 
frameworks and institutions, law was ultimately subsumed within aims like ‘free trade’ or 
‘global justice’. Such aims might function with or without law, paving the way for a 
deformalized and soft international law of questionable bindingness and enforceability.218 
Thus, for Koskenniemi, the nineties heralded an unconventional end of history in which the 
emerging consensus as to the world’s needs made international law ‘slowly vanish[] behind its 
utilitarian reasons’.219 This is the trajectory of technocratic international law Koskenniemi 
leaves us with. 
 Koskenniemi’s history not only looks ambivalently, and therefore refreshingly, upon a 
time characterised by high optimism.220 It also appreciates a common managerial trend across 
international law’s sub-disciplines. Yet even this account is perhaps too sweeping in hindsight. 
1989 has often been used as a placeholder for great upheaval in international law, to the extent 
that continuities either side have sometimes been glossed over. The project on ‘Cold War 
International Law’ has already dispelled the myth of disciplinary dormancy between 1945 and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.221 Similarly, and despite the emergence of the Washington 
consensus in the early nineties, much of international law’s distributional and market-oriented 
coordinates had already been set by the late 1970s. What is more, around the time of 
international law’s proclaimed fall in the 1960s, major global ferment was already challenging 
the nature and telos of the international law project. Principal among these changes was the 
process of decolonisation, but this is left out of Koskenniemi’s analysis of disciplinary 
change.222 Between 1960 and 1990, former colonies had not only gained their independence, 
but had articulated an ambitious rewriting of the global economy and had subsequently seen 
those demands severely diluted as a result of Western recalcitrance. What exactly happened to 
lawyers and their institutions during that time, then, can be partly illuminated by historicising 
managerial knowledge in the key institutional setting of the United Nations. 
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 Aside from this omission, and while neither Koskenniemi nor Kennedy can be faulted 
for not writing a history of management, their stories leave a few loose ends which point 
towards the rise of management thought in global governance. The final story Koskenniemi 
tells in Gentle Civilizer is a good example. In 1965, when US President Johnson launched a 
military intervention in the Dominican Republic, some legal scholars defended the action. One 
such was Adolf Berle, a law professor at Columbia University. In Berle’s view, the existing 
use of force regime was inappropriate to determine the legality of the intervention, which 
should instead be evaluated according to its strategic purpose. If the UN Charter was 
insufficient to achieve that purpose, then it would have to be disapplied. Berle scoffed at the 
excessive formalism of his colleagues, arguing ‘[w]e here deal seriously with international 
affairs, where life and death are at stake and not with interminable Byzantine legalistics without 
point or outcome’.223 His view embodied the pragmatic instrumentalism of the policy analyst 
which would come to characterise the discipline before long. 
 But Berle also represents the fusion of a technocratic approach to international law and 
the resort to management theory in legal scholarship. Together with Gardiner Means, Berle 
published The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932. Therein, they posit the 
separation of ownership and control in large companies as the fundamental pillar of commercial 
law and corporate governance in the US.224 They deal at length with the role of management 
and managers in controlling that separation, and pose solutions to the various problems these 
corporations experience. Indeed, they follow many other scholars at the time in importing 
Taylor’s scientific management principles into their intellectual project.225 Another theorist of 
managerialism, James Burnham, later cited Berle and Means’ managerial thesis as a ‘powerful 
confirmation of the theory of the managerial revolution’.226  
 Berle’s straddling of the managerial and international legal worlds hints at a deeper 
connectivity, not just personally, but also sociologically and historically between these two 
expert knowledges. Exposing those connections, I attempt to determine the impact of importing 
managerial knowledge with all its epistemic, sociological, and historical baggage, into a field 
like international criminal justice. The point is not to expose their incompatibility, but to 
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problematise their easy co-existence and, at the ICC, their apparent co-dependence within the 
imaginary posited by Ambach and others in the ICJ community. 
 
3. Conclusion: Managerialism as more than technocracy 
 
 
Reviewing extant perspectives on management in international law, this chapter reveals the 
dearth in theoretical studies on its scope, workings, and historical emergence. Explained away 
by lawyers and reformists like Ambach as objective organisational tools, managerial practices 
have been received into global regimes and institutions like the ICC wholesale. This, despite 
the difficulty in assessing their effectiveness and the contradictions at the heart of the 
objectivity claim. Moreover, the mainstream view on management cannot capture the 
constitutive power of this expert knowledge or its historical coincidence within international 
law’s institutions.  
 Addressing these deficiencies, the critical contributions of Koskenniemi and Kennedy 
have proven instructive for a study of managerial expertise. Their analysis allows us to locate 
management within the wider technocratic turn in global governance, rather than in an 
historical vacuum. Their sociological mappings reveal the operation of expertise, specifically 
in international law’s functional regimes. They tell us what international lawyers do in those 
regimes thereby opening up a space for assessing their managerial work. In this vein, the thesis 
responds not only to Mégret’s plea vis-à-vis international criminal justice, but Kennedy’s plea 
as regards global governance more generally, to study ‘the operations of knowledge in power 
by mapping the languages and moves people in expert communities use in their work, their 
common-sense assumptions, justifications and technical choices’.227 
 Perhaps because of its more eclectic perspective, or more recent uptake of political 
economy concerns, Kennedy’s cartography of expertise is perhaps more insightful for a low-
level analysis than Koskenniemi’s birds-eye view, even as Kennedy omits to study concrete 
practices. This is where the contributions of the managerial judging literature and Sinclair’s 
genealogy prove methodologically attractive, especially for a study of practices like audit, 
strategic planning, and indicators. Sinclair’s work is particularly instructive as a series of 
 
227 Kennedy, ‘Introducing A World of Struggle’, 446. 
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historical interventions. The following chapters find resonance with this genealogical 
sensibility. 
 What all these contributions share, though, is an interest in institutional practices. The 
Resnik and Sinclair accounts are most obviously institutional, but so too are the Koskenniemi 
and Kennedy understandings despite their rejection of the institution as a heuristic. 
Koskenniemi’s ambition throughout his managerialism writings has been to expose ‘the way 
in which patterns of fixed preferences are formed and operate inside international 
institutions’.228 And although Kennedy is even less conceptually committed to the institution, 
his early writings on the institutional turn in international law leave little doubt as to their 
historical and contemporary significance. With institutions in mind, then, the next chapter 
traces the birth of managerial practices in the twentieth century and their expansion into public 
and international organisations. Here we not only discover the origins and trajectory of 
management in international law, but its power to affect (and curtail) institutional possibilities 
on a global scale.   
  
 
228 Koskenniemi, ‘20 Years Later’, 9. 
64 
 
 
2 A History of the Managerial Present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter, I build on the critical perspectives of technocracy outlined in chapter 1 to trace 
a genealogy of management and managerial practices in modern organisations. One of my 
misgivings about the mainstream approach was that it does not consider how management’s 
historical evolution impacts on its own epistemological and disciplinary parameters. To be 
sure, the pragmatic ‘move to institutions’ (and later the institutional turn in IR) provided the 
space for a more rationalised approach to managing the globe. Moreover, by the 1990s the 
functional regimes of global governance had created similar conditions in specialised areas, 
which again prompted a move to more sophisticated frameworks for organising the activities 
of institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC). Important though it is to locate 
management in these technocratisation trends of international law, these are not the only 
histories which explain management’s popularity in international law. Hence the need for a 
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genealogy tracing the contemporary concept of management by looking to the conditions and 
contingencies of its emergence in the past.  
This historically-informed account reveals how management travelled from private to 
public to international organisations (IOs), and how, in the international law setting in 
particular, managerial tools and efficiency thinking shaped institutional possibilities at a key 
moment in the development of the United Nations (UN). Although applied in other IOs before 
the UN, managerial practices are best elucidated through the UN given their application and 
refinement in that setting over a thirty-year period. The political struggles which raged within 
and through the UN in the aftermath of decolonisation offer a clear picture as to the discursive 
effects of management in a pre-ICC setting. The UN, unlike other similar institutions at the 
time,229 involved a wide range of actors, a broad range of topics, and a diverse set of managerial 
technologies. The UN example thus helps to answer the question of how managerial practices 
became so self-evident in an institution like the ICC by the end of the 20th century when many 
in the international criminal justice (ICJ) community today continue to treat such practices as 
novel.  
This chapter should not be taken as a comprehensive history but as a series of episodes 
illuminating the patterns of management across various historical periods and institutional 
spaces. What emerges from this history of the managerial present is a definition of managerial 
practices as knowledge practices which shape organisational reality. This definition further 
pierces the mainstream understanding of management. Rather than neutral, scientific tools, 
managerial practices are seen as expert techniques for reinforcing extant distributions of 
institutional power. Managerial practices have proven particularly potent in the UN setting, 
where they were deployed as part of the Western counter-strategy against Third World calls 
for UN democratisation. Management’s effects thus went well beyond the optimisation of UN 
programmes and bodies. Such a finding reveals that by the time management entered the 
project of international criminal justice in the 1990s, it had a significant historical baggage 
which already revealed its discursive effects within international law’s governance regimes.  
 
 
229 Notably, the World Bank applied, since the 1960s, various neo-Taylorite methods under Robert McNamara’s 
leadership, G. Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States (OUP 
2017) 241–2, 263–5, 268. More recently, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has 
adopted new public management and public governance processes, C. Alawattage and M. Elshihry, ‘The 
Managerialism of Neoliberal Global Governance: The Case of the OECD’, in A. Littoz-Monnet (ed), The Politics 
of Expertise in International Organizations (Routledge 2017) 167. Putting these important threads to one side 
does not, however, mean downplaying their importance for the broader managerial turn in international 
institutions. Rather, these institutions similarly trace the patterns of managerial discourse albeit in a more 
fragmented and partial way than the UN. 
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1. From the factory floor to the United Nations 
 
 
In 2005, one of the most popular management theorists of the twentieth century, Peter Drucker, 
published his ‘essential tips for managers’ in the Wall Street Journal. Replicating the advice 
offered fifty years earlier in his 1955 book The Practice of Management, Drucker declared that 
‘[m]anagement will remain a basic and dominant institution perhaps as long as Western 
civilization itself survives’.230 Also in 2005, the United Nations published the World Summit 
Outcome document, best known to international lawyers for its elaboration of states’ 
‘responsibility to protect’ citizens from serious human rights violations. Alongside this 
important development, the Outcome document pledged ‘to enhance the relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and credibility of the United Nations system’ by 
embedding a host of management techniques within its organs and agencies.231 
 The question this chapter answers is how and by what means we have reached the point 
of being able to make such grand claims as Drucker’s – and the UN’s – about a set of principles 
which did not even exist a century ago. This section considers management’s origins and 
trajectory in order to answer this question, replacing the notion of a decontextualized science 
with an historically situated expertise.  
 
1.1. Searching for management’s origins 
 
 
Management scholars have, like international lawyers, attempted to historicise their discipline. 
This has often taken them far back to the ancient world to locate management’s harbingers to 
begin to knit the discipline together. In his history of management thought, Daniel Wren cites 
the earliest recording of the vizier or supervisor in 1750 BC as a type of pre-modern manager. 
This supervisor existed in several contexts, including ancient Egypt. The managers of that time, 
according to Wren, sowed ‘the seeds for the managerial concepts we see reported in the 
Bible’.232 In another ancient setting, namely classical Greece, Aristotle is said to have 
 
230 P. Drucker, ‘Peter Drucker’s Essential Tips for Managers in 2005’ (Wall Street Journal, 6 January 2005) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120818665027812913.  
231 UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, paras 15, 161–7 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_6
0_1.pdf.  
232 D. Wren, The Evolution of Management Thought (4th edn, Wiley 1994) 16–7. 
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inaugurated the spirit of scientific enquiry which paved the way for scientific management over 
two millennia later.233 More recently, the accounting practice of double-entry bookkeeping, 
which emerged in Italy during the late middle ages, inaugurated a spirit of evaluation and 
documentation which still characterises modern auditing techniques.234  
 As these generalities suggest, there is little to connect such broad developments to the 
highly professionalised management discipline of today. Some documentary practices such as 
double-entry bookkeeping remain a stalwart of modern accounting. Yet even this 15th century 
practice lacked the systematicity of modern techniques, having been applied irregularly in 
small companies.235   
 More convincing as management’s origin point is the Industrial Revolution and the 
economic and organisational upheaval it precipitated in late-eighteenth century England.236 
Here, Wren attributes management’s rise to the capitalist division of labour. The specialisation 
of functions and division between worker and owner necessitated, for Wren, a new group to 
mediate the relationship between them. This was not only a theoretical concern, but a practical 
imperative of mass manufacturing which had created a massive workforce flooding into new 
industrial cities like Manchester from the countryside.237  
 Nonetheless, the replication of the factory model into the present day should not gloss 
over the many breaks which distinguish early management from its later forms. Inside the 
English factories, the manager was drawn from workers’ ranks and their authority from the 
trust (and sometimes fear) established among subordinates. Leading by their own force of 
personality, managers were not professionally trained and had little need for or access to 
standardised evaluation techniques. Thus, the emergence of a managerial ‘class’ was not 
accompanied by the kinds of managerial practices which are the focus of this study.  
 Although looking to such disciplinary harbingers, management scholars are broadly 
agreed that modern management was birthed by the American engineer Frederick Taylor 
during the 1890s. Originally intending to train as a lawyer like his father, Taylor decided to 
 
233 Wren, The Evolution of Management Thought, 18.  
234 R.A. Bryer, ‘Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Birth of Capitalism: Accounting for the Commercial 
Revolution in Medieval Northern Italy’ (1993) 4 Critical Perspectives in Accounting 113. 
235 Bryer, ‘Double-Entry Bookkeeping and the Birth of Capitalism’, 113. 
236 British industrialisation went hand in hand with colonial expansion particularly in India, where many statistical 
practices resembling managerial tools were applied to classify colonial populations first by the British East India 
Company and later by British colonial administrators, including surveys and censuses, D. Chakrabarty, 
‘Modernity and Ethnicity in India: A History for the Present’ (1995) 30 Economic and Political Weekly 3373, 
3375.  
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become an apprentice machinist in Philadelphia due to deteriorating eyesight as a teenager. 
Joining Midvale Steel Works as a machinist in 1878, Taylor quickly rose to the rank of chief 
engineer.238 At 25, Taylor introduced a technique at Midvale called ‘time study’ to observe 
individual workers and eliminate time-wasting, a technique which foreshadowed the 
development of his own management science.  
At Midvale, and later at Bethlehem Steel, the largest US shipbuilding company at the 
time, Taylor observed the dynamics of the factory floor. He hoped to end ‘soldiering’ or 
workers’ tendency to work only to the level of the least productive of their colleagues.239 Taylor 
devised principles and tools of management to calculate, time, and record every minute 
component of the production process to stop this practice and ‘the waste of material things’.240 
Such tools would allow managers to identify average production levels and thus sanction 
under-performance, reward productivity, and generally enhance organisational efficiency. As 
this new approach suggests, the role of the manager would be instrumental. The manager would 
garner productivity less through personal leadership than through the application of scientific 
laws and tools symbolised by the stopwatch and the ledger. To this end, Taylor instituted a host 
of techniques including time and motion studies, planned work layouts, improved posture, 
better lighting, costed plans, and budget projections.241  
 The purpose of these techniques has been much disputed. Taylor himself described the 
aim of securing ‘[m]aximum prosperity’ for both worker and owner.242 For him, prosperity was 
an economic calculation: ‘in the case of any single individual the greatest prosperity can exist 
only when the individual has reached his highest state of efficiency; that is, when he is turning 
out his largest daily output’.243 It is this economic rationale which has led some scholars to 
conclude that management’s purpose was to extract labour from workers in the most efficient 
and cost-effective way possible.244 This reading is supported by the context of Taylor’s efforts; 
he hoped to secure the greatest national efficiency for the United States at a time when it was 
 
238 S. Cummings et al. (eds), A New History of Management (CUP 2019) 84–5. 
239 F. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (Dover Publications 1998 [1911]) 6. 
240 Taylor, Principles, iii and 9. 
241 Morden, Principles of Management, 5–6; Taylor, Principles, 9. 
242 Taylor, Principles, 1. 
243 Taylor, Principles, 2. 
244 Harry Braverman argues that management ‘starts … from the capitalist point of view … It investigates not 
labour in general, but the adaptation of labour to the needs of capital’, H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly 
Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (Monthly Review Press 1974) 86. See also J. Merkle, 
Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement (University of 
California Press 1980) 86: ‘the Scientific Management of Taylor was a system of social control’. Taylor and his 
disciples disputed this stating that management would secure ‘social harmony’ between classes, see R. Bendix, 
Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization (Wiley 1956) 275. 
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vying for global expansion.245 To quote Taylor again, efficiency would ‘so lower the cost of 
production that both home and foreign markets would be greatly enlarged, and we could 
compete on more than even terms with our rivals’.246 Emerging just when the US was seeking 
to establish itself as a global power, management fed into the country’s domestic and imperial 
aspirations.  
 
1.2. ‘To make this competent man’: Taylor’s scientific management 
 
 
The aim behind scientific management is elucidated by the practices it deployed as much as 
the wider political attitudes and aspirations of the time. Devising his principles of scientific 
management for the factory floor, Taylor instigated a managerial revolution in society through 
the organisation. And rather than seeking to improve the leadership skills of managers, Taylor 
looked to the performance of the workforce and the environmental factors inhibiting high 
productivity.247 This, to borrow from Miller and O’Leary, ‘implied a revolution in the nature 
of authority … from power over men to the administration of things’.248 With actions being 
recorded in such minute fashion, organisations would be regulated through ‘a complete change 
in the mental attitude of all the men in the shop toward their work’.249 Not only would workers 
themselves be conscripted into their own self-discipline, but others including factory owners, 
government leaders, the general population, and of course managers would also be recruited 
into this regulatory revolution. The point was to ‘train and to make this competent man’, the 
ideal worker who would perform his specialised tasks as efficiently as possible.250  
 Management entered and altered the everyday lives of factory workers in a relatively 
short space of time. This was due not only to the power of the factory owners who had begun 
to invest in Taylor’s services. Management science also built on contemporary American 
attitudes towards science. In his most famous text, Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor 
labelled management ‘a pure science, resting upon clearly defined laws, rules, and principles’, 
which could be objectively applied.251 In this way, he tapped into the growing reputation of 
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science as objective mode of discovering the truth. Scientific management revealed that not 
only the natural world, but the social world too, could be objectively studied and ascertained. 
It could reveal a logic or set of laws underpinning not only the organisation, but society as a 
whole, offering principles and tools to effectively realise collective goals. Management held 
the promise of optimising the world by regulating the organisation and its staff.  
 Extolling the scientific credentials of management, Taylor also benefitted from a new 
approach to politics and political reform in 1900s America. Management emerged at a time of 
great economic and social change in the US. An expanding population and a growing urban 
workforce gave rise to a host of labour, educational, and sanitation issues requiring large-scale 
solutions. However, at the time, ideological party politics were considered both quaint and ill-
equipped to resolve the problems of the modern world. Science was seen as offering the ideal 
solution to social upheaval and discord without the complaint of political interference. Taking 
the politics out of politics many progressive figures defined it ‘not in terms of good and evil, 
but in terms of knowledge, efficiency, and scientific planning against ignorance, error, and 
economic waste’.252 Taylorism represented the organisational arm of this technocratic 
imaginary.253 It not only fastened itself to the attitudes of the time, but also projected its own 
‘scientific’ gaze onto society as a whole. It imagined the ‘competent man’ and efficient 
organisation as central units of societal progress.  
 
1.3. The factory floor goes national 
1.3.1. A difficult start 
 
 
Although emerging at an opportune moment in US history, Taylorism was by no means an 
instant hit. Taylor’s new methods were received with suspicion among workers and trade 
unions for whom constant surveillance signified a loss of autonomy. Workers’ skills and 
knowledge were separated, claimed, and redistributed back to them by the manager in highly 
controlled environments.254 Political theorist and union activist Simone Weil gained a personal 
insight into management’s effects when she took a year of research leave to work as a labourer 
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at the Renault factory in France. French factories had received their own version of Taylorism 
through the ‘14 principles of management’ devised by Henri Fayol in 1916.255 Working on the 
factory floor and experiencing managerial methods at first hand, Weil described the practice  
as ‘a new species of oppression’.256 Writing to the new leader of Bolshevik Russia, Vladimir 
Lenin, she implored him not to implement scientific management in Russian industry, citing 
their exploitative and anti-democratic tendencies.257 Lenin discarded Weil’s suggestion, 
arguing that Taylorism represented the advanced stage of capitalism needed to ‘pave the way 
for socialism’.258 
 In the US, trade union agitation against Taylorism was being violently suppressed in 
some factories, leading to dismissals and arrests.259 In other factories, however, time and 
motion studies were banned.260 Taylor was dismissed from Bethlehem Steel in 1901 after his 
practices created industrial unrest. Thereafter, he devoted his time to writing and lecturing on 
scientific management. Nonetheless, shortly after he published Principles, Taylor was called 
to testify before a US congressional inquiry into the effects of scientific management. Members 
were concerned at the social tensions which Taylorism had generated.261 The inquiry also found 
that many of the efficiency experts following Taylor ‘worked for the short run’ and failed to 
see beyond the efficiency drive.262 It would require more than the force of Taylor’s ideas to 
disseminate the gospel of management. 
 
1.3.2. Gaining recognition  
 
 
Despite reproach from some quarters, management had already caught the eye of many 
industrialists and government leaders during the 1910s. This had been part of Taylor’s plan 
from the outset, when he had linked his own project to Theodore Roosevelt’s crusade for 
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national efficiency.263 Soon, not only businessmen but also government bureaus began to seek 
out the services of Taylor and his management disciples.264 As politicians and government 
officials invested in this new managerial approach to societal problems, policy thinktanks 
sprouted up to hold the federal government to its efficiency goals. One of the first thinktanks, 
the Institute for Government Research, focused its early efforts on making American public 
agencies more efficient in order to improve the functioning of government.265  
 Other figures in the progressive movement lauded Taylor’s new science, including 
political theorist Walter Lippmann and US Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
Notable among these progressives was Louis Brandeis, who had taken on the American 
railroad barons to defend labour practices and who, in 1916, joined Holmes as associate justice 
on the US Supreme Court. Brandeis was an early subscriber to Taylorism and believed in its 
capacity to promote social harmony and improve the condition of the working class by allowing 
more profits to be spent on pay and conditions.266 Such is Brandeis’ connection to the 
movement that he coined the term ‘scientific management’ for Taylor, and was asked to write 
a foreword to one of the movement’s early texts, Primer of Scientific Management (1912).267 
Brandeis and others were pivotal in fusing the idea of organisational efficiency to the wider 
goal of social order and progress. In doing so, they overcame the early opposition to 
management and allowed managerial experts to be recast as ‘industrial statesman’.268 
 Management also gained traction as a professional discipline and an area of theoretical 
and practical study. It joined psychology, public administration, and indeed international law 
as nascent professions at the turn of the 20th century.269 Indeed, management latched onto 
another educational innovation of the time – the Business School. The link between business 
and management had been forged as soon as Taylor entered the steel factories of the 1880s. 
But additional effort was needed to ensconce management in business pedagogy. It was 
convenient that Taylor’s former employer, Joseph Wharton, had endowed the very first US 
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Business School in 1881.270 Taylor’s methods were quickly adopted in new institutions 
including Harvard Business School and in 1916, Columbia University began to offer the 
Masters in Business Administration (MBA), with Taylorism as its guiding logic. It was soon 
joined by Wharton, Harvard and other leading business schools in offering the course. The 
MBA became a rite of passage for would-be managers and symbolised management’s status 
as a serious professional discipline.271  
 
1.3.3. Beginnings of a revolution 
 
 
The management graduate, equipped with technical tools and visions of an efficient society, 
found himself in high demand as the First World War came to an end. But the post-1918 order 
also heralded other, more international visions. The doctrine of liberal internationalism, 
extolled by US President Woodrow Wilson, prompted the construction of institutions like the 
League of Nations ‘to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace 
and security’.272 Other organisations like the International Labour Office (ILO) were 
established to address increasingly global problems such as poor working conditions and labour 
discrimination. Guided by the convictions of ‘peace, security, and freedom’, these institutions 
also drew on the efficiency movement of the age to help achieve their aims.273  
 The ILO was a productive site for managerial experimentation. As Sinclair details, the 
ILO’s adoption of Taylorism in the 1920s ‘grew out of its interest in the possibility of using 
scientific techniques to enhance worker welfare’.274 Some ILO officials from Europe had seen 
the application of such practices in their home countries and required little convincing to apply 
them to labour standards or economic technical assistance. These officials, many of whom were 
lawyers, embraced managerial tools and advocated the global dissemination of managerial 
knowledge. Accordingly, the first ILO Director-General created a special section to promote 
the international study of management. In 1924, ILO officials attended the first International 
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Management Congress, and were instrumental in setting up the International Management 
Institute (IMI) close to the ILO building in Geneva.275 The ILO’s response to major labour 
challenges such as the Great Depression of the 1930s was to advocate ‘more, bigger, and better 
rationalisation’ as a solution to social discord.276 Their early activities and goals were thus 
highly conditioned by Taylor’s philosophy. 
 The ILO’s belief in scientific management was guided by the same technocratic and 
political attitudes prevailing in the US and Europe during the interwar period. ILO officials 
looked upon management as a way to ‘fan the Promethean sparks into flames to light the path 
of progress to be followed by mankind in a spirit of practical idealism’.277 These ideas were 
brought to bear within institutions like the ILO by prominent management experts and 
Taylorists. Thus, upon the creation of the IMI in 1927, Percy Brown, a management consultant 
and one-time president of the American Taylor Society, was appointed as deputy director. After 
resigning from the post a year later – although not before promoting the advantages of 
managerial practices in various sectors – he became a partner in the management consultancy 
firm McKinsey & Co.278 
 Brown’s journey is typical of the move from business to international research to 
academia which managers were making throughout the 1930s. They embodied Taylor’s 
aspiration that scientific management applied ‘with equal force to all social activities’.279 As 
his later career indicated, Brown also joined many other ‘efficiency men’ in establishing ‘a 
new professional service: management consulting’.280 At McKinsey and elsewhere, Brown and 
his colleagues would be employed to provide advice to companies on planning and structures, 
but also to enhance organisational credibility among shareholders and the public.281 They did 
so by redefining organisational aims and implementing strategic tools. In this way, they 
levelled the playing field between small and large businesses by reshaping them in a similar 
managerial image.282  
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 Private companies were not the only organisations to benefit from managerial expertise. 
Federal agencies and programmes had also adopted its methods, at least since the 1910s. This 
move to public organisations would accelerate under US President Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. Relying more on economic planning than in the preceding decades, New Deal politics 
still depended on expert disciplines to improve social welfare. Managers were recruited into 
that project, as exemplified by new schemes like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The 
TVA was established in 1933 to provide utilities and economic development for the Tennessee 
valley basin as one of the worst-suffering regions of the US during the great depression. 
Initiating this ambitious programme, the federal government relied on engineers, scientists, 
planners, and managers to accurately identify economic and social problems, and collect 
relevant data for their alleviation.283 Alongside the TVA, similar agencies and programmes 
sprung up and with them a growing demand for managerial experts to organise and optimise 
society.  
 It was this managerial phenomenon which commentators attempted to theorise during 
the 1930s and 40s. In The Managerial Revolution, political theorist James Burnham labelled 
New Dealism a ‘managerial ideology’.284 Writing in 1941, Burnham captured the power and 
popularity of management. The US federal government was not only employing a record 
number of managers but, according to Burnham, was being taken over by a new ‘managerial 
class’. Burnham observed this new class emerging between capitalist owners and workers to 
seize the state-owned means of production.285 He prophesied the transition from capitalism not 
to socialism but to managerialism citing in evidence the similar managerial traits of the Nazi 
and Soviet states of the late 1930s. This managerial society would be guided by the philosophy 
of ‘coordination, integration, efficiency [and] planning’.286 And instead of being run by 
industrialists or workers’ dictatorships, managerial society would be characterised by the ‘drive 
for social dominance, for power and privilege, for the position of ruling class, by the social 
group or class of the managers’.287  
 In hindsight, Burnham was wrong to predict the demise of capitalism.288 Yet conceiving 
a new social system and hierarchy beyond the deeply entrenched capitalism-socialism binary 
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of the time illustrates the ubiquity of managers and managerial ideas. Burnham’s theory also 
accurately captured just how far management had come in a few short decades. By the 1940s, 
management had become more than a method for alleviating low productivity among factory 
workers, applying now to private and public organisations in America and beyond. 
Management found a waiting audience in the bureaucratic office as much as the shop floor and 
in the mind of the progressive technocrat as much as the entrepreneurial businessman. Burnham 
thus captured society’s reimagination in efficiency terms.  
 
1.4. The factory floor goes global 
 
 
Despite Burnham’s misgivings, the New Deal continued. Even more crucially for the ascent of 
management was the perception, whether accurate or not, that American strategic and 
managerial ingenuity had won the war.289 Managerial expertise emerged after 1945 as an even 
more attractive solution to large-scale social problems. In response to postwar chaos, states 
came together to establish the United Nations as well as other financial institutions. Yet it was 
another major postwar project, also led by the Americans, which exported managerial expertise 
to Europe.  
 
1.4.1. Atlantic crossings 
 
 
The European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan, injected $13 billion into Western Europe 
to stimulate and modernise its economic infrastructure. Taking its cue from the model of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, the US sought to alleviate high unemployment and low production 
levels in the war-ravaged European economies through ambitious economic policies and 
expertise. Among the many measures initiated by the Marshall Plan, the Technical Assistance 
Program began to transfer management knowledge from the US to Western Europe. The 
Program was designed to ‘identify problems of inefficiency’ in European companies and to 
‘instruct Europeans in the most modern American industrial practices’.290 In Europe, as in 
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Tennessee, the US government replicated certain managerial practices. ‘Factory Performance 
Reports’ were rolled out across German industry and by 1948, 700 French industrialists and 
managers had visited US factories to witness the application of new management methods.291 
Of the billions of dollars set aside for European recovery after the war, a sizeable amount was 
spent on ‘management training, executive seminars and American technical consultants’.292  
 Yet the transfer of management knowledge did not only improve productivity levels 
and know-how. It also imported a distinct way of seeing the political and economic conditions 
of postwar Europe. Political and economic instability were framed as technical problems of 
outmoded organisational methods which American managerial experts could update. They 
would seek to rebuild the postwar economies of Europe in the American image through 
managerial tools.293 One British treasury official begrudgingly captured this mimetic tendency 
of management, lamenting that ‘the Americans want an integrated Europe looking like the 
United States – “God’s own country”’.294  
 That official sentiment, however, captures not only the moulding effect of management, 
but the wider geopolitical struggle of which it was part. The defeat of Nazi Germany had left a 
power vacuum in Europe which it was feared the USSR would soon seek to fill. Thus, from 
the Allied position, the Marshall Plan not only functioned to reconstruct war-torn Europe but 
to secure American hegemony at an important site of potential American-Soviet confrontation. 
Managerial practices were put to that political task by training European companies and 
governments in the image of American business and shaping them into suitable trading 
partners. Factory performance reports, for example, provided the US government with 
productivity data which would allow it to assist, alter, and control European economic growth 
to its advantage.295 Management’s deployment within the Marshall Plan left little doubt as to 
the discipline’s American pedigree and makes explicit management’s importance to the 
geopolitical struggles of the early Cold War.  
 Little wonder, then, that American management methods became so popular in Europe 
during the 1950s and 60s. By then, the management consulting business had launched in 
Europe with firms such as McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group taking on European 
companies as clients. By the end of the 1950s, smaller American firms had established offices 
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in capitals like London and Paris, and were soon followed by some of the market leaders 
including McKinsey.296 Management consultants offered their broad insight into American 
organisational planning and efficiency to European companies such as Nestlé, Deutsche Bank, 
and United Fruit Company.297 Moreover, even at this early stage, European governments were 
seeking assistance on how to make the state apparatus and public services more efficient. By 
the early 1970s, McKinsey had already taken on assignments from British Rail, the BBC, NHS, 
and the Dutch Ministry of Education.298 Such general uptake of McKinsey’s services 
confirmed the ‘widespread perception that the “elite” management consulting firm embodied 
the cutting edge of superior American organizational knowhow’.299 
 However, even if consultancy firms were the most common producer of management 
knowledge by the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was not only they who implanted such 
knowhow. This is apparent from the experience of one international body, the UN Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO). Created in 1966 at the behest of the new Non-Aligned 
Movement, UNIDO’s objective, as contained in article 1 of its constitution, was the ‘promotion 
and acceleration of industrial development in the developing countries with a view to assist in 
the establishment of a New International Economic Order’.300 Within two years of its creation, 
UNIDO officials began investigating ways to improve the special organ’s performance, 
especially in the transfer of technical knowledge to developing countries. One official, Walter 
Kotschnig, who had worked for the US State Department on the creation of UNIDO, was 
involved in these discussions. Kotschnig observed that to discharge its mandate, ‘UNIDO must 
secure personnel of a different type from those generally found in international 
organisations’.301 Specifically, it would ‘have to draw heavily in its recruiting on practitioners 
of industry, on proven organisers, practical technologists, and managerial talent’.302 For this to 
work, Kotschnig was attuned to the fact that ‘such personnel will obviously have to be found 
primarily in the plants and establishments of industrialised countries’.303  
 Despite the internal appetite for managerial ideas within international bodies such as 
UNIDO, management consultancy firms were the ‘primary institutional conduit for the transfer 
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of American organizational models to Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s’.304 From the days 
of Taylorism and the stopwatch, management had transformed into a systematic framework for 
analysing and solving the problems of organisations old and new through strategic management 
techniques. Consultants contemplated new budget control systems, large-scale restructuring, 
and high-level strategic reform. For example, in 1957 McKinsey was recruited to reorganise 
the joint headquarters of Royal Dutch Shell in London and The Hague. McKinsey imposed a 
new ‘“decentralized” or “multidivisional” model’ of authority to be delegated between 
functional and regional divisions while still retaining Shell’s single executive board.305 
Elsewhere, consultants hired to restructure company divisions ended up addressing questions 
that went ‘to the core of the company’s strategic position’.306 In 1968, McKinsey was recruited 
by Rhône-Poulenc, the largest French company at the time. Surveying its performance, 
managers observed that Rhône’s problem was one of core identity: ‘[a]re we a chemical 
company, are we a pharmaceutical company, a fine chemical company…?’.307 As managers 
posed bigger strategic questions, they carved out an indispensable role for their own expert 
tools to resolve them. 
 
1.4.2. Management goes public  
 
 
Applied to public bodies from the late 1960s, managerial practices already harboured the 
potential for universal expansion. But it was not until the 1970s that management scholars 
began to catch up with practitioners to theoretically justify management’s move to the public 
sector. ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) was the movement which spurred the application of 
hitherto company-located managerial tools to a range of public sector organisations in Western 
and OECD countries. Given that the majority of the UN’s and ICC’s managerial practices 
originate in NPM principles, it is worth considering the context in which NPM arose.  
 Three overlapping developments coalesced to render NPM a potent approach to public 
organisations.308 Firstly, since the oil crisis of 1973, Western economies had begun to stagnate 
and public debt had soared. Western governments such as the Carter administration 
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concentrated on reducing the budget deficit by curtailing and optimising public expenditure. 
The efficiency tools which had worked so effectively on private companies in the preceding 
decades provided an attractive solution. Secondly, and despite these deficit reduction efforts 
by Carter and others, a new political landscape emerged by 1980 reflecting a systematic 
realignment of the state’s relationship to the economy. Across the West, and especially under 
US President Reagan and UK Prime Minister Thatcher, governments promised to let the free 
market loose. Spurred by the belief in markets as the most efficient means of organising social 
relations, these neoliberal governments extended many free market principles to the public 
sector.309 They also extended the managerial tools originating in private business in an effort 
to remake public organisations in the managerial image.  
 Thirdly, NPM emerged within and furthered a new means of governing the neoliberal 
state.310 While neoliberal ideology is often associated with shrinking state intervention into 
citizens’ lives, that caricature does not capture the complex regulatory role which the state 
began to arrogate to itself in the 1980s, particularly in the provision of public services such as 
healthcare, transport, and education.  
The managerialisation of UK higher education beginning in the mid-80s illustrates that 
intense regulatory role. Like other public services during the 1980s, higher education was 
reoriented so as to ‘contribute more effectively to the improvement of the performance of the 
economy’.311 With economic need at the forefront, the university was to be directed towards 
and evaluated in light of its contribution to economic growth. The university’s mission would 
be to attract young talent and to transform society through innovative research. A host of 
managerial bodies and processes associated with the NPM movement were therefore imposed 
by the Thatcher government.312 
 In research, assessment exercises were first conducted in 1986 to decide where and how 
to allocate public funds. This pre-figured a new ‘Research Assessment Exercise’ to rank the 
scholarship produced by university researchers on a scale from ‘below average’ to 
‘outstanding’. Thereafter, university departments would receive ratings ranging from 
‘Unclassified’ to ‘4*’. More recently, the Research Assessment Exercise was replaced by the 
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Research Excellence Framework which also rates and ranks research output according to the 
broader but still utilitarian standard of ‘impact’.313  
 In assessing teaching, the neoliberal state discharged a similar governance function. A 
Quality Assurance Agency was established in 1997 to audit and review the standard of teaching 
provision across UK universities. Auditors evaluated teaching through assessment exercises, 
and performance indicators were used to measure the value-for-money and student satisfaction 
provided by university educators.314 To this managerial milieu a Teaching Excellence 
Framework was added in 2017 to mirror the framework for research. The teaching framework 
uses statistics from student surveys and graduate employment rates to measure the quality of 
teaching, learning environment, and student outcomes.315 Universities are then awarded a gold, 
silver, or bronze performance rating.  
 Alongside these changes to university activities, managerialism also transformed the 
identity of university academics. The academic shifted from an intellectual and pedagogical 
guide into a service provider. They have also emerged as an entrepreneurial figure who must 
peddle their research wares in ever more innovative and impactful ways to received high 
performance ratings and to better compete for dwindling research funds.316 Many so-called 
‘manager-academic[s]’ have been recruited into the university’s managerial apparatus to 
oversee compliance with and improvement of research and teaching frameworks.317  
 The example of UK higher education exposes managerial neoliberalism not as a way to 
govern less, but to govern more, and to govern more diffusely and microscopically than ever. 
Rather than leaving society to manage itself, the neoliberal project has been realised precisely 
through the managerial practices of audit, indicators, and appraisal. In the university sphere, 
this has created efficient, productive organisations populated by entrepreneurial researchers. It 
remains to be seen how similar NPM tools influenced international institutions like the UN. 
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1.4.3. Contesting assumptions 
 
 
While management had changed markedly since the 1900s, the total management frameworks 
devised in the 1980s harboured and fomented the efficiency mindset that had been Taylor’s 
refrain. Popular management texts such as Peters and Waterman’s In Search of Excellence 
(1982) hoped to extend the management of social life to new frontiers. They posited that not 
only formal structures of the organisation could be managed. Rather, they promised managers 
that ‘all that stuff you have been dismissing for so long as intractable, irrational, intuitive, 
informal organisation can be managed’.318 Chief among those irrational components was the 
organisational employee. As the managerial university demonstrates, employee performance 
would need to be periodically recorded and evaluated in order to achieve organisational 
excellence. Thus, management coincided in the 1980s with the neoliberal project and 
professional expertise to render hegemonic the discipline which had been devised only a 
century before. As in previous settings like the factory floor and postwar Europe, managerial 
practices combined with other social forces including national and economic agendas, and 
geopolitical interests to intensify extant patterns of control. 
 The foregoing account not only reveals the rise of management throughout the 20th 
century. It also challenges the most fundamental assumptions concerning the concept and role 
of management, many of which have been endorsed by international lawyers and the ICJ 
community. First, management, while latching onto the pretence of objectivity, was often 
implemented with specific political, if not economic, goals in mind whether this was the 
creation of European companies in the American image, or the attempt to orient the public 
sector towards economic growth. For workers, whether factory labourers or academics, 
management has operated to regulate organisational life and aspirations. Second, as the work 
of managerial experts and consultants reveals, management has consistently operated by 
producing knowledge about organisations and their staff. Although the precise tools and fora 
may have changed, managerial tools have always sought to reimagine society as an optimisable 
system of efficient organisations and ‘competent men’. Third, the uniquely American origins 
of management, and the struggle to have it recognised as an expert discipline, punctures 
somewhat management’s claim to universality. The recurring dynamic of managerial expertise 
over the last century has been to produce American, European, and ultimately international 
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organisations as optimal systems of governance. I now move to consider the most common 
managerial practices as applied in modern organisations, before moving to the UN setting.  
 
2. Selected managerial practices 
 
 
As the foregoing account shows, managerial practices have emerged and taken effect within 
organisations. Yet whether in the steel factory or the public agency, managerial practices also 
produce a view of the world as an optimisable endeavour pursued by experts. I thus consider 
these practices in more detail, focusing on those which have appeared most often in the UN 
and, more importantly, the ICC context. Such practices vary widely in their aims, as well as in 
their degree of specificity, scope, and longevity. What prompts their consideration together, 
though, is their constitutive power within organisations.  
 
2.1. The mission statement 
 
 
The mission, or mission statement, is ‘one of the most widely used management tools in the 
world’. First introduced in private and public organisations of the 1980s, mission statements 
are now adopted by organisations ranging from multinationals to community-run initiatives.319 
At the ICC, mission statements have been produced both at the organisational level and by 
specific organs since 2006.  
The mission statement documents the core purposes and aspirations of the organisation. 
In doing so, organisations hope to provide a source of unity and motivation for staff.320 They 
also hope to make the organisation’s aims more transparent and legitimate to external 
stakeholders by setting expectations. As well as legitimising the institution, mission statements 
also shape the identity of professional staff. This is hinted at by the mission’s motivating 
function. The mission aligns professional identities to the organisation’s basic aims and 
provides meaning to their everyday activities. It creates a lens through which the professional 
can see him/herself as indispensable to the organisation and the wider societal aims which it 
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espouses. Accordingly, staff must ‘live the mission’ and professional success is measured 
according to how far staff ‘know, understand and are committed to their organisations’ 
mission’.321 The ICC has adopted this same view in relation to its own mission statement and 
views staff commitment to the mission as an important professional trait.322  
 Despite being implemented to achieve whatever aims the organisation may have, 
mission statements bring other aims and ideals with them. Having emerged as part of the NPM 
movement and the drive for efficiency, mission statements implant notions of efficiency and 
individual performance into organisations. Thus, in their sample of mission statements from 
across a range of sectors, Bartkus et al. find that they reduce organisations’ unique 
contributions and ethos into a generic boilerplate formula, ‘threaten[ing] the firm’s ability to 
adapt to change’.323 The standard message conveyed in mission statements is to ‘continuously 
improve the company’s long-term value to customers, employees, shareholders, and 
society’.324 This is similar to the construction of the ICC’s mission to ‘[f]airly, effectively and 
impartially investigate, prosecute and conduct trials of the most serious crimes’, ‘[a]ct 
transparently and efficiently’, and ‘[c]ontribute to long lasting respect for and the enforcement 
of international criminal justice’.325 
 
2.2. The strategic plan 
 
 
As seen in the activities of consultancy firms during the 1960s, strategic planning has a slightly 
longer history than mission statements. Strategic planning is defined as the ‘long-range 
planning of a firm in relation to its market, competitors, technology, management, resources, 
funding, and so on. The result is usually the preparation of a strategic plan or business plan 
covering the medium or long term’.326 The strategic plan often fleshes out the mission’s broad 
aims in detail over a three to four-year cycle.  
 The strategic plan is a good illustration of management’s constitutive power within the 
organisation. The strategic plan is unique among the many practices surveyed here insofar as 
it seeks to capture the entire organisation, both its structural elements such as hierarchies and 
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reporting lines and non-structural aspects such as culture and staff. In casting a wide net, the 
plan defines, orders, and evaluates facets of organisational life according to pre-set goals, 
activities, indicators, resources, and timeframes.327 The ICC’s Strategic Plan is a good example 
of how various managerial tools coalesce around the strategic planning process to define 
organisational resources and objectives.328  
 To see the organisation, whether private company or international criminal tribunal, 
strategically is to place that organisation in a wider social reality and to connect its activities 
and aims to the perceived objectives of society.329 Like the mission, the strategic plan is 
premised on the need to find an optimal allocation of organisational resources to ensure 
society’s aims are realised as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. Yet the strategic plan, 
like the mission statement, is created by institutional actors operating within a political, 
historical, organisational context. Despite appearing to capture a consensus as to the 
organisation’s purpose, the strategic plan ‘project[s] solidarity of purpose and the universality 
of the interests of senior managers and stakeholders’.330   
How senior officials frame social reality will thus guide the work of the organisation 
and its primary goals. Hence, strategic planning captures one version of the world, designates 
it as reality, and uses it as the driving force for institutional decision-making. Activities and 
decisions which fit within the parameters prescribed by that social reality are prioritised and 
refined, while those which disrupt or do not support that reality are deprioritised and rendered 
invisible. Thus, the conditions of organisational possibility become apparent: what can be 
strategically captured becomes the accepted reality and what should be prioritised by the 
organisation. Everything else is discursively closed off.  
 Seen in relation to other managerial practices, strategic planning reveals how deeply 
intertwined are managerial practices in a web-like network. The strategic plan acts as the 
reference point for performance indicators, determining their scope and content. At the ICC, 
the Office of the Prosecutor’s Strategic Plan for 2016-2018 formulated 14 performance 
indicators to ‘help the Office obtain more focused information on its performance, and how the 
strategy is being implemented’.331 Once performance data have been collected from the 
indicators over a number of years, they will be fed back into efforts to update the strategic plan 
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for the next cycle. Hence the strategic plan and performance indicators co-constitute one 
another. Similarly, the strategic plan provides the seeds for other strategies and plans dealing 
with more specific organ- or function-related activities. The ICC Committee on Budget and 
Finance has thus recommended that all court organs devise separate strategic plans which 
derive from and further inform the court-wide Strategic Plan. By creating a self-referential 
network, these practices create engrained patterns of organisational meaning over time.  
   
2.3. The performance indicator 
 
 
Indicators emerged in private and public institutions, including national courts, when the NPM 
movement took off in the 1980s. Indicators have since become a familiar feature of the global 
governance architecture as exemplified by the United Nations ‘Rule of Law’ and World Bank 
‘Doing Business’ indicators.332 A considerable literature has since emerged to theorise 
indicators and understand their implications for global governance. Davis et al. define 
indicators as a ‘named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or 
projected performance of different units’.333 They describe the process of data collection thus:  
 
[t]he data are generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex 
social phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and processed form, are capable of 
being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as countries, institutions, or 
corporations), synchronically or over time, and to evaluate their performance by 
reference to one or more standards.334 
 
This summary of indicators and the data that sustains them reveals that indicators do not merely 
capture a pre-existing reality. Instead, the reality which the indicator finds is the reality it 
constructs itself. This is apparent in how the indicator is created – it is devised by socially-
situated ‘actors and institutions, expertise, temporality, and resources’.335 Once the scope of an 
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indicator is settled, a particular version of past struggles is also consolidated as contextual 
background. The indicator has its own view of what is wrong with the world based on what it 
includes and deems worthy of being measured. Only those aspects of the world will be solved, 
leaving other problems to appear intractable or simply ‘there’. In positing such context, 
problems, and solutions, an indicator ‘builds on a theory of what constitutes a good society, or 
what constitutes a problem or pathology to overcome in the course of improving the national 
society and polity’.336 
 Performance indicators are little different except that they are applied institutionally to 
track and determine the successful completion of internal activities. Depending on what the 
indicator measures, certain data will be regarded as institutionally useful and some less so, 
producing in the end a particular vision of social context and organisational performance. Like 
the strategic plan which precipitates it, then, ‘the category of “indicator” has distinct knowledge 
effects as a means of constructing understandings and the terrain of classification and 
contestation’.337 At the ICC, for example, performance indicators are used to collect data on 
fair trial issues. Yet they rely on sources such as the number of appeals lodged with fair trial 
infringement arguments, or the number of days permitted for defence submissions.338 As a 
procedurally-focused understanding of fairness, such data inevitably excludes information on 
prosecutorial policies which may inhibit defence strategies. Moreover, the tendency of 
indicators to rank data creates a preference for ‘rankable’ and quantifiable data, thereby leaving 
certain immeasurable but no less important data such as the psychological impact of pre-trial 
detention out of the picture.  
  
2.4. The performance appraisal 
 
 
As a way of collecting individualised performance data, performance appraisal has become a 
central pillar of many organisations’ human resources activities.339  Performance appraisal is 
an individualised cycle for measuring and evaluating staff performance according to pre-
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defined criteria. It is premised on the philosophy that an organisation can only function 
effectively with an efficient, productive, and dedicated workforce.340 However, performance 
appraisal is not a neutral exercise in capturing employee performance. Rather, it is a constant 
exercise in the production of professional subjectivities according to a set of organisational 
ideals.341 I say constant here because while staff may spend only a fraction of their time 
thinking about appraisal or filling in appraisal forms, the process of recording and rating the 
employee begins in earnest as soon as they are recruited into the organisation (even before) and 
continues until the day they leave (even after). The process itself follows a yearly cycle which 
is defined by periodic meetings, informal chats, and appraisal deadlines.342  
 Within this regime, it is not so much the staff that create and control the appraisal as 
the reverse. Performance appraisal produces a cast of characters in addition to other subjects, 
including appraisee, appraiser, supervisor, and human resources officer. These subjects are 
bound together by the appraisal regime which positions the appraisee at its core. Indeed, given 
that all staff, whether entry-level or managerial, are objects of performance measurement, this 
network becomes a thick and interstitial means of producing knowledge throughout the 
organisational hierarchy. As seen in chapter 4 below, such a network is made visible in the 
many documents associated with performance appraisal including probation reports, 
competency models, missions, and appraisal forms, all of which capture the professional 
identity of the employee in a ‘network of writing’ which is then stored away in their personnel 
file.343 Through such documents, the professional subject is captured as a series of skills, 
competencies, achievements, and ratings. In this process, the professional’s attitudes and 
understanding of the social project in which they are engaged, are moulded to fit with the 
demands of the organisation. 
 Meetings between the appraisee and appraiser perform the same function. Here, the 
institution extends its managerial gaze into the appraisee in order to create an accurate, 
officially-sanctioned truth about them. Much like the confession box, the performance meeting 
recruits the employee into their own self-regulation.344 The employee will seek to expose and 
reflect on their own professional achievements and shortcomings to bring themselves closer to 
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the ideal professional the institution wants them to be. The meeting is thus a time for ‘revelation 
and redemption [which] brings the personal and the organisational into intimate relation’.345  
 After the meeting the employee is recorded on paper and the documents are stored 
away. Over time, the personnel file builds up a picture of the professional and the extent to 
which they have been crafted into an efficient team-player committed to organisational aims 
and values.346 Deploying the techniques of recording, meeting, rating, and storage, 
performance appraisal epitomises the modern dynamic of governing as ‘the ceremony of 
power, and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of 
truth’.347 
 
2.5. The audit 
 
 
Beyond performance appraisal, there are collective ways of holding the organisation to 
account. The most popular of these is audit. Originally designed to verify accounts and book-
keeping records, audit has become ‘a key term in the lexicon of contemporary management’ at 
least since the 1970s.348 Thereafter, Western countries experienced what Michael Power 
describes as an ‘audit explosion’. Institutions increasingly turned to audit as a method of 
verifying and managing risk in a host of areas, precipitating such new techniques as the 
‘environmental audit, value for money audit … medical audit, teaching audit, and technology 
audit’.349 
 Like performance appraisal, audit verifies organisational data with a view to enhancing 
financial control and accountability, and minimising organisational risk. It is characterised by 
‘independence from the matter being audited; technical work in the form of evidence gathering 
and the examination of documentation; the expression of a view based on this evidence [and] a 
clearly defined object of the audit process.350 In this regard, auditing resembles the same 
methodical and evidence-based work of lawyers. Yet like lawyering, auditing also fashions the 
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organisation to correspond with a certain professional attitude. Gathering evidence and 
reporting on finances and management, the auditor is trained only to see the organisation as a 
site for optimisation and accountability. Their risk aversion leads them to limit organisational 
creativity and progress to that which is completely predictable, costed, and capable of 
producing measurable results. Seeing the organisation thus, audit shapes organisations into 
auditable systems.  
 Audit identifies employees in a similar way, namely as ‘depersonalised units of 
economic resource whose productivity and performance must be constantly measured’.351 The 
employee becomes a source of risk and therefore must be regulated.352 Similar to appraisal, 
audit implicates the employee in the process of moulding themselves into a risk-free, auditable 
subject. Wherever it is applied, audit superimposes the standards of efficiency, performance, 
and risk on operational staff, turning them from a competent professional into an unreliable 
resource. Only after auditors have done their work can the professional be regarded as 
trustworthy and risk-free because the audit report says so. Audit thus creates and thrives in a 
climate of ‘doubt, conflict, mistrust and danger’.353 
 Audit also has a legitimising function. It adheres to the professional values of 
independence, neutrality, and technical analysis espoused by (legal) experts. These values lend 
credibility to the institution, contributing to a ‘style of evaluation from which organisations 
emerge as legitimate, safe, efficient, cost-effective, and so on’.354 Furthermore, audit is 
particularly immune from criticism. When audit appears to go wrong – which it has on many 
occasions, according to Power – criticisms are often taken up as ‘lessons learnt’ for the next 
auditing cycle. The possibility that auditing might be part of the problem because of its overly 
narrow focus on efficiency and risk is never considered. Doing away with audit is always out 
of the question. Audit therefore ‘supplies its own rationale [and] regenerates itself in the face 
of apparent failure’.355  
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2.6. The restructuring exercise 
 
 
Restructuring exercises should not be mistaken for any large-scale organisational reform 
project. Restructuring has distinct qualities and is often used synonymously with terms like 
downsizing, streamlining, and rationalisation. While these words helpfully allude to how 
restructuring reduces an organisation’s use of ‘financial, physical, human, or information 
assets’, they do not capture the much larger remit of most restructuring exercises.356 In fact, 
restructuring is no less than a ‘complete strategic transformation intended to change an 
organisation’s design, its work processes, corporate culture, values, attitudes, and mission’.357 
Restructuring is among the most resource-intensive of all managerial practices, demanding that 
an organisation set aside substantial resources, time, and personnel to effect structural and non-
structural change. It may require the organisation to recruit project managers, lay-off some 
employees and recruit others, and rearrange the organisational chart. Restructuring can take a 
few short months or upwards of two years, as in the case of the ICC Registry’s restructuring 
exercise.358  
 Restructuring does not only rearrange offices and people; it also governs them. Being 
conducted under the logic of efficiency and streamlining, restructuring often embeds the 
discourse of performance and productivity within organisations. Employees are sorted into 
dispensable and indispensable resources according to organisational need. For those that are 
spared redundancy, the exercise rarely affirms their value to the organisation. Rather, it 
indicates that the mere performance of one’s daily tasks to an acceptable standard does not 
offer job security. The use of performance appraisal and other statistics to determine who 
should be made redundant heightens the sense of control and precarity exerted by the 
organisation over its employees. The employee must become even more careful to conform 
with institutional practices and the image of the ideal professional to avoid the same fate as 
their former colleagues. 
 Restructuring offers an insight into how organisational discourse becomes settled. As a 
means of effecting organisational change, restructuring allows institutional stakeholders to 
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alter and fix certain priorities within the organisation.359 It can be used to identify the external 
forces at work and what the organisation is capable of doing in response. For this reason, it 
matters who is involved in restructuring, what their aims and parameters of action are, and what 
tools they use. Similarly, it is important to notice which groups and agendas are ignored or 
side-lined during restructuring as an insight into the other organisational realities which could 
have been produced but were not.360 
 This overview of the most common managerial practices reveals their constitutive 
effects within modern organisations. Emerging within an historical context characterised by 
efficiency, targets, and oversight, such practices reproduce a certain organisational reality and 
particular professional identities. Following from the preceding genealogy, management can 
be said to exist ‘in relation to actual historical changes that have both produced it and have 
been produced by it’.361 In the final part of this chapter, I combine these insights to trace the 
emergence and impact of management on a crucial organisational site in international law, the 
United Nations. This genealogy of management at the UN reveals the context within which 
management was deployed and popularised on the international plane through a confluence of 
political, economic, and expert forces and concerns. It thereby sets the scene for analysing the 
ICC’s managerial practices in subsequent chapters.  
  
3. Managing the United Nations 
 
 
I noted above that managerial practices were advocated and deployed already within the 
international institutions of the interwar period.362 Yet many of the practices just recounted 
only appeared in international institutions beginning with the UN around the late 1960s. This 
was the point at which managerial practices began to be directly applied to the ‘bureaucracy’ 
itself, in addition to the target populations with which those bureaucracies dealt, such as 
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technical assistance at the ILO.363 I thus look to this formative period for the UN in the wake 
of decolonisation.  
 
3.1. An ‘unmanageable’ body 
 
 
One starting point is 1968, when the Governing Council of the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) commissioned Sir Robert Jackson to investigate the programme’s effectiveness and 
the functioning of the UN’s development mandate.364 Established in 1966, the UNDP had 
already commenced providing technical assistance and capacity-building support to 
developing countries. As well as evaluating these core functions, Jackson’s remit also extended 
to analysing internal staff and management issues. His 1969 report on the UN’s development 
mandate was a sobering indictment of its performance as seen through a rudimentary 
management lens. He began by asking: ‘Who controls this “Machine”’?365 His investigations 
seemed to reveal that ‘governments do not, and also that the machine is incapable of 
intelligently controlling itself’.366  
 Yet the problem for Jackson was not incompetent staff, but the composition of the 
machine itself. The UNDP was ‘so organised that managerial direction is impossible. In other 
words, the machine as a whole had ‘become unmanageable [and] is becoming slower and more 
unwieldy, like a prehistoric monster’.367 The UNDP had become too decentralised and many 
of its projects worked too independently to mount a coordinated response to multi-layered 
development issues. Looking inside the UNDP bureaucracy, Jackson lamented a lack of 
modern management methods including performance appraisal systems and a staff recruitment 
policy.368  
 While Jackson’s recommendations went relatively unheeded, his approach to UN 
reform became a template for similar efforts in the following years. Focusing on the efficiency 
of the system, Jackson took as settled the UNDP’s underlying aims and purpose. He brought a 
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typically technocratic vision which assumed both the universality of those aims and, indeed, 
the UNDP’s indispensability in realising them. Defining the problem as one of manageability, 
Jackson offered incremental fine-tuning of performance and oversight, which would result in 
a decades-long effort to make the UNDP ‘manageable’ according to standards of efficiency. 
Creating this need for management, Jackson’s approach was an early manifestation of 
managerial thinking in the UN organisation. 
 
3.2. The UN’s postcolonial condition 
 
 
Jackson did not, however, operate in historical isolation. In fact, it was precisely the historical 
moment in which he conducted his investigations that informed his managerial stance. The 
bodies Jackson surveyed including the UNDP, UN Children’s Fund, and UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), had turned the UN ‘into what is probably the most 
complex organisation in the world’.369 Yet as Jackson intimated throughout his report, that 
complexity itself resulted from massive geopolitical upheavals in the preceding decade. 
National struggles for independence throughout the Third World had led to many newly 
independent states joining the UN from the mid-1950s onwards. From its 51 founding members 
in 1945, the organisation had almost doubled in membership by 1960, the year in which 
Nigeria, Senegal, and the Congo were admitted. Also in that year, the UN General Assembly 
passed Resolution 1514 (XV) affirming the right of all peoples to self-determination.  
 However, it was not only numbers that challenged the UN infrastructure. Since its 
creation, the UN had, in the words of one British official, embodied ‘an Alliance of the Great 
Powers embedded in a universal organisation’.370 In 1945, many European powers retained 
their colonial administrations over vast territories in the Global South while other areas were 
classified under the old League of Nations mandate system. Therefore, and as Mazower 
recounts, the new UN organisation was ‘a product of empire’ offering a ‘more than adequate 
mechanism for its defence’.371 Not anticipating the degree of Third World resistance to imperial 
rule, the founders of the UN were therefore unprepared for the geographical and political bloc 
which emerged inside the organisation once decolonisation began.   
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 As far as the West was concerned, recent additions to the UN family did not pose any 
great upset to the existing balance of power in the early 1960s. This was despite the accelerating 
rate at which nations were gaining independence and the historic occasion of the 1955 
conference at Bandung.372 Geopolitics continued to be plotted on an East-West axis with the 
so-called ‘uncommitted third’ drawing little attention except as satellites or stages for proxy 
wars between the US and the Soviet Union.373 Yet as postcolonial states found a collective 
voice, particularly with the formation of the Group of 77 (G77) in June 1964, the UN began to 
shift from ‘an instrument of empire into an anti-colonial forum’.374  
 Already by the mid-1960s, the G77 comprised a numerical majority within the General 
Assembly and began to counterbalance Western institutional advantage by creating new bodies 
such as the UNDP, UNCTAD, and UNIDO. This strategy was part of an early move to realign 
the power of Western states and corporations and fed into the nascent Third World agenda 
known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Through the NIEO, Third World 
states lobbied for changes to the international trade and development regimes, international 
shipping, industrialisation policy, and the treatment of multinational companies. These radical 
calls commenced in fora such as the southern-dominated UNCTAD in 1964. By the time of 
UNCTAD’s second conference in New Delhi in 1968, though, Western states had failed to take 
any steps to undo their dominant bargaining position as centres of production, blocking reform 
to commodity pricing, import tariffs, and debt agreements. UNIDO and the UNDP had fared 
slightly better in their activities, but also attracted attention as sprawling administrations with 
an overtly political agenda.  
This is the context in which Jackson was commissioned to investigate UNDP: to 
enhance the UN’s development capacity through greater cooperation between the UN and the 
Third World, and to increase its financial resources. For Jackson, it was imperative that ‘the 
plight of two-thirds of mankind [not] be swept under the political rug and left there’.375 In this 
regard, Jackson’s managerial proposals, although minor, were designed to ensure the 
realisation of the development agenda through an efficient UN system.  
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 Jackson’s proposals can be seen as feeding the broader Third World agenda to secure 
the effectiveness of southern-dominated institutions.376 By 1974, the centrality of such 
institutions to the NIEO had been enshrined in the General Assembly’s Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and its Programme for Action. 
Acknowledging the ‘continuing severe economic imbalance’ between North and South, the 
General Assembly advanced changes to the international regime in the trade of raw materials 
and commodities, the international monetary system, and development financing among 
others. It called for a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and for establishing a 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.377 The Declaration positioned the 
UN at the core of this radical project:  
 
The UN as a universal organisation should be capable of dealing with problems of 
international economic cooperation in a comprehensive manner and ensuring equally 
the interests of all countries. It must have an even greater role in the establishment of a 
new international economic order.378 
 
As radical as its aims were, the NIEO project would still live or die by the institutions charged 
with its execution: UNCTAD, yes, but also UNDP, and the Economic and Social Council. 
Given that most of the NIEO project never came to pass, the question thus turns to what 
happened to such institutions, and what, if anything, management had to do with it.  
 
3.3. The managerial rebuttal 
 
 
As part of the NIEO, the G77 demanded nothing less than complete democratisation and 
participation in UN bodies, as well as the strengthening of the UNDP, ECOSOC, and other 
bodies to reflect the changing demographic and priorities of the world organisation. Indeed, by 
the time of the GA Declaration in 1974, the Third World could claim several important 
institutional victories. As Rajagopal describes, ‘the momentum created at Bandung was 
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resulting in concrete political contestations’.379 New doctrines like permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources were articulated, and the expansion of ECOSOC membership had created a 
Third World majority in that body. Having partly rebalanced the institution, Third World states 
began to articulate their own interests with a more unified voice. Thus, the emphasis went from 
getting a seat at the table to improving working methods, planning, and operational capacity. 
 These achievements, however, did not come without a sustained backlash from the 
West. Beginning in the mid-1960s, many Western states claimed they were no longer welcome 
in the Third World-oriented UN.380 The West had ‘banked on retaining their advantages, or at 
least as many of them as possible’ despite the granting of colonial independence.381 Witnessing 
their loosening grip on the UN throughout the 1970s, Western states launched a counter-
strategy against what they perceived as crude majoritarianism and politicisation. While many 
Western actors voiced their opposition, the US spearheaded the effort. 
 The intervention of one US official, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, captures the nature of 
that reply. Moynihan had been appointed as US ambassador to the UN in 1975, and already 
had begun to decry the ‘failure of American diplomacy’ in dealing with the new reality of a 
postcolonial UN.382 He took a hard stance against the machinations of the G77, recommending 
that the US go into opposition at the UN.383 The US, according to Moynihan, would have to 
admit to the power of the new ‘ideology’ being espoused by the Third World and better 
communicate the benefits of ‘international liberalism’ which had, after all, been responsible 
for establishing the UN in the first place. Western hegemony would not be restored through 
formal empire, but by way of an ‘intellectual and multitiered American response to 
decolonisation and its consequences’.384 
 The Western counter-offensive to the New International Economic Order took many 
forms, both within and without the UN organisation.385 One strategy, however, counteracted 
the specific limb of the NIEO devoted to democratising the UN. Western states recognised that 
many of the political demands and reforms which had been won by the G77 since the mid-
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1960s had been made possible as a result of the expanding membership and powers of UN 
development bodies. Without such institutional reforms, the NIEO project would have stalled 
before it commenced. Just as Third World states had looked on the UN of the immediate 
decolonisation period as a site for democratisation, then, Western states began looking at the 
same structures as sites for counter-reform not long after. For Western states, a ‘more 
fragmented United Nations system was seen as increasing their influence on the governance of 
the system’.386 Thus, the counter-reform strategy was set in place once the West began to view 
UN reform ‘in light of the conflict of interests between developed and developing countries’.387  
 These alternative visions of the UN – either as avenue for a new global order, or as 
obstacle to Western dominance – soon clashed.388 In December 1974, Secretary-General Kurt 
Waldheim was asked by the General Assembly to recruit a body of experts to propose reforms 
to the UN development framework. The expert body would submit ‘proposals on structural 
changes within the United Nations system so as to make it fully capable of dealing with 
problems of international economic cooperation’.389 Richard Gardner, a US diplomat who had 
served as ambassador to the UN during the Kennedy administration, was appointed to lead the 
25-member panel. Having been involved in the UN for much of his career, Gardner was 
concerned for the economic wellbeing of the developing countries much in the same way as 
Jackson had been some five years earlier. Indeed, prior to his appointment as panel chair, 
Gardner had offered some suggestions for improving the UN. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 
July 1970, Gardner diagnosed the UN as an ill patient too weak to address some of the most 
pressing diplomatic challenges of the time, including the crisis in the Middle East.  
 For Gardner, the UN also exhibited two specific pathologies which were increasingly 
being understood in tandem in the wake of Moynihan’s intellectual offensive. First, he 
observed ‘[t]here has been a marked decline in third-party attitudes and a marked increase in 
the tendency to vote, not on the merits of a question, but with regard to bloc affiliations and the 
protection of other interests’.390 Gardner acknowledged the inherently political nature of the 
institution, but argued that ‘[f]or the world organization to work more effectively, its members 
will have to give greater priority to their long-term interests in building a civilized system of 
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world order than to short-term considerations of national, ideological or racial advantage’.391 
Second, and answering the question of how to solve this and other issues, Gardner identified 
the 25th anniversary of the organisation as ‘an opportunity … to launch a continuing process of 
renewal and reform’ of this ‘ossified “establishment”’.392 This would help to address growing 
US ‘demoralization’.393 Despite his desire to address economic underdevelopment in the 
Global South, then, Gardner adopted an approach to reform which set the UN on the path 
towards more Western-friendly reform initiatives. 
 Gardner identified Third World politicisation of the UN as a problem whilst framing 
the solution in terms of seemingly apolitical reform. He proposed universalising UN 
membership, but also ‘reducing the gap between voting power and real power’.394 General 
Assembly procedures would need to be streamlined and greater attention paid to making the 
human rights framework more effective. Notably, Gardner stated that ‘a major overhaul is 
needed in the UN’s system of budget preparation and financial management’.395 In this regard, 
the UN ‘lagged behind most of its major members by its failure to develop a modern planning, 
programming and budget system’.396 Budgeting should be framed in terms of outputs to keep 
better track of performance and results. To improve the institutional machinery, the US would 
need to identify upcoming vacancies within the UN so that ‘qualified persons from the 
academic, professional and business worlds … can step into these assignments’.397 From this 
Western standpoint, Gardner concluded that a ‘genuine commitment to strengthen world order 
would imply lobbying hard for peacekeeping, economic or budgetary reforms where we [i.e. 
the US] believe they serve the general interest’.398 
 Gardner’s attempt to engage in an intellectual response to Third World ‘ideology’ was 
the technocratic outworking of Moynihan’s more explicit strategy. Yet the expert group’s final 
report published in 1975 displayed a more balanced approach to reform. Gardner diagnosed 
the system as fragmented and decentralised. He thus proposed a stronger General Assembly, 
additional monitoring powers for ECOSOC, a new Office for Programme Planning and 
Coordination therein, as well as a new office of Director-General for Development and 
International Economic Cooperation.399 Yet alongside these proposals, Gardner recommended 
 
391 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 663.  
392 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 660 and 662. 
393 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 662. 
394 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 666. 
395 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 671. 
396 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 671. 
397 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 675. 
398 Gardner, ‘Can the United Nations be Revived?’, 676. 
399 J. Müller, Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts (Vol. 1, Brill 1997) I/24. 
100 
 
a degree of expert audit of operational activities to ensure fiscal accountability and 
transparency. He also advocated the evaluation and grading of individual staff members in a 
bid to improve productivity and ‘eliminate unproductive staff’.400 The expert report paved the 
way for an Ad Hoc Committee on restructuring the UN’s economic and social sectors in 1978. 
By then, the new Director-General for Development had been appointed, largely to the benefit 
of Third World states, affirming the mixed outcome of Gardner’s proposals.  
 Despite these favourable outcomes for the Third World, the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
deliberations had centred on how to implement UN programmes ‘in a manner that maximises 
efficiency and upgrades resource management’.401 That orientation was sharpened with 
Western calls for further rationalisation. Western states also continued to advocate a turn away 
from the General Assembly and development bodies and towards the ‘traditional loci of 
international negotiation’ such as the Security Council and the Western-dominated financial 
institutions.402 The apparent institutional gains of the Third World through these early expert 
recommendations were nonetheless being discussed in the language of efficiency and resource 
management, both by experts and by Western states.  
 The Western reaction centred around arguments about the unaccountable and 
ineffective character of the UN’s development architecture. New programmes were labelled 
‘wasteful and unsystematic, lacking meaningful evaluation procedures and modern 
management techniques’.403 A 1977 study by the US Comptroller-General into US 
participation in international organisations posited that ‘[m]anagement problems within the 
international organisations themselves keep the US from participating more’.404 The UN would 
need to be reorganised ‘to increase the organisation’s efficiency and effectiveness’ and assuage 
US concerns.405 To that end, the Comptroller-General proposed that the UN provide more 
information to the US to facilitate greater transparency. He also stated that ‘immediate steps 
must be taken to strengthen and improve financial management, including evaluation and 
external audit’.406 Under this strategy to reorient the UN, the US would also need to devise new 
recruitment strategies to increase the number of American personnel within the organisation.407 
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 This growing invocation of management at home seeped into Western strategies at the 
UN. The political scientist Stanley Hoffmann observed that the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
deliberations encapsulated ‘the American tradition of “apolitical pragmatism that stresses 
efficiency above all”’.408 Another commentator noted that efficiency, planning, and audit 
mechanisms were becoming ‘essential features of any restructuring design’ proffered by the 
US.409 In some ways, this flow of American management knowledge into the UN mimicked 
the flow of knowledge across the Atlantic during the Marshall Plan, and later by McKinsey. 
As such, and despite some calls from within the UN for the more ‘large-scale transfer of 
resources to developing countries’, institutional efforts remained incremental and managerial, 
rather than radical in nature.410  
 The potency of the efficiency argument is exemplified by the issue of staffing, 
specifically the question of geographical representation among UN personnel. After 
decolonisation, the geographical distribution of staff began to catch up with the new 
demography of the UN. By 1978, the US had begun to counteract the growth in Third World 
staff by identifying vacant UN posts for American personnel to fill. Yet US officials frequently 
raised this as a matter of efficiency. For example, Robert Jordan, a former US director of 
research at UNITAR, penned an article tellingly entitled ‘What Has Happened to Our 
International Civil Service?’. He suggested therein that ‘[t]he pendulum may have swung too 
far in favour of equitable geographical distribution’, arguing that ‘it is time to focus more on 
efficiency, competence and integrity’.411 By adopting performance appraisal techniques ‘used 
by selected national civil services and by some private sector enterprises’, the institution would 
therefore create a more productive workforce irrespective of background.412 Jordan justified 
this proposal by arguing that ‘the more efficiently the organisation’s activities are carried out, 
the greater the benefits for the newer member states’.413  
 Following the same logic, the International Civil Service Commission in 1979 
prioritised ‘the efficient and effective utilization of human resources’ through new tools of 
appraisal, individual work plans, and staff training.414 These practices would not only increase 
staff productivity, but would also, according to the Commission, generate ‘a sense of affiliation 
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with the organisation’ and ‘fulfil the individual’s need to retain a sense of control over his/her 
personal destiny in the increasingly complex and impersonalized modern industrial society’.415 
 The deployment of efficiency arguments, apparently within a broader Western strategy 
to stall the NIEO call for UN democratisation only grew when Ronald Reagan became US 
President in November 1980. Perhaps the most notable policy shift in US-UN relations under 
Reagan was the conditionalities he attached to continuing US financial contributions. The UN 
had faced budgetary shortfalls throughout its brief life, but by the mid-1980s, Reagan and the 
US Congress decided that the US would reduce its contribution by 20 percent unless and until 
the UN implemented a system of weighted voting based on national economic output.416 Not 
only did Reagan intend to claw back Western dominance within the institution, but this 
financial brinkmanship was also designed to demand further cuts to certain UN bodies and 
programmes.417 This was fuelled by claims of ‘politicization’ and ‘anti-Western bias’ but also 
‘rampant budgetary mismanagement’.418 It was for these reasons that the US withdrew from 
UNESCO in 1984. 
 Not only external pressures, but also internal triangulation, bolstered the efficiency 
discourse. UN officials pushed for the implementation of managerial tools in the interests of 
heightened performance. The proposals of the UN’s Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) demonstrate 
the discursive effect of the sustained deployment of efficiency principles. The JIU Statute, 
adopted by General Assembly resolution 31/192 (1976) vested it with the power to investigate 
‘all matters having a bearing on the efficiency of the services and the proper use of funds’ of 
the UN with the aim of ‘improving management and methods’.419 A core JIU member from 
the outset was Maurice Bertrand, a French public administration expert who served in the unit 
from its inception until 1985, whereupon he was appointed to an expert panel on UN 
restructuring. By 1985, Bertrand and his co-inspectors had penned ‘well over 200 reports, 
dealing with administrative, financial, and structural aspects’.420 Throughout their 
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investigations, the JIU adopted a view of UN dysfunction, prompting them to look for better 
ways to manage processes, finances, and personnel. In one report, the JIU reflected on the UN’s 
‘extraordinary complexity’, poor results and underperforming staff.421 This was not, however, 
to admit to the UN’s failure, but to recognise ‘the historic role played by the United Nations’ 
and to affirm ‘its importance and usefulness today’.422 Their technical diagnoses thus 
reaffirmed the need for an institutionalised response to the world’s governance problems. 
 Bertrand and his colleagues were under no illusion about the wider context in which 
efficiency proposals were being made. Reflecting on the US strategy during the 1980s, 
Bertrand observed that  
 
[a]bove all it was not a question of improving the functioning of the World 
Organization through a process of management or to increase its efficiency, but solely 
a matter of regaining control over the United Nations and thereby preventing them from 
being able to continue serving as a propaganda forum against the United States and 
against Reagan.423 
 
This acknowledgment distinguishes the more naïve stance adopted by the JIU in its reports, 
namely that ‘North and South were both seeking a new type of dialogue and considering 
whether the management … could provide the opportunity’.424 Despite appreciating the politics 
of management, then, internal officials were both powerless to efface organisational reliance 
on UN funding and yet still confident in the power of specifically managerial reform to benefit 
the UN as a whole. Such ambivalence is characteristic of the trend to see solutions in 
managerial tweaking, rather than the more radical democratisation of the UN which had been 
a central pillar of the NIEO. By the mid-1980s, the meaning of reform had shifted from 
democratisation to efficient management, and with it went the prospect of realising the NIEO 
through the UN.  
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3.4. Managerial consolidation 
 
 
What expert reform initiatives lacked in their implementation, they made up for in rebuffing 
the most radical proposals of the Global South. The West had made budgetary restraint, 
efficiency, and oversight a primary concern of any reform effort, as is apparent from the 
discussions of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts in 1985. Known as the 
Group of 18, these experts were to ‘conduct a thorough review of the administrative and 
financial matters of the United Nations, with a view to identifying measures for further 
improving the efficiency of its administrative and financial functioning’.425 Immediately, the 
group’s recommendations appeased, whether by accident or design, American concerns. They 
suggest that the procedure for passing the UN budget be done not via positive vote but by 
consensus. In effect, this would require that all members agree on the final budget, giving major 
financial contributors a de facto veto power.426 Under such a scheme, the group appeared to 
follow US demands for aligning institutional power with economic power based on the 
rationale of ‘efficiency’. 
 Aside from changes to the budget process, the group’s proposals were coded throughout 
with managerial concerns. They recommended restructuring the Secretariat, creating robust 
internal and external audit processes, and ‘monitoring, evaluation and inspection’ of personnel 
through periodic evaluation reports and a staff rating system.427 Through this cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency logic, ‘“reform” became synonymous [with] “cost-cutting”’ while 
organisational priorities ‘were subjugated to a relentless quest for savings’.428 
 The Group of 18’s proposals reveal the extent of internal support for managerial tools, 
but also the degree of external pressure exacted by influential groups advocating something 
even more radical. US concerns over budgetary mismanagement, politicisation, and 
inefficiency had initially been voiced by diplomats like Moynihan and Gardner. But during the 
Reagan years, conservative thinktanks like the Heritage Foundation were highly influential in 
shaping both official US foreign policy and the parameters in which many discussions on UN 
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reform took place. Combining an anti-communist stance with religious and economic 
conservatism, Heritage was founded in 1973 to counterbalance the liberal policies of the 
Brookings Institution. Once Reagan was elected in 1980, Heritage’s manifesto fed into national 
debate and crafted US policy on international affairs.429 It saw the UN as a socialist and 
therefore anti-American organisation which had been hijacked by the G77. For Heritage ‘the 
benefits that the US once enjoyed from participation in the UN have been completely negated 
by politicisation, mismanagement, and corruption within its bodies, programs and agencies’.430  
 Prior to the Group of 18’s deliberations, Heritage published a report entitled A World 
Without a United Nations. Criticising the ideology of the G77, Heritage advocated US 
unilateralism and disengagement with the ‘poisonous’ General Assembly.431 International 
diplomacy would function perfectly well, they said, without ‘the UN’s costly Secretariat, its 
cronyism, legions of bureaucracy, its high salaries and lavish perquisites and its anti-Western 
ideology’.432 Their report concludes that ‘a world without the United Nations would be a better 
world’.433 
 Yet however much Heritage espoused a radically conservative vision of the world, they 
were cognisant of how heavily invested states were in the UN machine. They did not have 
much hope for a world without the UN coming to pass. In lieu of such a world, a much-reduced 
organisational capacity for the UN became a reasonable alternative for Heritage. During the 
Group of 18 debates, Heritage issued recommendations to ‘trim[] the bureaucratic fat’ and 
enhance staff oversight.434 In this way, they fed into an already well-established narrative of 
institutional mismanagement and underperformance.  
 The Group of 18, while not responding directly to Heritage’s suggestions, nonetheless 
adopted the same paradigm. Issuing its 77 recommendations in August 1986, the group focused 
heavily on the ‘intergovernmental machinery and its functioning’ including the structure of the 
Secretariat and personnel performance measures.435 The latter of these attracted 22 
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recommendations including the proposal of a new Office of Human Resource Management 
and a system for the Secretary-General to record, rate and compare staff performance.436 
Pursuant to these proposals, the then Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, acknowledged the 
‘uncertainty’ created by heightened scrutiny and potential staff redundancies.437 Much as 
Heritage had hoped, the group’s recommendations resulted in some of the ‘bureaucratic fat’ 
being trimmed, even while the number of human resources experts increased. 
 The International Civil Service Commission followed up on the group’s proposals by 
recommending the implementation of a UN-wide performance management regime. The 
Commission envisaged a performance appraisal system to standardise the evaluation of staff 
through supervisory meetings, ratings, and sanctions for underperformance.438 The new Office 
of Human Resource Management assisted in this scheme by publishing a Personnel Manual to 
consolidate policies and practices across the UN common system. As these moves suggest, the 
Group of 18’s proposals were more readily implemented than predecessor reports and by 1988, 
‘several departments had undergone a detailed review of their structures in order to enhance 
their efficiency’.439 One Secretariat official noted that ‘[t]he reforms of the late 1980s could 
also be seen as a first phase in the discussion and implementation of effective management and 
leadership concepts in the Organisation in the new post-Cold War era’.440 
 By 1990, UN reform and efficient management had become axiomatic, with Western 
states, policy thinktanks, and UN officials and experts collectively excising NIEO hopes for 
democratisation from the agenda. The nineties were perhaps the most intense years of reform 
the UN had yet experienced. Several developments illustrate the extent of managerialisation 
during this period, as well as the commingling of geopolitical and expert forces to cement the 
UN’s global status as the Cold War ended. 
 In 1990, the JIU’s mandate was narrowed to focus exclusively on UN management 
problems. By resolution 45/237, the General Assembly authorised the JIU inspectors to ‘take 
a more selective approach in drawing up its work programme to give greater attention to 
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management, budgetary and administrative issues’ and to provide short reports with more 
quantifiable statistics, graphics, and tables.441 The General Assembly repeated the need for 
such a managerial mindset in 1993. Resolution 48/221 requested that the JIU ‘put more 
emphasis on inspection and evaluation to ensure optimum use of funds in order to enhance the 
efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations system’.442 The 
JIU followed suit. A 1995 JIU report characterised the UN as ‘a growing web of administrative 
controls and mandates that have enveloped the government bodies, leadership and staff of the 
United Nations in bureaucratic gridlock without providing the intended managerial culture’.443  
 This intensified managerialism of UN officials in the early nineties coincided with a 
new geopolitical dispensation precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War. Bipolarity had given way to multipolarity and the growing prospect of 
international cooperation on collective issues. And Security Council activities had increased, 
particularly in the deployment of peacekeeping missions in various parts of the Global South. 
In this new world order, the UN occupied a central space in resolving problems as diverse as 
poverty, environmental degradation, and, soon, impunity for international crimes. The internal 
efforts characterising this period therefore focused on how to make the UN fit for purpose in a 
post-1989 world. Such an effort, led by Western states including the United States, contrasts 
markedly with the Western recalcitrance that had predominated in the UN of the 1970s and 
1980s. Yet it was the West’s successful reorientation of the UN towards their interests, 
particularly in the area of human rights, that now gave the UN such credence. The organisation 
had emerged ‘in a guise more acceptable to Washington’ than at any time in the preceding 25 
years, thereby allowing the effectiveness of the organisation to become a central limb of 
Western states’ foreign policies.444  
 As UN effectiveness became an aim in its own right, successive Secretaries-General 
took an active interest in reform. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan were more managerial 
than their predecessors. At his inauguration ceremony in December 1991, Boutros-Ghali 
captured the technocratic spirit guiding institutional action, informing his audience that 
‘[d]espite the close ties that bind me to optimism, my ties to realism are even closer’.445 
Boutros-Ghali’s pragmatic idealism prevented him from ‘go[ing] beyond what is feasible’.446 
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He would instead ‘welcome and … study every proposal, from within and without this House, 
for streamlining our operations, eliminating what is wasteful and obsolete’.447 
 Embarking on reform in February 1993, Boutros-Ghali eliminated duplicate layers of 
the Secretariat and abolished several high-level posts. One of these was the DG Development 
post, so forcefully lobbied for by the G77 in the mid-1970s, and now removed in a bureaucratic 
exercise in a display of how significantly the balance had tipped. Other managerial posts were 
created in its place such as the Under Secretary-General for administration and management 
who would oversee budgetary and personnel reform. One of the first occupants of this position 
was Joseph Connor, former head of the management consultancy firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.448 
 Despite these reformist moves, the UN was not entirely free from US criticism during 
the nineties. A failed US-led peacekeeping operation in Somalia caused the new Clinton 
administration to tone down its ebullient peacekeeping strategy. It reintroduced conditions to 
its UN financial contributions, and once again deployed efficiency rationales. Clinton stated 
the UN would ‘need to reduce budget provisions, increase efficiency and effectiveness, 
streamline inter-governmental bodies, and de-emphasise programs considered not in the 
American interest’.449 He was suspicious of growing UN bureaucracy and preferred a more 
entrepreneurial style of governance both in the domestic and international spheres. This style 
had been advocated by Clinton after reading Reinventing Government, a popular management 
text in the early nineties which reapplied NPM ideas and tools to the state apparatus.450  
 Further to this NPM mindset, Clinton and the US Congress proposed some managerial 
innovations. One was an ‘American-style’ Inspector General’s Office within the UN to 
‘promote efficiency and effectiveness in the administration, ensure systematic evaluation of 
programs, and identify and root out alleged bureaucratic waste, fraud and abuse’.451 Shortly 
after, the UN established an Office of Internal Oversight Services with monitoring 
responsibilities. This was accompanied by an external audit of oversight mechanisms, an 
updated human resources strategy, and a new Efficiency Board.452 In its first year, the 
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Efficiency Board would identify ‘400 efficiency measures’, implementing roughly 20 percent 
of them.453 For the first time, the International Civil Service Commission began to advocate 
the use of mission statements ‘as a basis for strategic planning’ and to foster a ‘performance-
related culture’.454 
 Despite these reforms, considerable pressure was applied by the US not to re-elect 
Boutros-Ghali as head in 1996.455 A political dislike of Boutros-Ghali was framed and 
combined with accusations of mismanagement. The preferred replacement was an archetypal 
UN careerist. Kofi Annan joined the UN in 1962 and had served under Boutros-Ghali in the 
early 1990s as Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resource Management. He had also 
been part of the team creating the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Once elected as 
Secretary-General in 1996, he became the ‘doyen of all UN reformers’.456 Annan centralised 
managerial decision-making in the hands of a Senior Management Group comprising the heads 
of various UN departments and programmes. His 1997 report, Renewing the United Nations, 
redeployed many of the most familiar managerial practices. Annan hoped his human resources 
expertise would allow him to foster a new ‘management culture’.457 He created career 
management and training procedures ‘to help field staff to think more strategically, take greater 
responsibility, manage teams and stand accountable for allocating resources and achieving 
results’.458  
 Annan had in mind a results-oriented civil servant who would be an efficient resource 
to the organisation. A staff competencies model reproduced that image. International civil 
servants would uphold ‘core values’, and were to be evaluated based on qualities of ‘leadership, 
vision, empowering others, building trust, managing performance, and judgment/decision-
making’.459 Managers would also receive training in personnel management to standardise the 
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appraisal process.460 In August 1998, a month after the closing of the Rome Conference which 
had established a permanent International Criminal Court, Annan created a Strategic Planning 
Unit. The Unit would identify and plan the Secretary-General’s priorities, prepare policy 
documents, and ensure the effective realisation of UN goals.461 Together, Boutros-Ghali and 
Annan helped crystallise a managerial way of seeing the UN and its activities after decades of 
struggle by many states and other actors within and without the organisation. These factors 
coalesced to make efficient management the standard for assessing institutional performance 
and the realisation of global governance. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, I provided an historical account or genealogy of management in modern 
organisations as a gateway to a more robust conceptualisation of managerial practices. 
Although in the previous chapter, I defined managerial practices in the abstract as techniques 
of knowledge production, it was necessary to trace the emergence and impact of management 
on the international institutional plane to gain a clearer picture of what management is when 
translated to international law and global governance.  
The picture offered in this chapter contrasts with the mainstream view of management 
and refines somewhat the critical international law literature on technocracy. First, the 
managerial character of global governance, i.e. the resort to vocabularies of efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, and performance oversight as a way of managing problems, was neither timeless 
nor inevitable. Managerial practices were injected into the international legal lexicon only in 
the early 1970s and even then required considerable reinforcement in order to become part of 
the institutional vocabulary of the UN.  
Second, the above episodes demonstrate the highly political nature of these managerial 
tools in contrast to the claim of objectivity espoused by international lawyers past and present. 
Management’s American and corporate origins were responsible for subsequent moves to 
expand first to Europe in the Marshall Plan, and thence to the public sector. Management was 
deployed geo-strategically in Western efforts to fend off Soviet influence in post-war Europe 
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and economically to form national public sectors in the more efficient image of the private 
company. As techniques of knowledge, strategic planning, auditing, and performance appraisal 
refashioned organisations as managerial institutions and their staff as optimal cogs in the 
machine.  
These political, economic and expert forces were also visible in the UN context. 
Managerial practices and the efficiency logic they transmitted entered the UN just after Third 
World states began advocating a radical realignment of the organisation and the global 
economy. Promoted principally by Western states, but also senior UN officials and experts, the 
effects of the efficiency discourse was to neuter calls for UN democratisation. As the 1980s 
wore on, the radicalism of the NIEO project was replaced with the technical and seemingly 
apolitical project of efficient UN management. 
 This history of the managerial present provides an alternative understanding of 
management as a set of knowledge practices which discursively shape a particular vision of the 
organisation and its professional staff. Such a conception emerges only once we acknowledge 
that management is always already embedded ‘in a particular, historically bounded and 
philosophically informed view of the world’, and that it in turn reproduces that worldview.462 
Moving to Part 2 of the thesis, I consider how managerial practices reinforced the particular 
worldview or imaginary adopted by the international criminal justice community as it came 
together to form the International Criminal Court.  
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3 Managerial Practices at the 
 International Criminal Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapters equip us with several insights which can be applied to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and the international criminal justice (ICJ) project more broadly. The 
preceding genealogy reveals patterns of justification and argument for management within 
private, national, and international institutions, and the actors who deploy those arguments. 
Both domestically and globally, managerial practices have often been invoked on the basis of 
some broad appeal to efficiency but this has often masked how such practices have 
(re)produced certain political arrangements to the benefit of those proposing them, whether it 
is the United States in post-war Europe or the West in the postcolonial United Nations (UN).  
By the 1990s – the ‘Decade of International Law’ – managerial practices were ubiquitous 
throughout international institutions, assisting both lawyers and policy-makers in their efforts 
to realise a growing set of global aims.463 This chapter maps the deployment of managerial 
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practices within the ICC as the first permanent institution designed to realise one of those global 
aims, that of ending impunity.  
Aside from the centrality of the ‘anti-impunity’ message to modern-day international 
law, the ICC is an interesting point of enquiry because of its ambitious yet still technocratic 
aims. Within the ICJ community, the ICC is conceived as the ‘historical crescendo’ of 
collective efforts to end global injustice.464 For four former Presidents of the Assembly of 
States Parties (ASP), the ICC represents ‘a unique opportunity to fill the impunity gap’.465 
Indeed, the ICC has been invested with considerable hope by those who ‘belie[ve] in the central 
role of accountability for the most serious crimes of international concern’.466 The court is 
regarded as not merely a step on the road to international justice, but its ‘logical endgame’,467 
hence the narrative of ‘the gradual centralization of criminal repressive resources into 
international bodies’.468 Thus, when it was finally created in 1998, the ICC was said to have 
inaugurated a ‘global criminal justice system’.469  
 In these ambitious readings of the ICC – which reflect a technocratic imaginary – I ask 
what role managerial practices played in their (re)production. I begin by recalling the potential 
alternatives to a justice project populated by international criminal law institutions and experts. 
These non-institutionalised, non-expert-led versions of ICJ, while present since the mid-20th 
century, have been consistently side-lined by the ICJ community in their efforts to tackle global 
injustice. Hence, it was not only the Rome Conference, but also the machinations of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) beginning in the 1950s which established some of the 
boundaries of modern ICJ as an institutional project. Those early debates set the discursive 
parameters for the 1990s negotiations on a permanent international criminal court. After 
deciding on a permanent institutional and expert-led solution to global injustice, the drafters at 
Rome brought efficiency concerns into the heart of this institutional experiment during 
negotiations on the court’s funding model and in response to external developments at the ad 
 
464 V. Nesiah, ‘Doing History with Impunity’, in K. Engle et al. (eds), Anti-Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda 
(CUP 2016) 95, 95. 
465 Z. Al Hussein et al., ‘The International Criminal Court Needs Fixing’ (Atlantic Council, 24 April 2019) 
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hoc tribunals. Having created a space for the efficiency discourse, the court’s first staff began 
to lay its managerial foundations between 1998 and 2002. And once it opened its doors, the 
ICC began to construct a managerial scaffolding with a view to producing an efficient and 
rationalised project of international justice.  
 A range of actors, both internal and external, legal and non-legal, practical and 
scholarly, have fed the image of an optimal system of justice by invoking and implementing 
tools such as strategic planning, efficiency measures, and reengineering exercises. As seen in 
the UN example, and as repeated below, such tools have often been deployed at the ICC in a 
climate of political pressure, both from wealthy Western states concerned about budgetary 
overspend and from African states frustrated with the court’s priorities. In keeping with the 
argument advanced previously, though, I find that managerial practices solidified ICJ as an 
exclusively technocratic project to the detriment of those other ways of doing international 
criminal justice advocated by non-Western states and NGOs. At the ICC, then, managerial 
practices have produced an institution driven by its own efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and 
performance oversight, thereby reinforcing the already narrow coordinates of international 
criminal justice.  
  
1. Making the institution manageable 
1.1. Non-institutionalised international criminal justice? 
 
 
Before looking to the institutionalised vision of ICJ which the ILC embraced in the 1950s, it is 
worth considering some of the alternative visions of ICJ and indeed global justice470 which 
were already in existence up until then. The point is not to romanticise these alternatives, but 
to recall that responses to injustice were present as early as the 1950s even if they have since 
been crowded out by the professional ICJ project commencing in the 1990s.  
 One imaginary, which eschewed the technocratic trappings of contemporary ICJ, was 
the notion of collective and popular justice embodied in peoples’ tribunals. Peoples’ tribunals 
have been set up by transnational groups seeking to examine and record structural rather than 
 
470 To focus on the alternative imaginaries of ICJ is not to discount or deprioritise broader imaginaries of ‘global 
justice’ which do not contain state-based, juridical, or penological features. It is merely to focus on ICJ as one 
aspect of global justice, see F. Mégret, ‘What Sort of Global Justice is “International Criminal Justice”?’ (2015) 
13 JICJ 77, 79. 
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isolated instances of injustice. They include, most famously, the Russell Tribunal established 
in 1967 to hold the United States to account for its actions during the Vietnam War,471 and 
more recently, tribunals dealing with the use of ‘comfort women’ by the Japanese military 
during WWII,472 the 1965 mass killings in Indonesia,473 and the responsibility of ‘Europe’ for 
the injustices committed against refugees and migrants since 1993474. Often presided over by 
non-legal experts and with aims going beyond the delivery of a verdict, peoples’ tribunals 
represent an image of ICJ which is less institutionalised but also less constrained by substantive 
and geographic jurisdictional limits than formal court proceedings.475  
 Another set of non-institutionalised conceptions have been applied locally and 
nationally as a means of redressing violence and injustice in the wake of conflict. These 
alternatives are too numerous to recount here but often comprise modes of transitional and 
transformative justice including truth and reconciliation commissions, reparations, and 
psychosocial healing.476 Furthermore, Nouwen and Werner list a range of local alternatives to 
ICJ institutions including the ‘restoration of relationships’ under the Acholi notion of justice; 
restorative justice as a means of ending ongoing conflict; and redistribution of ‘wealth, power 
and opportunities’ to address underlying causes of violence.477  
 Beyond local mechanisms, even familiar international and juridical responses to mass 
atrocity have historically captured activities which have since fallen off the radar of more recent 
institutional efforts. The most obvious of such responses is the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg. In mainstream accounts, Nuremberg represents the origin point of international 
criminal law and the experimental precursor to the ad hoc and permanent international criminal 
tribunals of the 1990s.478 In addition to prosecuting high-ranking members of the Nazi regime, 
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the US Nuremberg trials extended to investigating Nazi economic imperialism (as a cause of 
military aggression) and thus the international criminal liability of corporate actors such as IG 
Farben and Alfried Krupp.479 Despite the IMT’s prosecution of economic activities, though, 
the subsequent emphasis on individual criminal responsibility within ICL has led to ‘de facto 
corporate impunity’ for international crimes.480 
 Without fetishizing any of these alternative imaginaries of ICJ, the point is to recall that 
other imaginaries did exist by the time the ILC began its deliberations on establishing an 
international criminal jurisdiction in the 1950s, and a fortiori, when the Commission reprised 
the theme forty years later. Moving to analyse the ILC’s debates we can begin to see how it 
rendered ICJ an institutionalised and expert-driven enterprise which thereafter became fused 
with the discourse of efficiency during negotiations at Rome.  
 
1.2. Institutionalising international criminal justice 
 
 
Plans for an institutional response to mass atrocity began almost as soon as the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo IMTs finished in the late 1940s. After the establishment of the ILC in 1947, its members 
were almost immediately given authorisation by the General Assembly to examine the topic of 
an ‘international criminal jurisdiction’.481  
 Alongside codifying the Nuremberg Principles, the ILC was to consider the 
‘desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of 
persons, charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon 
that organ by international conventions’.482 All such proposals took on a more or less 
institutionalised form. One model given attention but ultimately failing to receive the support 
of ILC members was the idea of a ‘Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice’.483 
Although members noted that such a chamber was ‘possible’ even though it would require an 
amendment to the court’s Statute, they decided not to endorse the idea. Despite acknowledging 
the ‘many difficulties which the establishment and functioning of an international criminal 
 
479 G. Baars, ‘Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? The Hidden Stories Behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-
WWII’, in K. Heller and G. Simpson (eds), Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (CUP 2013) 163, 179.  
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481 UNGA Resolution 260B(III), 9 December 1948.  
482 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 2nd Session, A/CN.4/34 1950, Vol. II, 
Part IV, para. 128 (‘ILC Report 1950’). 
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jurisdiction would encounter’, notably its impracticality and possible ineffectiveness, these 
factors did not, as far as the ILC was concerned, reduce the desirability of an institutionalised 
ICJ mechanism.484 By July 1950, commissioners thus concluded that ‘the establishment of an 
international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes … is 
desirable’.485  
 Despite offering quite detailed plans for an institutional mechanism, the ILC’s 
proposals were shelved for forty years as the General Assembly deferred consideration of a 
code of crimes.486 Only in the early 1990s was the ILC seized of the topic again, at which time 
several scholars had already rallied behind the idea of a permanent international criminal 
court.487 Moreover, the establishment of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda provided a glimpse into how internationalised ICJ might work by 
putting a cadre of professional international criminal lawyers to work in building a nascent ICL 
jurisprudence and institutional apparatus.488 By the time the ILC properly reprised the topic of 
an international criminal jurisdiction in 1992, the parameters of this new international 
experiment had largely been set.  
 Under the chairmanship of Abdul Koroma, an ILC working group was established. 
During its deliberations, the working group identified a treaty-based international criminal 
court as an appropriate mechanism through which to prosecute individuals for various 
international crimes. However, the proposed court differed structurally from the ILC’s earlier 
and later models. The working group envisaged that ‘[i]n the first phase of its operations, at 
least, the court would not be a standing full-time body’ but would be a ‘legal mechanism which 
could be available to be called into operation as and when required’.489 Some delegates raised 
questions over the feasibility and effectiveness of such a mechanism. Others cited the mixed 
record of the postwar IMTs, notably on questions of retroactivity and jurisdictional scope, in 
arguing for strengthened national prosecutions and universal jurisdiction laws as alternatives 
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to a treaty-based court.490 Yet in summarising its ‘general approach’ to the question of 
structure, the working group articulated its preference for a court as ‘a flexible facility at the 
international level’.491  
 By the time James Crawford succeeded Koroma as chair of the working group, not only 
had the idea for an institutional mechanism crystallised, but the future institution was 
increasingly envisaged as a permanent court. Although it was still considered then that the court 
‘will not have a large infrastructure or a permanent staff’, the ILC nonetheless embarked on 
‘produc[ing] a workable structure for a permanent court’.492 According to the ILC, the principal 
paradox with which it had to contend was whether to opt for the more ‘practical solution of a 
non-standing permanent body’ or ‘the more desirable alternative of a full-time organ’.493 Its 
1994 draft Statute sought to ‘combine the two approaches by providing for the present realistic 
and pragmatic arrangement, while at the same time envisaging the possibility of the court 
remaining permanently in session in the long term as a way of encouraging uniformity and 
further development of the law’.494 Thus, and despite recommendations that the court’s nature 
be left for states to decide, the ILC arrived at this compromise as the bedrock for discussions 
at the Ad Hoc Committee.  
 With the available options pared down to the question of how permanent the permanent 
court would be, deliberations moved elsewhere. The Ad Hoc Committee considered other 
central features of the court such as its relationship to the United Nations and the extent of its 
prosecutorial powers.495 Meanwhile, a consensus began to emerge on the less controversial 
question of the court’s permanence. As one attendee put it, ‘[a]lmost all the delegations that 
spoke to this question thought so [i.e. that the court should be permanent] but believed that it 
should sit only when it was needed’.496   
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1.3. Efficiency in the drafting stage of the Rome Statute  
 
 
Where did efficiency feature in these negotiations? Both the ILC working group and the 
majority of Ad Hoc Committee delegates were uninterested in questions of organisational 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In the 1950s, concerns about any future body’s 
ineffectiveness were considered political rather than ‘legal or technical’ questions which should 
be left for the General Assembly to weigh up.497 In the ILC working group forty years later, 
the desire for a full-time body was said to rub up against the practical need for flexibility. It 
seemed that permanence and efficiency were mutually exclusive, as suggested by the UN 
Secretary-General’s 1995 observation that a non-standing body would be more ‘consistent with 
the goals of flexibility and cost-efficiency’ than a permanent one.498 
 This zero-sum configuration of ICJ as either fully institutionalised and possibly 
inefficient, or efficient but potentially skeletal and non-uniform began to change during the Ad 
Hoc Committee discussions, particularly as a result of interventions by the United Kingdom 
and the United States. During an April 1995 session of the Committee, the UK delegation asked 
participants to ‘constantly bear in mind this question: is it the best use of limited resources to 
undertake international investigations and prosecutions with all the difficulties and duplication 
of personnel that that involves…?’499 In keeping with some of the ILC’s earlier proposals, but 
also with an eye on finances, the UK suggested instead that resources ‘continue to be devoted 
to national prosecutions’.500  
 US representatives raised similar concerns even if they tacitly accepted the call for 
permanence.501 Scrutinising the 1994 draft Statute, the US warned that it ‘contain[ed] no 
provisions regarding the budget and administration of the court’.502 Harking back to its 
managerial concerns at the UN, the US argued that ‘[i]n order to provide for effective 
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functioning and adequate oversight, a number of such matters must be addressed’.503 US 
delegates deemed cost-effectiveness to be ‘of the highest priority in the consideration of the 
draft Statute and the ability of the international community to support the international criminal 
court’.504 These interventions by two influential would-be states parties raised the status of 
efficiency concerns within the negotiations.  
 By September 1995, delegates began to countenance the possibility of a permanent and 
efficient court. This approach was most apparent in the deliberations on draft article 4(1):  
 
The approach reflected in article 4, paragraph 1, of the draft statute, whereby the court 
would be established as a permanent institution which would act when required to 
consider a case submitted to it, was described as an acceptable compromise which 
sought to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the requirements of flexibility and 
cost-effectiveness in the operation of the court and, on the other hand, the need to 
promote, as an alternative to ad hoc tribunals, a permanent judicial organ, able to ensure 
uniformity and consistency in the application and further development of international 
criminal law.505  
 
Such a conclusion reflects a shift in the drafters’ thinking to provide a space within the future 
permanent institution for efficiency considerations. Having made that slight yet significant 
move, delegates set aside further discussion of efficiency and cost-effectiveness concerns until 
after the court’s jurisdictional limits and structures had been settled. Thus, one group of Ad 
Hoc Committee delegates stated in August 1996 that  
 
at this point of our deliberations, financial considerations should not focus on cost 
factors. This is something that should be taken up later in the context of a feasibility 
study that would outline the administrative structure, personal requirements, resources 
requirements, and other costs relating to the entire body.506  
 
Efficiency concerns would be delayed until after the court’s basic features were settled. In the 
meantime, it was decided that the court would have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals, but 
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not corporations. It would investigate and prosecute a small number of ‘core’ international 
crimes which excluded offences such as slave trading or drug trafficking, while prioritising 
crimes causing direct and physical violence. The court would have jurisdiction to assess 
criminal activities committed after the state had ratified the Statute or in any case only upon 
the Statute’s entry into force. And the Rome Statute, like any treaty-based system, would be 
predicated on the formal consent of states, excepting situations referred by the UN Security 
Council under article 13(b). After solidifying these parameters of ICJ, efficiency concerns re-
entered discussions. In fact, efficiency was thrust to the forefront of drafters’ minds in the run 
up to the Rome Conference due to two factors in particular: the outcome of negotiations on the 
court’s funding model, and managerial developments at other tribunals. I consider these in turn. 
 
1.4. Importing the efficiency discourse I: Discussions on the ICC’s funding model 
 
 
The Preparatory Committee turned its attention to the court’s funding regime relatively late in 
the negotiations, in spring 1998. Delegates were aware that depending on which funding model 
they selected, the court would not only have different degrees of independence and institutional 
stability, but also different prospects for success. However well-designed the court’s 
substantive crimes or its legal procedures, ‘there was a general understanding that its authority 
would be undermined if hampered by a lack of adequate, long-term and secure funding’.507 
Thus, commentators have noted that a ‘common concern underlying most of the views 
expressed during the Preparatory Committee was the impact the financing could have on the 
effectiveness of the Court’.508 Others have described the debate as an exercise in weighing up 
competing priorities. Halff et al., for example, recall that 
 
[t]he discussion in the Preparatory Committee therefore focused on finding a 
mechanism that would be able to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the 
Court, while at the same time avoiding the situation in which the prospective financial 
burden could be a prohibitive factor for States considering accession to the Statute.509 
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Although independence and stability was one axis on which the various funding discussions 
took place, the above statement also suggests that states were divided between those more and 
less well-placed to deliver the court’s budget. Thus, wealthy states located in the Global North 
preferred a self-funded court while the majority of delegates representing Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America favoured a UN-funded institution.  
 Western states recommended a self-funded court in contrast to the ad hoc tribunals 
which had been financed by the UN. These states argued that a self-funded court would not 
only be more self-sufficient but would also be more financially accountable because overseen 
by its donors. Conversely, a UN-funded court, they argued, could be subject to the whims of a 
particularly wealthy UN member who was not party to the court. That state might seek to 
interfere with or disrupt court activities either by reducing contributions to the UN budget or 
by making such contributions contingent upon enhanced ICC oversight or control. 
 In contrast, delegates from the Global South were not entirely convinced that a self-
funded court would be less susceptible to financial interference. Some states feared that the 
court might be held to ransom by a few major donors until it complied with demands to restrict 
court activities or otherwise accommodate their interests. The secretary to the Rome 
Conference recognised the possibility that ‘in order to secure the financial health of the Court, 
the support of major financial contributors was crucial and hence the concerns of the major 
contributors should be looked at more sympathetically’.510 Others were equally cognisant of 
the possible damage arising from the withholding of funds. The head of the Indian delegation 
at Rome worried that a self-funded court might spend much of its time and energy appeasing 
major Western contributors even if those states did not seek to influence the court directly.511 
Furthermore, in the event that wealthy states did not sign up to the court or later withdrew, 
smaller states might be left to pick up a heavy financial burden. 
 Instead, many Asian, African, and Latin American state delegates, as well as civil 
society groups, proposed that the court be funded via the UN common budget. This would at 
least insure them against any financial risks arising from the non-participation of wealthy 
states. It would also better reflect the court’s universal aspirations. Amnesty International, for 
example, reasoned that ‘[i]t is appropriate to have the General Assembly fund the court as part 
of the regular UN budget since the court will be acting on behalf of the entire international 
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community’.512 As Kendall outlines, delegates recognised how, ‘given the nature of the crimes 
over which the Court would exercise jurisdiction’, a UN model would ‘make it possible for all 
States to initiate proceedings without financial burdens – an objective which could not be 
achieved if only the States parties to the statute were to contribute to the financing of the 
institution’.513 Removing any financial conditions from the power to refer cases ‘would have 
made the Court more representative of and accessible to all UN member states regardless of 
their financial circumstances, and thus more “global” in its orientation and possible 
interventions’.514 
 Despite these contrasting views, a consensus began to form around a self-funded court 
by the beginning of the Rome Conference. Although preferred by a majority of participants, 
UN funding appeared ill-suited for what was becoming an expensive body. More than this, 
though, the negotiations at Rome allayed fears that wealthier states would not sign up, making 
southern states more confident that they would not have to foot the bill. These fears partly 
resurfaced when the US made the last-minute decision not to sign the final Statute. 
Nonetheless,  
 
with the exception of the United States, most major donor States would support the 
Statute. This along with possible UN contribution to the Court in case of referrals by 
the Security Council removed opposition to placing the burden of financing the Court 
on the shoulders of States Parties.515 
 
Final article 115 of the Statute thus provides that the court be funded via state party 
contributions and potentially by the UN when referring situations to the court. The Statute also 
allows for voluntary contributions by governments, international organisations, and private 
persons.516 States parties are in charge of setting the court’s annual budget517 while the court’s 
finances are subject to annual independent audit.518 As for the level of state party contributions, 
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these are calculated according to the UN scale of assessment, itself based on GDP figures.519 
Such a scale would place the greatest financial responsibility on – and ascribing most financial 
control to – wealthy states parties. The struggle over the court’s funding model was therefore 
resolved in favour of the Western preference for a system that would make the court financially 
independent of the UN while financially dependent on Western states parties. Looking back to 
earlier UK and US concerns about cost-effectiveness, the creation of a self-funded court thus 
represented the successful inscription of concerns about financial accountability into the fabric 
of the new court. 
 
1.5. Importing the efficiency discourse II: The shadow of Paschke 
 
  
As well as internal negotiations on the court’s funding regime, external developments turned 
efficiency into an institutional priority for the ICC. These developments centred on an expert 
inquiry on the functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). In June 
1996, the UN General Assembly asked the then UN Under-Secretary-General for Internal 
Oversight Karl Paschke to ‘identify[] problems and recommend[] measures to enhance the 
efficient utilisation of resources’ at the tribunal.520 His findings, issued during the Preparatory 
Committee’s deliberations and only 18 months before the opening of the Rome Conference, 
made for a sobering read.521 The report identified ‘serious operational deficiencies in the 
management of the Tribunal’ and ‘frequent violations of the United Nations rules and 
regulations’.522 It concluded that ‘not a single administrative area of the Registry (Finance, 
Procurement, Personnel, Security, General Services) functioned effectively’.523 
 Paschke’s indictment of the ICTR cast a long shadow over discussions in Rome. Central 
to Paschke’s diagnosis was the mismanagement of the tribunal, rather than allegations of 
corruption or racism as had been expected.524 Characterising the problem in this way, Paschke 
suggested that the ICTR’s problems – like the UN’s in previous years – lay in ‘poor 
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524 UN, Press Briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, 12 February 1997 
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management, ineptitude or lack of expertise’.525 Expressing the hope that his findings would 
act as ‘a giant step towards the creation of an international criminal court of justice’, Paschke 
implored the future permanent court not to make the same management mistakes as the 
ICTR.526 
 The delegates in Rome were eager to learn these lessons. For example, the final 
structure of the Registry laid down in article 43 of the Statute was ‘largely due to the impact of 
the Paschke Report and tales, whether justified or not, of Registry mismanagement at the 
ICTR’.527 The ICTR Registrar had come under fire for defying requests from judges and the 
Prosecutor, causing rifts between the organs. ‘[A]ware of this statutory weakness and of the 
resulting threat of inefficiencies, the drafters of the Rome Statute supplied statutory provisions 
entrusting the Presidency with the responsibility for the proper administration of the Court’ 
under article 43(2) and provided that the Registrar be elected by the judges under article 
43(4).528 Beyond the Registry, the decision to create a pre-trial phase of proceedings to 
authorise investigations and confirm charges was deemed necessary to ‘streamline the 
functioning of Chambers to ensure that they are able to manage and conduct cases as 
expeditiously as possible’.529  
 After the negotiations ended, the ad hoc experience continued to frame institutional 
developments at the ICC. ICTY Registrar Hans Holthuis posited that administrative flexibility 
must become the ‘cornerstone of [the ICC’s] modus operandi’.530 Ralph Zacklin, writing as 
UN Assistant-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs in 2004, described the ad hoc tribunals as 
‘mammoth bureaucracies’.531 Recalling how their ‘insuperable administration and managerial 
difficulties … became apparent’ soon after their creation, he hoped the ICC would take heed 
by placing efficiency atop its list of priorities.532  
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 Reflecting on the long path towards the final adoption of the Rome Statute for a 
permanent international criminal court, the efforts outlined above do not quite resemble the 
mainstream image of the ICC as the climax of a ‘justice cascade’.533 Rather, the permanent 
court appears to have emerged as the preferred rational-legal response of international law 
experts to impunity since the 1950s. These early discussions paved the way for a consensus on 
the idea of a permanent judicial institution in the 1990s. Only once that technocratic imaginary 
of global justice had been fixed did the drafters begin seriously to consider the need for such 
an institution to be efficient and cost-effective. Attuned to the efficiency imperatives arising 
from the court’s funding model and to the ICTR’s own managerial problems, the drafters 
transformed efficiency from a minor concern into an indispensable priority for the new court 
as they signed the Statute. The head of the delegation from The Philippines captured this fusion 
of the justice ideal with technocratic pragmatism to see the former realized in the latter:  
 
The Philippines joins the world in pursuing the dream of an international criminal court 
that shall be an efficient and effective dispenser of justice and of international criminal 
law … The efficient and effective dispensation of justice has long been the holy grail 
of most judicial  systems. Elusive though it may be, this goal continues to be deemed 
of the highest value and  therefore continues to be pursued. The Philippines thus wishes 
to see the establishment of the International Criminal Court as the most effective means 
of achieving this goal.534 
 
2. Laying the managerial foundations 
2.1. The interim period 
 
 
The four year period between the end of the Rome Conference and the Statute’s entry into force 
is generally recalled by ICL scholars as the time when the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
and Elements of Crimes were agreed upon by the Preparatory Commission.535 Alongside the 
Statute, such texts formed the court’s applicable law and thus began to turn the court from an 
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exercise on paper into a functional reality. However, this interim period also wove the 
efficiency discourse into the fabric of the court thereby creating the conditions for future 
managerialisation.  
 Discussions during the interim period reveal that the desire for efficiency did not always 
translate into a demand for managerial practices. For example, in December 1999, the Working 
Group on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence discussed the Registry’s victim regime, 
specifically the proposed Victims and Witnesses Unit. The Unit would assist victims seeking 
legal advice and provide protective measures to both victims and witnesses. The working group 
was eager to ‘ensure the efficient and effective performance of [the Unit’s] work’.536 However, 
efficiency in this context meant separating prosecution and defence services, ensuring staff 
confidentiality, and offering adequate staff training. It did not amount to strategic planning or 
the measurement of staff performance. 
 Another approach to efficiency in these early years focused more on the need for 
adequate funding to get the institution up and running, rather than streamlining its structures or 
locating internal savings. The first President of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), Zeid Al 
Hussein, articulated this philosophy in 2004. He affirmed that the court ‘cannot be considered 
– no matter what its eventual size or the extent of its budget – as too expensive’.537 For him, as 
for others at the time, ‘[w]hat would be too expensive, are the consequences of having no Court 
at all’.538 Efficiency thus equated with providing the resources required to carry out the court’s 
functions effectively and thus took little account of the need for strategic planning and 
oversight. 
 Alongside these versions of efficiency, the foundations of a managerial approach were 
nonetheless being laid in the court’s nascent architecture. The draft Financial Regulations of 
early 2002 introduced would-be court officials to the vocabulary of financial accountability, 
audit, and internal controls.539 Funds were to be rigorously recorded and carefully disposed of 
‘to ensure … [t]he economical use of the resources of the Court’ while accounts would be 
subject to an annual audit.540 Hinting at a more financial approach to efficiency, the Regulations 
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aimed to instantiate ‘effective financial administration and the exercise of economy’ 
throughout the court.541  
 This desire for economy and oversight necessitated additional bodies for their 
realisation. Foremost among these was the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF), 
established by the ASP in 2002. The CBF comprised 12 geographically-diverse members 
drawn from the fields of economics, public administration, and diplomacy, many of whom had 
built their careers within national bureaucracies and audit offices.542 Karl Paschke, who had 
authored the report on ICTR mismanagement, was elected as the Committee’s first chair in 
2003.  
 The CBF was provided with extensive internal powers from an early stage. These 
include the power to review the annual budget proposed by the Registrar and make appropriate 
recommendations to the ASP. The CBF can also scrutinise the court’s audit reports and transmit 
these to the Assembly with additional comments. In monitoring court spending, the CBF has 
access to ‘any document submitted to the Assembly that contains financial or budgetary 
implications or any other matter of a financial, budgetary, or administrative nature’.543 These 
expansive powers effectively give the CBF carte blanche to investigate any aspect of the 
court’s work.544 
 An audit regime was also put in place during the interim period. The Financial 
Regulations established an Office of Internal Audit to ‘conduct independent audits of the 
financial transactions and the administrative systems’ in accordance with international auditing 
standards.545 The ASP appointed an Auditor with powers to ‘make observations with respect 
to the efficiency of the financial procedures, the accounting system, the internal financial 
controls and, in general, the administration and management of the Court’.546 Like the CBF, 
the Auditor would have ‘free access to all books, records and other documents … necessary 
for the performance of the audit’.547 Both the auditors and the CBF were embedded in the 
court’s structure from the outset and thus began to regulate the court according to standards of 
financial and administrative accountability.  
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2.2. Efficiency shaping the structure of court organs 
 
 
From these rudimentary foundations, court officials immediately began to design and tweak 
the organs as soon as the court opened in 2003. The Prosecutor-elect, Luis Moreno-Ocampo 
set off on a thoroughly managerial footing. During his last days at Harvard University before 
assuming his new post, Ocampo asked for some management advice from Fernando Oris de 
Roa, a friend in the Argentinian agribusiness. Ocampo recalled their conversation some years 
later, noting how he had asked Roa ‘for some advice on how to use the private sector efficiency 
to build an international organization’.548 Roa described the nascent institution as a kind of 
‘startup’, asked Ocampo about its ‘mission’, and focused his advice on ‘what I know: 
management’.549 In response, Ocampo noted that ‘I have the chance to build the most efficient 
public office’, and took such efficiency-mindedness with him to Europe like the McKinsey 
consultants before him.550  
Within Ocampo’s new Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), a preparatory team formed part 
of a group of ‘institution-builders’ who consulted widely with national and international 
criminal justice experts.551 The team also drafted key documents outlining the OTP’s 
composition, duties, and relationship to other organs.552 The OTP’s internal structure was 
separated into functional divisions and units dealing with investigations, complementarity, 
prosecutions, and trials. In a 2003 Policy Paper, Ocampo described how the experience of the 
‘first few months have guided it in shaping the most effective structure to carry out its 
mission’.553  
 The evidentiary and logistical challenges posed by the first OTP preliminary 
examinations in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) prompted the OTP 
team to devise a responsive body rather than a traditional bureaucracy. In a draft Policy Paper, 
OTP officials noted that ‘[o]nly a project-oriented as opposed to a static organisational model 
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can bring the desired results’.554 ‘[P]ost levels and fixed hierarchies’ were believed to be 
‘counter-productive’.555 To ensure the Prosecutor could discharge his mandate effectively, 
preliminary examinations would be ‘process focused and cost-effective’ while investigations 
would follow an ‘open, horizontal organisation … with very short vertical lines of authority’.556 
Moreover, the Statute’s complementarity regime required the court to investigate and prosecute 
cases where states parties were ‘unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution’.557 In those situations, said the Prosecutor, ‘the ICC must fill the gap created by 
the failure of States to satisfy their duty to investigate’.558 In doing so, the OTP would ‘need to 
exercise its investigative powers with firmness and efficiency’.559  
 Despite prioritising the process of institution-building during this initial stage, officials 
and commentators nonetheless saw the ICC as forming part of a much larger regime for 
addressing mass atrocities. Admittedly, Ocampo reflected on 1998 as the year when ‘a global 
criminal justice system was at last established’, suggesting the ICC’s central place within that 
system.560 Yet he later recalled how ‘the best outcome for this Court will be zero case. Because 
zero case means there’s no genocide, or if there’s a genocide, the national court will do it, and 
as a system we should respect national courts’.561 Payam Akhavan argued that ‘success is when 
the International Criminal Court remains idle’.562 The ICC was therefore only ‘a little piece’ 
of a pluralistic ICJ system.563 
 Nonetheless, Ocampo admitted that ‘the judges were not happy with [him]’ for taking 
this position.564 Moreover, despite his apparently pluralistic understanding of ICJ, Ocampo was 
committed to what he called the ‘ICC model’ of justice.565 For Ocampo, the court’s specific 
design and parameters could be exported and used ‘to manage all the conflicts, all the 
problems’.566 Accordingly, while his understanding of the ICJ system extended beyond the 
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ICC, the regime’s institutionalised and technocratic model was seen as the gold standard for 
pursuing justice.  
 This ICC-centrism also prompted the court’s other organs to construct the ICC as an 
‘independent and credible institution of international criminal justice’.567 The Presidency and 
Registry drafted administrative policies on human resources to classify staff according to the 
UN common system and to introduce a staff appraisal process. This decision to measure 
individual performance was particularly significant for the Registry, which housed most of the 
court’s staff. Its Human Resources Section commenced a ‘job evaluation exercise’ in July 2004 
‘to establish a sense of equity in the work environment’ and to ‘affirm fiscal responsibility to 
the States Parties’.568  
 Early attempts to fine-tune court organs sometimes evolved into more comprehensive 
restructuring exercises. Although smaller in scale than the recent reorganisation of the ICC 
Registry,569 these reforms crucially embedded the efficiency discourse within the court’s 
organs and units. In 2004, the OTP ‘examined its rudimentary structure to find ways to increase 
integration and efficiency’.570 It restructured several divisions ‘to adapt to needs that came to 
light as it became operational’, and created an OTP Executive Committee to centralise strategic 
decision-making.571 For its part, the Registry also focused on internal design to improve its 
defence and victim-related functions. These early rearrangements resulted in ‘a final and 
slightly revised structure’.572 This structure included a new Office of Internal Audit to conduct 
periodic and ad hoc reviews of court administration.  
 Such managerial foundations reflected an early yet sustained attempt to imbue the 
nascent institution with efficiency standards and ideals. These efforts did not only take place 
internally, but were reiterated and promoted by court officials in their diplomatic appearances 
before states parties and others. Speaking at the ASP’s 4th session in 2005, Moreno-Ocampo 
described how the court’s workload was coming under increasing strain: two situations had 
already been referred to the court by Uganda and the DRC, and the OTP was already planning 
additional field missions to Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic. Ocampo stated that 
his office would seek the proper allocation of resources, assuring states that cost-effectiveness 
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would be a ‘basic principle’ in this endeavour.573 At a diplomatic gathering in Brussels, the 
court’s first Registrar, Bruno Cathala, also acknowledged that ‘we must adapt our working 
methods on a case-by-case basis: we have to plan our projects according to constantly differing 
political and cultural contexts … In this drive to adapt to the requirements of the field, we are 
constantly looking for the most efficient use possible of our budgetary resources’.574  
 As these efforts suggest, the court’s first priority was to transform an idea on paper into 
a ‘fully functional judicial institution’.575 This was achieved by creating rudimentary 
managerial processes oriented towards the efficient delivery of court services. Although 
efficiency had several meanings during the interim period, the definition slowly coalesced 
around the notion of internal cost-effectiveness and optimisation as audit practices and internal 
reforms were rolled out.  
 
3. Building the court’s managerial scaffolding 
3.1. A ‘strategic’ approach to the court’s activities 
 
 
Not before long, the court set its prosecutorial and judicial processes into motion for the first 
time. In 2004, the OTP began investigating potential war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in Uganda and the DRC, with another investigation opened in 2005 into the alleged genocide 
in Darfur. The evidence collected in Uganda allowed the Prosecutor to issue arrest warrants 
against high-ranking members of the Lord’s Resistance Army. And by the end of 2005, the 
OTP would be in a position to issue an arrest warrant against Thomas Lubanga of the DRC for 
the conscription and use of child soldiers. These activities prompted additional strategies and 
tools to coordinate and manage court resources.  
 Despite these milestones, the infant court still had ‘teething problems’.576 The CBF 
regretted the court’s inability to grasp the full extent of its work capabilities and to outline clear 
and predictable objectives. Indicators to measure court performance were patchy, and results 
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were often vague, if reported at all.577 The CBF recommended that the court develop ‘results-
based budgeting’ to link budgetary resources to expected outputs, and to devise ‘a set of 
overarching objectives’.578 Within a few months, a Strategic Planning Project Group led by the 
Presidency proposed a strategic planning process to the CBF.579 The Strategic Plan would be a 
‘key management instrument’ allowing the court to trace its progress and link ‘long-term goals’ 
to ‘short-term action’.580 The Project Group sought the input of the CBF, which emphasised 
the need for a ‘meaningful set of interrelated strategic goals, expected accomplishments and 
performance indicators’.581 Such expert articulations began to refine the limits of the ICJ 
project as a managerial endeavour guided by the need for efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
They therefore merit further scrutiny. 
  
3.2. The Strategic Plan embedding ICC justice   
 
 
The ICC’s first Strategic Plan was published in August 2006. More than a simple recollection 
of the court’s goals, timeframes, and resources, the Plan began to refine the technocratic vision 
of ICJ by constructing the court in a managerial image through the discourse of efficiency, 
indicators, and targets.   
 From the outset, the Plan positions the ICC at the centre of efforts to end global injustice 
and impunity. The Plan recalls the ‘high aspirations’ vested in the court by the international 
community, and praises the achievements of both internal and external supporters who ‘turned 
the words of the Statute into a functioning, permanent judicial institution’ or ‘a working 
reality’.582 The Plan locates the ‘unique’ institution in ‘an emerging system of international 
justice involving States, international organizations, other international courts and non-
governmental organizations’, but also ‘within a broader system of international law concerned 
with the peace, security and well-being of the world’.583 Detailing the precise location of the 
court within those ‘system[s] of international justice’, the Plan affirms the court’s ‘particular, 
central role’.584  
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 Identifying the ICC’s essential contribution to ICJ, the Strategic Plan makes plain that 
the institution must operate efficiently and effectively for justice to be realised. It rationalises 
the need for optimal performance by stating that ‘[t]he effectiveness of the Court’s 
administration impacts directly on its ability to carry out its core functions’.585 The Plan also 
cites the concurrent moves within other international organisations to optimise their functions, 
arguing that the ICC should follow their lead: ‘At a time when international organizations are 
increasingly focusing on improving their administrations’, the court should ‘aim[] for the 
highest standards of transparency and efficiency in all its actions’.586 Prioritising organisational 
efficiency, the Plan justifies the rolling out of practices to optimise the court.  
 Having linked the global with the technical, the Strategic Plan carves out a space for 
itself within the ICJ project. The Plan is held to be ‘instrumental to the Court’s success in 
realising [its] aims’.587 It ‘provides a common framework for the Court’s activities over the 
next ten years’ and ‘sets out the clear direction and priorities that will guide the Court’.588 The 
Plan will ‘assist the Court in taking a proactive role in shaping its future’ without impinging 
on its legal decision-making.589 And as a public document, the Plan will ‘further strengthen 
[the court’s] vital relationship with States, international organizations and civil society’.590  
 Having identified management tools as indispensable to the provision of justice, the 
Plan proceeds to translate the court’s priorities and activities into a managerial language. For 
example, it repackages the vague aspirations contained in the Statute’s preamble into a new 
inspirational ‘mission’. The mission categorises the court’s three aims: it will ‘fairly, 
effectively and impartially investigate, prosecute and conduct trials of the most serious crimes’; 
‘act transparently and efficiently’; and ‘contribute to long lasting respect for and the 
enforcement of international criminal justice, to the prevention of crime and to the fight against 
impunity’.591 These are not only the court’s core aims, though, but the aims of an institution 
which stands at the centre of ‘an emerging international justice system’.592  By ‘reflect[ing] the 
context in which the Court operates, its core functions, and the impact it is intended to have’, 
the  mission fixes the court centrally within the ICJ project.593 
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 The Plan also reformulates the court’s priorities as ‘strategic goals’. The effect of this 
is twofold. Firstly, because the strategic goals are designed to enhance efficiency, they rank 
institutionally-focused concerns alongside the goal of securing high-quality justice. These are 
the goals of creating ‘a well-recognised and adequately supported institution’ and making the 
court ‘a model of public administration’.594 Overshadowing the one goal devoted to ‘justice’, 
the Plan’s institutional and self-sustaining goals appear equally if not more important as 
aspirations for the ICJ community. Second, the Plan continues to construct the court in a 
managerial image by alluding to its efficiency, flexibility, and motivated staff. Thus, to become 
a ‘model of public administration’, the court must   
 
[e]xcel in achieving desired results with minimal resources through streamlined 
structures and processes while maintaining flexibility, guaranteeing accountability and 
drawing upon sufficient qualified and motivated staff within a caring environment and 
a non-bureaucratic culture.595 
 
Behind its generic buzzwords, this statement offers a highly rationalised image of the court. It 
aims to focus both institutional energies and external hopes on the gradual optimisation of the 
court as the most sophisticated means of procuring justice. This only entrenches the court’s 
existing parameters as ‘the primary, and indispensable, means to achieve global justice’.596
 The Plan reproduces this managerial image through additional and subsidiary tools like 
the Court Capacity Model (see fig. 1).  To increase the ‘quality of justice’, the Plan proposes 
the Court Capacity Model as a ‘resource planning tool’ for ‘aligning the resources [the court] 
will need with the accomplishments it can achieve, as well as forecasting resource needs’.597 
The model prompts the court to collect data on the human and financial resources available to 
conduct the court’s core activities. Cognisant of the fact that contextual challenges might 
prevent the optimal realisation of outputs, the model also accounts for the impact of 
‘dependency factors’ relating to the conduct of investigations, prosecutions, or trials, the 
number of communications transmitted, and witnesses involved in the trial.598  
 Based on these ‘inputs’, the model is then fed with ‘assumptions’ about ‘the length of 
proceedings, the number of activities to be performed and the relationship between these 
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activities’.599 Together, these factors allow the court to simulate outputs from various 
combinations of resources and types of situations in order to accurately predict resource needs 
and manage performance expectations.600  
 
 
The model is not merely a simulation, though, but has been used to inform the court’s allocation 
of resources and to remove ‘bottlenecks in its production line’.601 Imagining this factory 
approach, the model visualises justice as the optimal allocation of institutional resources by 
experts. Its reliance on engineering terminology and equations not only gives the impression 
that these calculations are value-neutral but also that such scientific methods are the key to 
realising an optimal global justice system.602 
 Similarly, the model hints at the ICC’s rendition of justice by fleshing out the ‘strategic 
goal’ of delivering high-quality proceedings. Justice in this managerial reading is the result of 
the court being able to balance its various inputs and activities ‘to achieve a certain output over 
 
599 Report on Court Capacity Model, para. 21. 
600 Report on Court Capacity Model, paras 13–4. 
601 Report on Court Capacity Model, para. 25. 
602 The same applies to other metaphors, such as that of a ‘balanced scorecard’ of ICJ, M. Heikkilä, ‘The Balanced 
Scorecard of International Criminal Tribunals’, in C. Ryngaert (ed), The Effectiveness of International Criminal 
Justice (Intersentia 2009) 27. 
Figure 1. Court Capacity Model 
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a given period of time’.603 Only those activities which are foreseeable, time-bound, and which 
have measurable ‘impact’ can be used to sustain the model, excluding equally important but 
immeasurable and long-term endeavours such as the social and psychological wellbeing of 
victims and victim communities.604 By prioritising self-optimisation, the court offers a 
rendition of the justice project as a mathematical equation.605 
 Similar measures initiated by the Strategic Plan look to sustain the ICC by enhancing 
its reputation. These include proposals for a ‘branding exercise’, a ‘reengineering exercise’, 
and the creation of a ‘common ICC culture’.606 Such measures, according to the court, would 
allow it to deliver ‘results rather than processes’, remain financially and managerially 
accountable, and create a professional staff that is ‘dynamic, results-driven, respectful of 
diversity, honest, transparent … and service-oriented’.607 Like the Court Capacity Model, such 
measures do not only enhance performance but direct the hopes of the ICJ community towards 
the creation of a well-oiled bureaucracy as the centrepiece of an ‘emerging international justice 
system’.608  
 Through missions, strategic goals, and predictive models, the Strategic Plan produces 
a refined understanding of what ICJ means and how to realise it. ICJ is not only an institutional 
endeavour, but one which requires the whole-hearted commitment of various internal and 
external experts to the goal of optimisation. The court’s strategic goals and tools such as the 
Court Capacity Model allow officials to equate the tweaking of court inputs and expectations 
with progress towards ICJ tout court. This equation ensures that the ICC is viewed as the most 
appropriate ‘construction site for more justice’.609 And it allowed many to adopt the view that 
the ICJ regime is ‘feasible’ only if officials and observers improve ‘the possibilities of the 
International Criminal Court to function efficiently’.610 
 
 
603 Report on Court Capacity Model, Executive summary. 
604 Report on Court Capacity Model, para. 31. 
605 Human Rights Watch made this observation on the draft Strategic Plan, lamenting that it ‘place[d] too much 
emphasis on management and organizational issues’ to the detriment of ‘the court’s long-term vision’, HRW, The 
Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court: A Human Rights Watch Memorandum’, July 2006, 2 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/The%20Strategic%20Plan%20of%20the%20ICC.pdf. 
606 Strategic Plan 2006, paras 39 and 50. 
607 Strategic Plan 2006, paras 40 and 48. 
608 Strategic Plan 2006, para. 18. 
609 H.P. Kaul, ‘The International Criminal Court: Current Challenges and Perspectives’ (2007) 6 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 575, 576. 
610 ICC, Report on Turin Conference on International Criminal Justice 14-18 May 2007, ICC-ASP/6/INF.2, 19 
October 2007, 42 (H. Jallow, ICTR Prosecutor). In this vein, the Plan hoped to make the ICC ‘the reference 
institution of international criminal law’ within ten years, Strategic Plan 2006, para. 39. 
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3.3. The Plan’s managerial offshoots 
 
 
Once formulated, the Strategic Plan was presented to states parties, which then endorsed the 
court’s strategic framework. Some states parties, particularly major donors including Germany, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, welcomed the Plan as a move towards ‘self-
examination’.611 Thereafter, the court implemented the Plan over several years. The budget 
proposal for 2007 provided an opportunity to allocate the court’s resources in line with the 
Plan’s three strategic goals. The court would devise indicators to assess its own progress 
towards achieving those goals, and additional risk and oversight measures, including ‘strategic 
(external) analysis, risk assessment, strategic and operational planning and performance 
reviews’, would keep these goals on track.612  
 As the Strategic Plan provided the necessary tools for pursuing a managerial approach 
to ICJ, it also precipitated additional strategies to deal with more specific court functions. One 
such strategy was the court’s Strategic Plan for Outreach. Premised on the need both for justice 
to be ‘done and seen to be done’, the Outreach Strategy articulated the court’s rationale and 
methods for communicating with victim communities.613 It aimed ‘to ensure that affected 
communities can understand and follow the Court’ and to ‘enable the Court to better understand 
[their] concerns and expectations’.614 To this end, the strategy identified target groups for 
outreach including NGOs, civic leaders, women, children, and academic communities,615 and 
outlined several ‘message themes’ which court staff should focus on when communicating with 
these audiences.616  
 Regulating the court’s interactions with external groups, the strategy hoped to 
‘maximise understanding’ of the court’s work, especially ‘so that it could respond more 
effectively and clarify, where necessary, any misconceptions that might exist, particularly on 
the question of how local and international justice mechanisms work together’.617 However, 
 
611 Statement of Germany at the ASP 5th session, 23 November 2006, 2 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP5_Statement_germany.pdf. See also ASP Resolution ICC-
ASP/5/Res.2, 1 December 2006, para. 1 welcoming the plan, although only two African states explicitly welcomed 
it in their ASP statements, while most European states, as well as Canada, Australia and New Zealand (appearing 
jointly) welcomed the plan in this and subsequent sessions. 
612 Strategic Plan 2006, para. 56. 
613 ICC, Strategic Plan for Outreach, ICC-ASP/5/12, 29 September 2006, para. 2 (‘Outreach Plan 2006’). 
614 Outreach Plan 2006, paras 2–3. 
615 Outreach Plan 2006, paras 18 et seq. 
616 Outreach Plan 2006, para. 46. 
617 Outreach Plan 2006, para. 3. 
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the expectation that the central role of strategic communication was to clarify inaccuracies 
glossed over the strategy’s own role in shaping public perceptions and expectations of 
justice.618 The strategy notes how ‘communication should serve first of all to increase the 
confidence of those communities in the international criminal justice system, since they will 
be better informed about the Court and its role’.619 By ‘situat[ing] the Court as part of a broader 
international justice system’, the strategy equates justice with court involvement, thereby 
directing public aspirations for justice towards the criminal prosecution of individuals.620 Thus, 
as Moyn observes, ‘[t]he ICC stands out as much for what it symbolizes as for what it really 
is: the new dream of individual criminal accountability as a central feature – perhaps the central 
feature – of our current vision of international or global justice’.621 
 The strategy’s ‘message themes’ reinforce that vision. It proposes that the content of 
such messages focus on the court’s ‘attributes and the context in which it operates’.622 In 
particular, outreach personnel should highlight the court’s ‘judicial role, the fairness, efficiency 
and impartiality of its proceedings, and the fact that the Court is mindful of the context in which 
it is active, and is responsive to victims’.623 The purpose of outreach, therefore, is not only to 
communicate the court’s work to victim communities, but to do so in a way that promotes the 
court’s positive characteristics and its capacity to bring justice to them. The strategy plays a 
central part in institutional self-promotion by managing how victims see the court and ensuring 
they have an impression of the court’s efficiency.  
 Despite these strategic practices, the CBF lamented in 2007 that the court had yet to 
fully implement results-based budgeting and indicators. Offering further guidance, the 
Committee stated that performance indicators should be ‘SMART’, i.e. ‘specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant and time-bound’.624 As with the Court Capacity Model, SMART 
performance criteria reinforced the notion that justice would be achieved if only experts 
articulated detailed, costed, and realistic institutional goals. Definitions of justice which were 
 
618 N. de Silva, ‘International Courts’ Socialization Strategies for Actual and Perceived Performance’, in T. 
Squatrito et al. (eds), The Performance of International Courts and Tribunals (CUP 2018) 288, 304; B. Kotecha, 
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619 Outreach Plan 2006, para. 4. 
620 Outreach Plan 2006, para. 46. De Silva comments that ‘The ICC, for example, noted its Outreach Unit’s 
interactions with victims’ communities, where registry officials would persuade communities to adopt the ICC’s 
norms of individual criminal responsibility, fair trial standards, and so on’, de Silva, ‘Socialization Strategies’, 
315–6.  
621 S. Moyn, ‘Anti-Impunity as Deflection of Argument’, in K. Engle et al. (eds), Anti-Impunity and the Human 
Rights Agenda (CUP 2016) 68, 69. 
622 Outreach Plan 2006, para. 46. 
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624 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 8th Session, ICC-ASP/6/2, 29 May 2007, para. 16. 
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not easily measured or achievable within a short timeframe, such as restoring relationships or 
structural redistribution, came to appear impractical and undesirable.625  
 The court designed two further managerial processes as offshoots to the Strategic Plan. 
First, in 2007, the audit regime was altered and extended. The CBF noted how the Internal 
Auditor had adopted a ‘hybrid of internal and external audit roles’ which had ‘diminished the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function’.626 The Committee thus recommended that ‘the 
internal audit function should be adjusted in the light of experience to strengthen the 
contribution that the Internal Auditor could make to the efficient running of the Court’.627 The 
Internal Auditor would focus solely on ‘providing independent assurance and advice to the 
Registrar, as accounting officer, on the effectiveness of the Court’s control and management 
systems’.628 Through such expertise, the Registrar and other court officials would discipline 
and improve the court based on the need for efficiency. The CBF’s additional recommendations 
for a risk management framework and a ‘statement of internal control’ further produced a 
managerial court through expert knowledge.   
 Second, in the wake of the Strategic Plan the court turned its attention to the 
management of individual staff. In 2008, the CBF recommended that the court take a ‘strategic 
approach to managing the court’s most crucial assets, its human resources’.629 In the court’s 
setup phase, the Human Resources Section had successfully completed ‘the speedy recruitment 
of qualified external candidates’ and had developed key policies such as the Staff Rules and 
Regulations.630 As its apparatus continued to grow, the court observed the need to look beyond 
‘“basic” organizational human resources functions’ to ‘explor[e] a more dynamic and complex 
set of human resources management practices’.631  
 These new practices would primarily be designed to optimise staff performance and 
foster a more productive working environment. The court therefore reaffirmed its desire to 
recruit only the most efficient and committed individuals and instituted a process for career 
advancement based on efficiency-driven performance criteria.632 The court would also create 
competency profiles for all posts to standardise performance evaluation, which would be 
assisted by a systematic performance appraisal system.633 Through these appraisal and audit 
 
625 Nouwen and Werner, ‘Monopolizing Global Justice’, 165 and 170. 
626 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 9th Session, ICC-ASP/6/12, 28 September 2007, para. 22. 
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offshoots, the efficiency mindset further trickled down into the court’s everyday work, with 
the court concluding in 2008 that it had made ‘good progress’ in implementing its Strategic 
Plan.634  
 
4. The catalysing effect of the global financial crisis 
 
 
According to then-Registrar Silvana Arbia, 2008 marked an ‘historic moment for international 
criminal justice’, as states parties celebrated a decade of the Rome Statute.635 Six cases were 
before the court while four persons were housed in the ICC’s Detention Unit at Scheveningen. 
It was hoped that a fifth detainee would soon arrive after the recent issuance of an arrest warrant 
against President Al-Bashir of Sudan. In addition to celebrating a decade since Rome, the court 
also lauded the construction of an ‘entire administrative infrastructure from scratch’.636  
 However, from another viewpoint the court had only crystallised into just the kind of 
institution some African states parties had feared it might back in 1998.637 All the court’s 
situations were located in Africa and all those housed in the Detention Unit were Africans. The 
circumstances surrounding the application for an arrest warrant against President Bashir 
troubled African states parties. Mahmood Mamdani noted how in relation to Darfur, the 
Prosecutor had ‘uncritically taken on the point of view of one side in this conflict’ thus 
‘attribut[ing] far too much responsibility to Bashir alone’ instead of acknowledging the 
region’s historical and colonial vestiges.638 Cognisant that ‘the search for justice should be 
pursued in a way that does not impede or jeopardize efforts aimed at promoting lasting peace’ 
in Sudan, the African Union requested that the Prosecutor defer proceedings against Bashir.639 
 
634 ICC, Report of the Bureau on the Strategic Planning Process of the ICC, ICC-ASP/7/29, 6 November 2008, 
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The Prosecutor rebuffed these concerns by stating that Bashir was ‘standing in the way of 
justice, peace, and security for the Darfuris’640 and that there could be ‘no peace without 
justice’.641 This justification of the court’s presence on the African continent confirmed to 
many that the ICC was becoming, if it was not already, a court for Africa.  
 Nonetheless, around the same time the CBF voiced its aspirations towards making the 
ICC more efficient in carrying out those activities. It stated that a ‘rigorous examination of 
possibilities to increase productivity would yield significant cost savings given that many 
inefficient bureaucratic policies had been adopted in the early years of the Court’.642 Locating 
the court’s problems in its inefficiency rather than its structural arrangements, the CBF 
recommended that ‘the Court undertake a review of administrative procedures with the aim of 
eliminating red tape’.643  
 Although the court’s organs and the CBF were instrumental to the court’s efficiency 
drive, other actors – particularly major state party donors – also stipulated the need for the court 
to remain financially accountable and to deploy its resources wisely. These external concerns 
were apparent in Western states’ endorsement of the court’s Strategic Plan and were raised 
with greater frequency from 2008 onwards. In late 2007, Japan signed and ratified the Rome 
Statute and in doing so became the court’s largest financial contributor. It pledged to ‘faithfully 
fulfil’ its obligation to contribute 22 percent of the court’s budget.644 Mirroring the sentiments 
of other Western donors, Japan predicated the viability of the institution on its efficiency. The 
Japanese Foreign Minister committed to ‘pursu[ing] the efficient management of the ICC so 
that it can deliver maximum results within its limited resources’.645  
 However, it was the global financial crisis of October 2008 which precipitated even 
deeper interest in court management by states parties, especially major donors. Only a month 
after the crisis began, the ASP held its 7th session in The Hague. Representatives of several 
wealthy states parties rose during the ASP general debate to articulate what they considered to 
be the court’s new economic reality. France noted that ‘[t]he current economic and financial 
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climate requires us to ensure that the development of the Court’s activities is based on a 
financial scenario which is compatible with what Member States can provide’.646  
 Beyond rethinking their budgetary commitments, Western states parties also 
recommended that the court renew its commitment to achieving yearly efficiency savings. They 
lauded the ‘excellent analytical work’ of the CBF ‘without which many aspects of the Court’s 
work would remain little known’.647 Thanks to the CBF, states parties had ‘[a] better 
understanding of the constraints on the Registry and a better knowledge of the financial, 
material and human resources available to the Court’.648 The CBF’s work would also ensure 
that ‘the considerable resources [the court] already has can, if necessary, be redeployed and 
that new requirements can also be financed by productivity gains’.649 This concerted effort by 
states, court organs, and experts would, according to the French representative, be ‘what it 
takes if states parties are to be able to continue to justify to their parliaments and their public 
opinion the resources sought by the court’.650  
 Senior officials responded swiftly in recommitting the court to the search for 
efficiencies. Registrar Arbia stated: 
 
I am conscious of the fact that resources allocated by the States Parties need to be used 
efficiently and cost-effectively … The Court will spare no effort in ensuring optimum 
administrative and management actions in order to secure the best results with 
minimum costs  without in any way jeopardizing the quality and efficiency of 
justice.651 
 
All aspects of the court’s work would be subject to rigorous review, including the number of 
trials, funding of defence activities, and the protection of victims and witnesses. This approach 
of seeing core legal activities as opportunities for cutting costs contributed to the notion that 
justice, however construed, was the outcome of the optimal application of institutional 
resources.  
 The extension of this managerial gaze to all the court’s activities also implicated ICC 
staff members in the efficiency drive. The Registrar noted how ‘the Court owes its success to 
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cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-ASP7-GenDebe-France-ENG.pdf. 
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its dedicated and committed staff’.652 The court would therefore appraise staff performance 
and train managers in performance measurement ‘to ensure the proper functioning of a modern, 
transparent and non-bureaucratic organization’.653 In a similar vein, the court would continue 
to foster ‘good governance’ by conducting a court-wide risk assessment exercise and refining 
its audit processes.654 
 The risk assessment exercise exhibited the same expert preference as other managerial 
tools. Registrar Arbia described risk management as the practice of identifying and evaluating 
risks ‘in terms of likelihood and impact’.655 External consultants were charged with assessing 
a variety of risks after which the court then ‘select[ed] priority risks and envisage[d] actions to 
address them accordingly’.656 How the court identified and prioritised risk therefore depended 
on the expert parameters applied by the risk assessors. The degree of risk was evaluated 
according to the audit measures of institutional and financial uncertainty and impact rather than 
wider risk to accused persons and victims. This inward focus was already apparent in the CBF’s 
identification of the risks arising from the global financial crisis – the Committee had identified 
risk solely in terms of the ‘banking risk’ to the court’s financial holdings in several Dutch 
banks.657  
 The court’s ‘comprehensive enterprise risk management exercise’ also sustained the 
ICC itself. According to the court, ‘[t]he nature of the risks and the measures the Court has 
taken and is taking to address them are shaped by and take place within the context of the 
corporate governance framework’.658 The report detailed some of the risk measures taken prior 
to the 2008 exercise, including the creation of a ‘system of Court-wide administrative 
issuances’, a Coordination Council, and a Strategic Plan. To this risk regime, the 2008 exercise 
added a ‘Corporate Governance Statement’, an expanded Audit Committee, and ‘business 
process re-engineering’.659  
 These risk and audit practices not only prioritised the court’s managerial activities and 
expertise, but also the court’s status as a sine qua non of the wider justice project. Thus, the 
Corporate Governance Statement published in 2010 located risk in the overlap between organ 
functions and the potential damage to prosecutorial and judicial independence. Risk also 
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emerged from the paradoxical situation of requiring independent organs to cooperate on 
common issues. The solution offered was to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the organs, 
and to centralise responsibility in the Presidency. The expert framing of risk in such 
organisational and administrative terms thus sustained the institution and its ongoing work.660  
 In contrast, the risk of applying this managerial understanding of risk itself was 
unaccounted for. These risks become apparent when looking to the expert assessments within 
the court’s reports: the fundamental basis and positive impact of the court’s activities are 
assumed and its primary concerns are with institutional reputation.661 Where the risk to victims 
is acknowledged – for example, the safety risk to individuals testifying during proceedings – 
this comes in the context of a broader discussion on how to coordinate the work of the OTP 
and the Victims and Witnesses Unit. Again, the risks associated with ICC-style justice are not 
considered. These include the risks to peace arising out of the court’s intervention in the first 
place, a risk which African states parties had already been articulating for some years.662 It also 
occludes the risk to victims in the event that justice is not obtained. Such risks were obscured 
in the court’s campaign to optimise, which instead resulted in an expansion of the Audit 
Committee, creation of an Audit Plan, and implementation of public sector accounting 
standards to the court’s finances.663 
 These risk and audit frameworks were supported by additional accountability 
mechanisms, chief among them an Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM) established by 
the ASP in 2009. Article 112(4) of the Statute had countenanced a mechanism with the power 
to investigate, evaluate, and inspect court organs, functions, and policies with the aim of 
enhancing ‘efficiency and economy’. The IOM was intentionally modelled along the lines of 
the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and officials from that office offered 
assistance to the start-up team at the IOM once it became operational in 2011.664 Like the OIOS, 
the IOM would be populated by audit personnel who would collect data on the court to diagnose 
a range of managerial and personnel deficiencies. 
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 The years immediately following the global financial crisis (and the ensuing recession) 
saw several competing pressures placed on the court. Prosecutorial investigations and court 
proceedings were becoming more frequent as the court began intervening in more situations, 
notably in Kenya after post-election violence in 2007/08. Added to this growth in activities 
were the parallel budgetary constraints placed upon the court by its members. The court’s 
response to these forces was to identify efficiency savings and initiate heightened performance 
management, audit, and risk assessment exercises. Not only the court but also commentators 
recognised the ability of managerial practices to ‘resonate more with states parties’ and thus 
legitimise the court’s activities.665 These practices also confirmed the court’s desire to 
‘continuously scrutinize its internal organisation in order to achieve state-of-the-art 
administrative and core processes, putting strong emphasis on efficiency in terms of non-
bureaucracy, flexibility and accountability’.666 This orientation both reinforced the court’s 
approach to justice, and obscured the fundamental weaknesses of such an approach as 
displayed by tensions arising out of the Bashir saga.667  
    
5. The complete and managerial institution668 
5.1. ICC performance after ten years 
 
 
In December 2011, as the court’s ‘first full cycle [was] coming to an end’, ICC President Sang-
hyun Song reflected on its achievements thus far.669 The number of ongoing investigations and 
trials had grown from the previous year, ‘amounting to well over a thousand hours of court 
sittings since January [2011]’.670 The number of applications to participate as victims in the 
court’s proceedings had risen to 5,865 by November 2011, and the number of victim 
applications for reparations had increased eightfold on the previous year to 6,254.671 Moreover, 
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closing statements had already been presented in the case against Thomas Lubanga, with Trial 
Chamber I soon to issue the court’s first judgment.  
 Nonetheless, these statistics did not capture the complex reality of the court’s 
performance. A comparison between the court’s response to the situations in Libya and 
Afghanistan paints a less optimistic picture. By 2011, the situation in Afghanistan, which 
implicated local and international actors including the US and its allies, had been under 
preliminary examination for four years with little sign of conclusion. In contrast, after the UN 
Security Council voted unanimously to refer ‘an old enemy’ Colonel Gaddafi to the ICC in 
February 2011, the OTP opened an investigation within one month.672 The contrasting 
timeframes had little to do with efficiency, but exemplified the deliberate ‘slow-walk[ing]’ of 
situations ‘when superpowers are involved’.673 The efficiency discourse nevertheless flattened 
these contrasting outcomes by continuing to present the court as the most rational and therefore 
ideal response to injustice.  
  
5.2. Doubling down on inefficiency 
 
 
The official response to the court’s defects was to treat the ICC as if it represented the universal 
and ideal model of ICJ. Thus, President Song reasoned before the ASP in 2011 that ‘[i]f we are 
seriously committed to building a system of universal justice, a system of equal justice for all, 
we must maintain the effectiveness of the Court’.674 To that end, Song reassured states parties 
that ‘[t]he Court is fully committed to seeking maximum economy and efficiency in its 
operations’ and that while ‘[s]ome important efficiencies have already been achieved … more 
will be needed in 2012’.675 
 As this intervention suggests, efficiency was considered an ongoing but never fully 
realised process. In 2012, the court submitted its seventh report on efficiency measures to the 
CBF and continued to keep track of efficiencies across all court functions via a coordinated 
 
672 M. Mutua, ‘Africans and the ICC: Hypocrisy, Impunity, and Perversion’, in K.M. Clarke et al. (eds), Africa 
and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (CUP 2016) 47, 54.  
673 K. Heller, ‘The ICC in Palestine: Be Careful What You Wish For’ (Justice in Conflict, 2 April 2015) 
https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/04/02/the-icc-in-palestine-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/.  
674 Statement of President Song to ASP 10th Session, 2.  
675 Statement of President Song to ASP 10th Session, 2.  
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strategy on efficiency.676 Efficiency measures therefore remained a ‘critical matter’ for the 
court.677 This was true even as they attracted adverse attention. 
 The International Bar Association’s (IBA) 2011 report on ‘Enhancing Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of ICC Proceedings’ is indicative of the more nuanced approach taken by 
external observers – whether at the policy678 or scholarly679 level – towards the court’s 
efficiency efforts. As an organisation mostly concerned with defence and victims issues, the 
IBA emphasised the problem of judicial inexpediency and ‘the protracted pace of judicial 
proceedings’ rather than the broader issue of organisational inefficiency.680 Nonetheless, it 
supported the court’s efficiency measures, such as the report on organ responsibilities and the 
work of the court’s Study Group on Governance.681 It also recommended that these efforts be 
expanded by getting the court to clarify the ‘respective management and oversight roles of the 
ASP and the ICC Presidency’ and recommended that the court ‘continue its ongoing efforts to 
review its processes and maximise its level of efficiency through coordinated, systematic effort 
and internal restructuring where appropriate’.682  
 Nevertheless, the IBA acknowledged certain limitations of the managerial mindset. It 
noted how ‘[t]he Court may well become a model of administrative and procedural efficiency 
yet fail to have an impact on victims and affected communities or to stem the tide of impunity 
for egregious crimes’.683 Similarly, the IBA reflected on the structural causes of the court’s 
inefficiency, including non-cooperation of states, ‘the special nature of international criminal 
proceedings [and] the uniqueness of the Rome Statute system itself’.684 Thus, the fact that the 
IBA accepted, at least in theory, the possibility that the court might be efficient yet still be 
 
676 ICC, Seventh Status Report on the Court’s Progress Regarding Efficiency Measures, ICC-ASP/11/9, 4 May 
2012, para. 4 (‘Seventh Efficiency Report’).  
677 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 47. 
678 See also Human Rights Watch, which noted in 2006 that ‘the ICC’s mandate will not be fulfilled solely by 
conducting efficient, effective investigations’, but must ‘prioritize efforts to make international criminal justice 
accessible and meaningful to local populations’, HRW, The Strategic Plan of the International Criminal Court: A 
Human Rights Watch Memorandum’, July 2006, 2 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/The%20Strategic%20Plan%20of%20the%20ICC.pdf.  
679 See Y. McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Tribunals (OUP 2016) 46, 66 and 90.  
680 International Bar Association, Enhancing Efficiency and Effectiveness of ICC Proceedings: A Work in 
Progress, January 2011, 8 (‘IBA Efficiency Report’). 
681 The SGG was designed to facilitate dialogue between the Court and States Parties ‘with a view to strengthening 
the institutional framework of the Rome Statute system and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Court’, ASP Resolution 9/2, ICC-ASP/9/Res.2, 10 December 2010, para. 1. For an overview of the Group’s 
activities, see ICC, Report of the Bureau on the Study Group on Governance, ICC-ASP/10/30 22 November 2011, 
para. 3.  
682 IBA Efficiency Report, 9 and 11. 
683 IBA Efficiency Report, 16. 
684 IBA Efficiency Report, 33. 
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unable to provide justice to victims reflects a more dialectical approach than the court’s blanket 
faith in efficiencies as a means of optimising ICJ.  
 For its part, the court often acknowledged that the search for efficiencies had the 
potential to conflict with fairness considerations, although in the same breath assured victims 
and defence organisations that it had found an appropriate balance between the two. In its 
seventh efficiency report the court indicated that while ‘[t]he cost-effectiveness of the Court is 
related to all aspects of its mandate [including] preliminary examination, investigation, trial, 
appeals and reparations’, each of these phases ‘has been designed to respect fairness towards 
all parties’.685 The court further recognised that fairness was not anathema to the concept of 
efficiency because ‘in the long term [fairness] is the measure that will produce a most efficient 
institution’.686  
 As well as positioning efficiency alongside or even below fairness considerations, the 
report also highlights the obstacles to judging court success purely on the basis of its efficiency. 
That limitation was most apparent when considering the court’s aim of prosecuting individuals 
and ultimately ending impunity. Under the Statute, the court had concurrent jurisdiction over 
international crimes alongside national courts. To measure success via the ratio of court inputs 
to court outputs, then, did not account for the fact that some of the court’s most basic goals 
were being achieved by ‘national judiciaries around the world’.687 Accordingly, and as Ocampo 
had alluded to early in his tenure as Prosecutor, a lower number of ICC cases might not signify 
failure, but rather success by other means.688 The court’s candid reflections on the limitations 
of efficiency even at this late stage of managerialisation hints to the benefits of seeing ICJ 
outside the ICC’s technocratic logic.  
 Despite such frankness, the court failed to connect these sentiments to action. In 
proposing efficiency savings, it saw no correlation between the entrenchment of managerial 
practices and entrenchment of a broader technocratic vision of justice. Thus, even while 
acknowledging the importance of fairness to the court’s long-term success, the report reiterates 
that ‘the court remains dedicated to implementing transparent and relevant benchmarks for its 
activities’.689 Challenging the primacy of the fairness criteria it had just extolled, the efficiency 
 
685 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 5. 
686 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 5. See A. Fulford, ‘The Reflections of a Trial Judge’ (2011) 22 Criminal Law 
Forum 215, 223. 
687 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 6. 
688 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 6. See Benjamin, Ocampo Interview. 
689 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 6. Scholarly interventions dealing with the fairness-efficiency debate, while 
acknowledging their contradictions, often settle on the need for a balanced equilibrium between the two ideals 
despite the tendency of efficiency concerns to colonise all others, see H. Abtahi, ‘Expediting the ICC Criminal 
Process: Striking the Right Balance between the ICC and States Parties (2018) 18 ICLR 383, 405; A. Jones, ‘A 
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report proposes a ‘reengineering exercise’ to ‘assess whether every activity or output is needed, 
and if there are more efficient ways of performing them’.690 This exercise extended to 
‘activities directly related to the judicial process’ and reviewed ‘areas where judicial decisions 
have had a significant cost impact in the past’.691 Not only does the court appear to repudiate 
the primacy of fairness, then, but it also prioritises judicial activities which are ‘certain and 
reasonably foreseeable’ in a doubling down on the rationalized notion of ICJ.692  
 While the court’s interventions attempted to allay fears of a swing towards efficiency 
and away from fairness, it only intensified the move to streamline court activities and have 
them measured according to managerial criteria. In fact, attempts to reduce the court’s reliance 
on managerial expertise did not simultaneously rebalance the debate in favour of fairness 
considerations. Nor did it negate the desire to transform the court into a fully rationalised 
institution. The managerial infrastructure required the production of further managerial 
knowledge by the court for the benefit of states parties and the CBF. Adding to the court’s 
managerial archive, this knowledge needed to be kept constantly up to date and its gaps 
routinely filled.693 It therefore became difficult for the court to extricate itself from the 
managerial demands which it and others had placed upon the court, even as officials recognised 
management’s limitations.  
 
5.3. Discursive closure 
 
 
By 2013, the court began to face several challenges to its legitimacy despite its piecemeal 
improvement of court management. The African Union (AU) continued to challenge the court’s 
intervention in Kenya and Sudan with some suggestion that the AU would back a motion 
endorsing the mass withdrawal of African states parties from the ICC.694 This potentially 
 
Quiet Transformation? Efficiency Building in the “Fall” of International Criminal Justice’ (2019) 19 ICLR 445, 
447. 
690 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 8. 
691 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 8. 
692 Seventh Efficiency Report, para. 6. 
693 Thus, managers updated the court on its progress in implementing audit recommendations and the court 
provided an update on its organisational structure, managerial reporting lines, and the cost drivers behind trials in 
order to make budget projections more accurate, ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 18th Session, ICC-
ASP/11/5, 9 August 2012, paras 24–36; ICC, Report of the Court on its Organizational Structure, ICC-ASP/11/6, 
4 May 2012. The CBF often lamented the lack of information provided by the court, see e.g. CBF 18th Report, 
para. 36. 
694 ‘African Countries Back Away from ICC Withdrawal Demand’ (Sudan Tribune, 10 June 2009) 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31443.  
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perilous outcome had been prompted by the charges brought against the sitting President of 
Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his Vice-President, William Ruto in 2013. Ultimately, instead of 
withdrawing from the court, African states parties requested the UN Security Council to defer 
proceedings against the two Kenyans in the hope of pursuing a dialogue at the ASP on ‘the 
indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government and its consequences on peace and 
stability and reconciliation’.695 African members did manage to hold this dialogue and secure 
some minor amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but the indictments 
proceeded, confirming African members’ ‘sense of lack of consideration of a whole 
continent’696 and of an inbuilt selectivity bias within the Rome Statute system.697 
 In contrast, and from a managerial perspective, 2013 represented the successful end to 
the court’s first managerial cycle as the old Strategic Plan was replaced with a new plan for 
2013-2017. Whatever the court’s underlying weaknesses, the 2013 Strategic Plan effected to 
successfully mobilize the court’s priorities, structures, and staff in the construction of a 
complete and managerial institution. The new Plan provided a more comprehensive picture of 
the court as a managerial system, as illustrated in the below organigram or flowchart of the 
organisation’s strategic plan: 
 
 
695 ASP, Indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government and its Consequences on Peace and Stability and 
Reconciliation: Informal Summary by the Moderator, ICC-ASP/12/61, 27 November 2013. 
696 AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decision on 
the International Criminal Court, Assembly/AU/Dec.493(XXII), 30–31 January 2014, para. 8. 
697  M. Mamdani, ‘Darfur, the ICC and the New Humanitarian Order – How the ICC’s “Responsibility to Protect” 
is Being Turned into an Assertion of Neo-Colonial Domination’ (The Nation, 29 September 2008) 
https://www.thenation.com/article/new-humanitarian-order/; T. Mbeki and M. Mamdani, ‘Courts Can’t End Civil 
Wars’ (New York Times, 5 February 2014); for an overview, see A. Kiyani, ‘Al-Bashir and the ICC: The Problem 
of Head of State Immunity’ (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 467, 493–7.  
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This flowchart located the ends (and means) of global justice in the careful, almost homeostatic 
arrangement of the ICC’s mission, goals, objectives, and results. The new mission reinscribes 
the old by continuing to restrict the conditions of possibility for the ICJ project to those goals 
which the ICC could achieve. These are the ability to ‘conduct preliminary examinations, 
investigations, prosecutions and trials of the most serious crimes within its jurisdiction fairly, 
effectively and impartially’.698 They are also to ‘maintain judicial and prosecutorial 
independence’, ‘be administratively transparent, efficient and accountable’, and ‘fight against 
impunity and contribute to the prevention of crime and long lasting respect for the rule of 
law’.699 Tucked between the court’s core objectives, the goal of creating a transparent, efficient, 
and accountable court appears as an important pillar supporting the further managerialisation 
of the institution.  
 As seen in the flowchart, the mission also directs the court’s three strategic goals 
grouped as judicial and prosecutorial, managerial, and cooperation and support goals. Having 
outlined the centrality of the court to the broader ICJ project, the requirement of good court 
management seems self-evident, thus prompting a list of managerial ‘priority objectives’. 
Those objectives will then produce ‘expected results’. In a sign of how far the court had 
internalised the discourse of efficiency and cost-effectiveness since the previous Plan, the 
 
698 ICC, Strategic Plan 2013-2017, 18 April 2013, 2 (‘Strategic Plan 2013’). 
699 Strategic Plan 2013, 2. 
Figure 2. ICC strategy flowchart 
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expected results appear in the organigram to be framed by certain ‘budget indicators’. The 
organigram thus reproduces the managerial parameters of the court’s justice-seeking efforts, 
by restricting it to the achievement of predictable and costed results within pre-defined 
institutional goals. 
 To illustrate how the 2013 Plan restricts the discourse on ICJ, let us consider one 
priority objective for the court’s judicial goals, namely ‘to ensure adequate and meaningful 
participation and representation of victims’.700 Because of the court’s understanding of justice 
as administered efficiently through its own institutional structures, meaningful participation 
and representation of victims here equates with what can reasonably be achieved under 
conditions of efficient management. Accordingly, the court will ‘[r]evisit the victim application 
system’, ‘[i]mplement [a] Revised Strategy in Relation to Victims’, ‘[i]mplement the revised 
legal aid system relating to victims’, and ‘[p]rovide focused training for Counsel on the ICC 
List of counsel’.701  
 The results are also phrased in terms of the benefit to the institution, rather than to 
victims themselves. They will create a ‘deeper understanding of the lessons learnt and the 
challenges faced to date’ and ‘achievement of more sustainable, effective and efficient victim 
application system’, albeit with an ‘[i]ncreased sensitivity to the requirements of victims 
broadly’.702  Gradually, then, the original hope of an inclusive and participatory victims regime 
is realised in the reform of an internal procedure and the production of an internal strategy 
document. The same dilutive effect is witnessed in relation to securing expeditious judicial 
proceedings (conducting an ‘in-depth “lessons learnt” exercise’) and guaranteeing the rights of 
the defence (implementing a revised legal aid system ‘and continuously monitor[ing] its 
adequacy and cost-effectiveness’).703   
 Moreover, despite listing judicial and cooperation goals, the most numerous are the 
Plan’s managerial goals. The priority was to continue to craft a court which could ‘[d]eliver 
coherent governance and efficient, well-planned and cost-effective administration’.704 This 
goal sat alongside others to ‘[f]urther develop the Court’s systems to plan and budget 
strategically, including its efficient management of risks and performance’.705 Despite the 
division between managerial goals and the court’s functional aims, the court’s adoption of the 
 
700 Strategic Plan 2013, 3. 
701 Strategic Plan 2013, 5. 
702 Strategic Plan 2013, 5. 
703 Strategic Plan 2013, 4. 
704 Strategic Plan 2013, 6. 
705 Strategic Plan 2013, 6. 
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efficiency discourse over time had already informed and ultimately constrained its approach to 
justice-seeking.  
 The value ascribed to managerial knowledge within the court’s efficiency discourse is 
best captured by the priority objectives and expected results of the court’s managerial goals. 
Unlike the judicial goals, which appear as bureaucratic proxies of justice, the managerial goals 
can be achieved with relative ease. To deliver coherent governance, the court will ‘[r]e-examine 
and adapt the structure, staffing and resources of the Court in the light of practical experience, 
promoting efficiency and effectiveness’.706 To enhance budgeting and planning, the court will 
refine its risk management processes and ‘improve the performance measurement and 
evaluation of the Court’.707 Having reduced the programme of ICJ down to an office-based 
enterprise, the improvement of the court’s managerial credentials become the most achievable 
and effective indicator of success.  
 One of the Plan’s aspirations was to improve the link between ‘strategy-budget-
performance indicators’.708 Matching this interest, the ASP requested the court to ‘intensify its 
efforts to develop qualitative and quantitative indicators that would allow the Court to 
demonstrate better its achievements and needs, as well as allowing States Parties to assess the 
Court’s performance in a more strategic manner’.709 These performance indicators would 
function much like other indicators by collecting data over time, building up a picture of the 
court’s strengths and weaknesses, and acting as an accountability mechanism for states.710 The 
four initial indicators tracked the fairness, expeditiousness, and transparency of proceedings; 
the effectiveness of the ICC’s leadership and management; the security and protection of those 
at risk from court involvement; and victims’ access to court.711 In devising this list, the court 
acknowledged the difficulty of creating accurate and comprehensive criteria for the collection 
and evaluation of performance. It also acknowledged that the list was a ‘work in progress’ 
which did not purport to capture all nuances in the court’s performance.712 That objective 
would only be met with the gradual refinement and accumulation of data over time. To that 
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711 ICC, Report of the Court on the Development of Performance Indicators for the International Criminal Court, 
12 November 2015, para. 7 (First Indicators Report’). 
712 ICC, Report of the Court on the Development of Performance Indicators for the International Criminal Court, 
12 November 2015, para. 6. See B. Kotecha, ‘The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Limits of Performance 
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end, in April 2016, senior court officials attended a Swiss retreat on performance indicators 
and a month later the Hague Institute for Global Justice held a forum on performance indicators 
attended by court staff, academics, and civil society.713 
 While recognising the limitations of performance indicators, the court reproduced many 
of its managerial imperatives through these tools. Specifically, the court did not account for the 
fact that the preliminary indicators and the data gleaned from them told a particular story about 
what was required to realise ICJ, even before those indicators and data could be made more 
comprehensive. The expeditiousness of court proceedings, the effectiveness of court 
management, security of individuals, and victims’ access to court appeared as the project’s 
priority objectives and the data produced in relation thereto supported those priorities. 
Moreover, the data collected was circumscribed by the court’s own demands for internal 
efficiency. Thus, it would apply ‘mainly quantitative indicators which stakeholders will 
recognise as reflecting key aspects of the Court’s performance, and which can be measured 
over time’.714 Unquantifiable and immeasurable data would not be collected, and would, over 
time, be deprioritised. Similarly, in recognising the high impact of external factors on 
performance such as local security, limited data, and lack of state cooperation, the court limited 
its initial selection of indicators to cover ‘issues which are essentially under the control of the 
institution itself’.715  
 The partial nature of these data is apparent in the measures used for their collection. 
The expeditiousness of proceedings was traced by collecting data on the duration of phases and 
the parties’ adherence to court deadlines. The fairness of proceedings was calculated by the 
percentage of court findings as to fair trial violations and the number of successful appeals on 
such grounds. Access to court was captured by the time taken to decide on victim applications 
and the percentage of the victim population reached through outreach activities. As these data 
reveal, indicators could only tell a story about the internally controllable and statistically 
measurable features of ICJ, ignoring some external and more remote sources of knowledge. 
The data collected then reinforced the primacy of an ICC-centric response to global injustice 
while occluding other responses. The effect is aptly summarised by Nouwen:   
 
 
713 ICC, Second Court’s Report on the Development of Performance Indicators for the International Criminal 
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When what matters is what is countable, what is countable determines what matters: 
the availability of datasets rather than the importance of issues begins to set the research 
agenda. Empirical research that is limited to indexing, quantifying, and counting thus 
risks misrepresenting an inherently political concept such as “justice” as a value-neutral 
unit that can be multiplied by the application of technical expertise.716   
  
6. Conclusion 
 
 
Performance indicators are an appropriate technique on which to conclude this historically-
informed account of the ICC’s managerial practices. Although they have received relatively 
more attention from legal scholars than have other managerial practices, performance 
indicators exhibit features common to all such tools. They respond to internal and external 
demands for organisational efficiency and fiscal accountability. They are devised by court 
officials and external experts, often at the behest of the CBF and Western states.717 And they 
function primarily through the collection and evaluation of performance data which, over time, 
purports to capture the strengths and weaknesses of the court in order to gradually optimise its 
functions.  
 Despite their differing functions, lifecycles, and degrees of specificity, the managerial 
practices described here form a dense and interlinked web of knowledge. Thus,    
  
[t]he development of performance indicators may partially overlap with a number of 
 other managerial initiatives and reporting obligations that also require identification of 
 objectives or measurement of workload such as budget, strategic planning, risk 
 management, victim participation in proceedings, or outreach.718   
 
 
716 S. Nouwen, ‘“As You Set out for Ithaka”: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions about 
Socio-Legal Empirical Research in Conflict’ (2014) 27 LJIL 227, 230. See R. Buchanan et al., ‘“What Gets 
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Hirsch and A. Lang (eds), Research Handbook on the Sociology of International Law (Edward Elgar 2018) 101. 
717 Performance indicators are, however, unique in that states parties did not originally invoke them, and after 
three annual reports on their implementation, have not attracted much attention. One ICC official notes that under 
the new Presidency of Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, performance indicators are likely to be deprioritised. However, 
and as noted in relation to other managerial processes, the move away from indicators has not dampened the ICC’s 
rationalisation efforts, ICC Interview 3, 31 July 2018 (on file with author). 
718 Second Indicators Report, para. 26. See recently, ICC, OTP Strategic Plan 2019-2021, 17 July 2019, para. 61.  
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Together, these and other practices capture the court – its structures, activities, personnel, and 
beneficiaries – in minute and bureaucratic detail. Seen from this managerial perspective, the 
court disappears as a mechanism of global justice under a clutter of strategies, efficiency 
measures, and court reports. Yet these managerial documents do not hide the court’s ‘true’ 
reality – they reveal it. By engaging the court, its officials, experts, states, and NGOs, in the 
process of optimisation, managerial practices bring out, in the most banal way, the 
impoverished limits of the technocratic project of international criminal justice.719  Through 
mission statements, the court exports its own narrow concept of justice globally. Its Court 
Capacity Model imagines global justice as a production line, with the court ready as the best 
supplier, to meet the bespoke demands of its international customers. Because of its efficiency, 
ICC justice becomes the high-point of a rationalised solution to the problem of global injustice. 
 Managerial practices are not solely responsible for this discursive closure: as the initial 
part of this chapter shows, it was the machinations of the ILC from the 1950s onwards which 
set the institutional limits of the anti-impunity project.720 By the time states came together to 
create a permanent ICC, they were left with a choice between more or less institutionalised and 
expert-led versions of ICJ. The decision to opt for a permanent institution was followed by the 
decision to make the court self-funded, and to internalise the lessons of Paschke in ways that 
fused together the hitherto separate notions of institutionalisation and efficiency. These 
external influences would continue to play on the court, surfacing more intensely in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. By then, pressure from major donors would further map out the 
managerial journey which the court had already embarked upon.  
 Clear from this journey is that it was not an objective and gradually more effective 
application of managerial tools to enhance performance. It was about fixing the court’s 
technocratic imaginary of the ICJ project in the face of many challenges to its own hegemonic 
position within that project. From the alternatives to institutionalised ICJ which existed as early 
as the 1950s to the underlying structural deficiencies legislated by the Rome Statute, 
managerial practices cleared the space for ICC justice as the best, most rational of all possible 
worlds. Since 2002, then, managerial practices have less organised the ICC around the demands 
of ICJ than shaped ICJ around the demands and capabilities of the ICC. As we have seen, it 
has also diluted its own limited vision of justice by making technocratic ICJ even more 
 
719 F. Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice: A Critical Research Agenda’, 42.  
720 This overlaps with the criminalizing tendency within the anti-impunity movement beginning in the 1970s. See 
K. Engle, ‘A Genealogy of the Criminal Turn in Human Rights’, in K. Engle et al. (eds), Anti-Impunity and the 
Human Rights Agenda (CUP 2016) 15.  
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quantifiable, short-term, and self-referential while silencing non-quantifiable data and non-
institutional voices.721 As Kamari Clarke has elsewhere concluded about legal practices, so too 
can it be said of management: ‘[t]hese new technologies of knowledge generation have guided 
the development of a new international domain dependent on the viability of its supranational 
disciplinary institutions’.722 
  
 
721 W. Ten Kate and S. Nouwen, ‘The Globalisation of Justice: Amplifying and Silencing Voices at the ICC’, in 
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4 Managerial Practices and the  
 ICC Lawyer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: From the institutional to the individual 
 
 
Managerial practices waxed throughout the ICC organisation from an early penchant for 
efficiency to a more recent demand for – and recording of – rationalisation in every sphere of 
court activity. In constructing that managerial institution, senior officials have identified the 
court’s staff members as pivotal to institutional success. As former Registrar Silvana Arbia 
emphasised to states parties in 2008, ‘the Court owes its success to its dedicated and committed 
staff’.723 She elaborated that the court’s ‘high quality results could not have been achieved 
without the commitment, determination and strong motivation of the Court’s staff members 
who have brought their competence, creativity and tireless efforts to the service of international 
justice’.724   
 Arbia’s conviction – echoed by other key figures725 – has led the court to implement a 
range of staff-focused managerial practices to optimise individual performance. Among these 
 
723 Statement of Registrar Arbia to the ASP 7th Session, 17 November 2008, 22. 
724 Statement of Registrar Arbia to ASP 7th Session, 4. 
725 In the wake of the Registry’s reorganisation, Registrar von Hebel expressed his ‘gratitude to all ICC staff for 
their constant commitment to and sacrifice for defending the principles underpinning the Rome Statute’, Statement 
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practices are the human resourcing tools of recruitment, performance appraisal, and career 
advancement.726 They also include more general frameworks for collective accountability such 
as audit and independent oversight. Together these practices are said to utilise and optimise the 
court’s human resources to contribute to the ICC’s ‘proper functioning [as] a modern, 
transparent and non-bureaucratic organization’.727  
 In reinforcing the connection between individual staff, the modern organisation, and 
‘international justice’, practices of human resource management also feed into the dominant 
discourse of contemporary ICJ, i.e. as an office-based endeavour conducted by professional 
international criminal law (ICL) experts. Whereas the dominant view is that the decision by 
the international community to opt for an institutionalised and expert-driven version of ICJ has 
precipitated necessary practices of professional optimisation, in fact the opposite is the case. 
The imposition of managerial practices designed to record, rate, and shape the ICC lawyer into 
an efficient human resource has solidified the technocratic image of ICJ as pursued by a 
‘growing cosmopolitan elite’.728 Practices of professional optimisation thus reinforce the 
rationalised vision of ICJ outlined in chapter 3, with all the deficiencies and blind-spots that 
that vision entails. 
 As I show in this chapter, the efficient ICC lawyer is produced at the quotidian level 
through the managerial practices and documents they encounter. Sociologists of the ICL field 
have observed that international criminal lawyers are already made in multiple ways outside 
ICL institutions.729 It is through this socialisation of individuals and the construction of a 
professional field of ICL that the juridical and institutional coordinates of ICJ discourse become 
settled.730 Yet the lawyer’s identity is further refined, and managerial acculturation begins in 
earnest, only once they interact with the ICC as it moulds them into an efficient human 
resource. Such refinement begins outside the court, during the job application process, but 
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Expertise’ (2015) 26 EJIL 747. 
729 See Nuremberg Academy conference ‘Power in International Criminal Justice: Towards a Sociology of 
International Justice’, Instituto degli Innocenti, 28-29 October 2017, 5 
https://www.nurembergacademy.org/fileadmin/user_upload/170912_Programme_and_concept_note_Florence_c
onference_20171028-29.pdf;  
730 K. Campbell, ‘The Making of International Criminal Justice: Towards a Sociology of the “Legal Field”’, in M. 
Christensen and R. Levi (eds), International Practices of Criminal Law: Social and Legal Perspectives (Routledge 
2017). 
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continues throughout the professional lifecycle as the lawyer gets in, settles down, keeps on, 
and moves up within the organisational structure.731 At all times, the lawyer will encounter a 
host of individualised tools and processes including application materials, performance 
meetings, appraisal models, reports and forms, and oversight mechanisms. These practices 
produce the lawyer through a web of managerial knowledge. 
 This micro-level account of the ICC’s managerial practices is pieced together in a 
number of ways. Like most lawyers, I use the court’s documentary archive as a way to create 
a story about the ICC’s work. Although using non-legal documents to do so, this story reveals 
how the ICC lawyer gradually becomes inculcated into the institutional apparatus. Yet this is 
not a made-up story: for one, the documents themselves offer a persuasive account of the 
patterns of managerial thinking within the institution in a way that corresponds with the macro 
image in the previous chapter. In addition, the practicalities of being managed as an ICC staff 
member have been corroborated through interviews with several current and former ICC staff 
members, both in The Hague and elsewhere. It is hoped that the image of the ICC lawyer which 
emerges is familiar to the ICC staff member or at least makes the everyday rituals of ICC office 
life look strange in an effort to better understand the parameters and constraints of the modern 
ICJ project.732   
  
 
 
 
1. Becoming an ICJ professional 
 
 
By the time the prospective ICC staff member decides to apply for a position at the court, they 
will already have a particular vision of what ICJ is and how to achieve it. This will have been 
determined by certain geographical, educational, and cultural factors. As a law student, they 
 
731 The chapter is structured along the ‘life cycle of the staff members’, R. Oosterlinck, ‘Staff Management in 
International Organisations: The Example of the European Space Agency’, in C. de Cooker (ed), International 
Administration: Law and Management Practices in International Organisations (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 95. See 
also Harper, Inside the IMF. 
732 Others may, of course, reject this story as either exaggerating a small part of office life or as too detached from 
the broader goals which the ICC seeks to realise. Yet it is precisely the seeming unimportance of these practices 
and documents which masks their omnipresence as technologies of discipline, surveillance, and conformity. The 
ICC lawyer who rejects this account has already internalised the ideals of efficiency and performance management 
which managerial tools and documents enact. 
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will have been drawn into the small and infant sub-field of ICL, perhaps due to its novelty or 
sensationalism.733 They may see in ICL a career path that will allow them to ‘assuage[] the 
moral hunger for a response to visible yet unimaginable human suffering’734 without giving up 
on the desire for a ‘respectable career’735. As they progress through their studies, reading 
textbooks and articles,736 seeing the ICC in the news, in documentaries,737 and on film,738 or 
attending the court as visitor or intern,739 they slowly become socialised into the ICL 
‘profession’740. In doing so, they come to adopt a view of justice as achievable through the 
expert interpretation of legal rules and the institutionalised prosecution of individuals for 
international crimes. This socialisation process also habituates them towards the piecemeal 
improvement of ICL institutions.  
 
1.1. Getting in: The job application 
 
  
For its part, the ICC reproduces this image of ICJ from the very first encounter it has with 
prospective employees. That encounter takes place not inside the ICC building, but digitally 
through the court’s online recruitment system. The ICC ‘eRecruitment’ portal, contains all the 
relevant recruitment information and documents for the lawyer to make their application from 
 
733 E. van Sliedregt, ‘International Criminal Law: Over-studied and Underachieving?’ (2016) 29 LJIL 1, 1–4. 
734 S. Nouwen, ‘Justifying Justice’, 330. See also D. Koller, ‘The Faith of International Criminal Lawyers’ (2013) 
40 NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 1019. 
735 S. Moyn, ‘Anti-Impunity as Deflection of Argument’, in K. Engle et al. (eds), Anti-Impunity and the Human 
Rights Agenda (CUP 2016) 68, 79. 
736 M. Christensen, ‘Preaching, Practicing and Publishing International Criminal Justice: Academic Expertise and 
the Development of an International Field of Law’ (2016) 17 ICLR 1, 10: ‘Through the professionalization of the 
field of ICL, the legal battles of the international criminal courts were extended into academia, where they took 
on the formal formats of scholarship and the perceived quality of objectivity and authority offered by this specific 
form of social production as inscribed into its formalized peer-review system’. 
737 W. Werner, ‘Justice on Screen – A Study of Four Documentary Films on the International Criminal Court’ 
(2016) 29 LJIL 1043. 
738 K. Ainley et al., ‘International Criminal Justice on/and Film’ (2018) 6 LRIL 3. 
739 Campbell, ‘The Making of International Criminal Justice’.  
740 Specifically on the profession of ICL and related fields, see M. Christensen, ‘The Emerging Sociology of 
International Criminal Courts: Between Global Restructurings and Scientific Innovations’ (2015) 63 Current 
Sociology Review 825; Christensen, ‘Preaching, Practicing and Publishing International Criminal Justice’;  M. 
Christensen and R. Levi, ‘Introduction: An Internationalized Criminal Justice: Paths of Law and Paths of Police’, 
in Christensen and Levi, International Practices of Criminal Justice, 1; Y. Dezalay and B. Garth (eds), Lawyers 
and the Construction of Transnational Justice (Routledge 2012) especially parts I and III; F. Mégret, ‘Thinking 
about What International Humanitarian Lawyers “Do”: An Examination of the Laws of War as a Field of 
Professional Practice’, in W. Werner et al. (eds), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi 
(CUP 2017) 265; F. Mégret, ‘International Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field’ (2018) XIII Champ Pénal 1. See 
also the ‘profession’ of international law, J. d’Aspremont et al. (eds), International Law as a Profession (CUP 
2017); F. Kratochwil, ‘Practising Law’, in W. Werner et al. (eds), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading 
Martti Koskenniemi (CUP 2017) 225, 228 ff.  
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anywhere in the world.741 The portal contains features such as a job search facility, the ability 
to track vacancies and applications, and a page to construct one’s professional profile and 
upload documents such as a CV and cover letter. Utilising these organisational and digital tools, 
and displaying them on a sleek and minimalist website, the eRecruitment portal plays to its 
own professional aspirations and those of its prospective employees.   
 As the applicant engages with the website, they will become more familiar with the 
organisation and the position for which they are applying. In this interaction they begin to be 
encased in the ICC’s ‘organisational world’742 despite their geographical remoteness from the 
court743. The applicant creates an online profile and begins to scroll through the list of court 
vacancies to find the appropriate job posting. Due to the size of the organisation and its multiple 
functions, they may have to narrow the search criteria by selecting ‘professional’ category jobs. 
They may also narrow the search by selecting only ‘legal affairs’ as the ‘functional area’ they 
are interested in. But in selecting ‘legal affairs’ from this list, the applicant will also confront a 
number of specialisms appearing comfortably alongside legal positions. These include 
‘auditing’, ‘controlling/accounting/finance’, ‘customer service’, ‘corporate management’, 
‘human resources’, ‘sales and marketing’, and various others (see fig. 3). Scrolling past these 
specialisms, they select ‘legal affairs’ which generates a handful of vacancy listings.  
 For the purposes of this chapter, I use the example of the lawyer applying for the 
position of Legal Officer (P-3) in the Gender and Children Unit of the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP).744  
 
 
741 ICC eRecruitment website, 
https://career5.successfactors.eu/career?company=1657261P&site=&lang=en_GB.  
742 G. Burrell, ‘Modernism, Postmodernism and Organisational Analysis: The Contribution of Michel Foucault’, 
in A. McKinlay and K. Starkey (eds), Foucault, Management and Organization Theory (SAGE Publications 1998) 
14, 25. 
743 The majority of applicants for court vacancies are internal applicants, in which case they may complete the 
application in the vicinity of the court in The Hague.  
744 All information correct as of August 2018. ICC, Job Description for Legal Officer (P-3), ID 18084 (posted 31 
January 2018) (on file with author).  
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Selecting this vacancy, the applicant is brought to the main job description which contains all 
the information required for the lawyer to make their application (see fig. 4).  It lists the 
duration of the contract, the salary, and application deadline. The job specification also 
describes the structural location of the post within the organisation, and lists the substantive 
‘duties and responsibilities’ which the successful candidate will be expected to perform.745 The 
bulk of the page outlines the essential and desirable criteria which the successful candidate is 
expected to satisfy, including qualifications – ‘education’, ‘experience’, ‘knowledge, skills and 
abilities’, and ‘knowledge of languages’ – as well as a list of ‘core competencies’ (see 
Appendix A).746  
 
 
745 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
746 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
Figure 3. ICC ‘eRecruitment’ search 
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Looking to the requirements of this position in the Gender and Children Unit, one witnesses 
the court beginning to construct the ideal, efficient professional. The successful candidate will 
provide legal advice and support to the OTP, conduct legal research, provide expertise for staff 
training, and ‘liaise with external networks’ on relevant topics, among other tasks.747 To 
properly discharge these tasks, the successful candidate is expected to have a high level of 
university and professional (legal) training. Their professional experience will include 
‘investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes and crimes against 
children’.748 They should also have a range of professional skills such as communication, 
organisation, and cross-cultural teamwork skills. For these tasks, the technocratic lawyer, 
particularly one with experience in other national or international legal institutions, is the most 
suitably qualified candidate. 
 Moreover, several features of the job description refine and crystallise the lawyer’s 
understanding of an ICC-centric justice project. The section entitled ‘organisational context’ 
seeks to position the would-be employee within a wider managerial structure. Irrespective of 
their role, each staff member will be conceived of and encased in this functional hierarchy.  In 
the present example, the successful candidate will join the Gender and Children Unit, housed 
in the OTP’s Investigation Division. Seeing the employee through this organisational 
paradigm, the job description also begins to set the lines of authority and limits of professional 
 
747 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
748 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
Figure 4. Legal Officer job description 
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action. Thus, the applicant is informed that the Division is ‘under the overall management of 
its Director and management team’.749 This management team ‘recruits, trains and monitors 
performance of investigators, analysts and data inputters within the integrated team’.750 The 
reality within which the lawyer will operate consists of units, divisions, and management 
teams, while their responsibilities are defined by and confined to managerial reporting lines. 
As much as the job description creates that organisational context for the lawyer, in thinking 
about the position and what it entails, the lawyer will also create that context and link it to the 
wider ICJ project.  
 The section entitled ‘duties and responsibilities’ performs a similar function. As noted 
in chapter 3, the court has reduced the aspirations of ICJ down to what is institutionally possible 
in an atmosphere of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The duties and responsibilities operate 
to reinforce those aspirations by focusing staff on institutional targets such as the ‘preparation 
of draft implementation reports’, the ‘development of investigation plans’, and ‘preparation of 
filings’.751 The successful candidate will also ‘provide legal expertise and contribute to the 
design of specific training of staff members with regard to engagement with witnesses 
especially children’, ‘liaise with external networks’, and ‘present periodic reports to [the OTP 
Executive Committee] on such liaison activities’.752 Informed of these duties, the prospective 
employee begins to narrow the conditions of possibility down to what can be achieved by an 
efficient institution.  
 The job description also reinforces the prospective employee’s managerial subjectivity 
through a list of ‘ICC core competencies’. A competency is ‘a measurable pattern of skills, 
knowledge, abilities, behaviors and other characteristics needed to perform and fulfil one’s job 
responsibilities’.753 At the ICC, as in any organisation, the successful candidate is expected to 
embody various core competencies deemed necessary to the fulfilment of the organisation’s 
mission. Competencies therefore construct an ideal-type professional against which (would-
be) employees will be evaluated, and against which they will evaluate themselves.  
 The ICC job description lists seven core competencies, namely ‘dedication to the 
mission and values’, ‘professionalism’, ‘teamwork’, ‘learning and developing’, ‘handling 
 
749 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
750 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
751 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
752 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 1. 
753 E. Schilling, ‘Core Competencies and their Role in Performance Appraisals’, University of California Merced, 
3 May 2016, 3 https://hr.ucmerced.edu/files/page/documents/webchat_slide_-_core_competencies.pdf.  
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uncertain situations’, ‘interaction’, and ‘realising objectives’.754 Under each of these 
competencies, the job description lists specific behavioural traits and skills (see fig. 5).755 
  
 
 
 
Disseminating its core competencies during this pre-recruitment phase, the court makes plain 
that all staff activities, including core legal tasks, are to be judged on the basis of these 
institutional traits. Thus, when engaging with external groups, the ideal Legal Officer will ‘act 
consistently and in accordance with the mission and values of the Organisation’ and ‘present a 
positive image of the court’.756 When offering legal advice or support, that ideal lawyer ‘seeks 
feedback … to increase organisational effectiveness’, ‘manages time effectively’, ‘focuses on 
client needs’, ‘takes responsibility for actions’, and ‘monitors and maintains quality and 
 
754 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 2. 
755 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 2. 
756 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 2. 
Figure 5. Core competencies model 
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productivity’.757 The lawyer must become an optimal component of the institution in order to 
help realise the ICJ project. 
 In completing their application for the position of Legal Officer, the applicant will 
already begin to sell themselves to the court. They will outline their relevant education, 
experiences, and professional skills. They will also seek to align themselves as closely as 
possible to the ideal managerial professional as described in the core competencies section of 
the job description. In their CV and cover letter, the applicant will shape themselves into an 
organised and professional team-player thoroughly committed to the court’s mission and 
values.758 Imagining themselves into the role, the applicant will envisage the completion of 
their legal tasks according to the criteria of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. This act of self-
disciplining or self-regulation represents the beginning of the lawyer’s ICC career as a project 
of constructing the managerial subject.759 As the applicant uploads the required documents to 
the eRecruitment portal and clicks ‘apply’, their identity is captured for the first time in the 
court’s digital archive.  
 
1.2. Getting in: The recruitment process 
 
 
At the other end of the computer screen, the ICC’s internal recruitment team receives the 
lawyer’s application. For external applicants, this will be the court’s first encounter with them 
and the knowledge the applicant has provided will allow the court to construct a rudimentary 
image of the applicant on paper (or on screen). Despite the diverse range of applicants which 
the recruitment team may have to consider, the fact that each applicant will have represented 
themselves through the generic CV and cover letter, and will have sought to align themselves 
to the core competencies, means that all applicants will be assessed according to managerial 
criteria and evaluated as being either more or less aligned with the professional ideal. This 
image will be captured in an individual file, which may later mature into the applicant’s official 
file should their application be successful. 
 As the court begins to accumulate knowledge about the applicant, it will be required to 
assess them based on pre-set criteria. This imperative arises not only from the core 
 
757 Legal Officer Job Description 2018, 2. 
758 The  CV is ‘a powerful technique for stating what one was, is and will be and for giving a narrative of the self’, 
C. Grey, ‘Career as a Project of the Self and Labour Process Discipline’ (1994) 28 Sociology 479, 495. 
759 Grey, ‘Career as a Project of the Self’, 479. 
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competencies, but from the court’s legal texts. Article 44(2) of the Statute states that when 
recruiting staff, the court ‘shall ensure the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and 
integrity’. ASP resolution 1/10 of 2002 distinguishes this requirement as a ‘general principle’ 
applicable to all staff irrespective of category or level of seniority.760 Moreover, the ICC 
Recruitment Guidelines place human resources personnel at the centre of decisions on 
candidate selection. The guidelines oblige the Human Resources Section to review all vacancy 
announcements as drafted by the relevant section before they are published on the eRecruitment 
portal.761 Once all applications have been received, the Human Resources Section will be the 
first to review them,762 and of the three-member Interview Panel established to conduct the 
recruitment process, at least one of its members ‘should represent the Human Resources 
Section and coordinate the process’.763 
 Once convened, the Interview Panel compiles a shortlist of candidates and decides how 
they will be assessed, i.e. via ‘telephone interview’, ‘written tests’, ‘role plays’, or ‘face to face 
interviews’.764 These modes of assessment will extract further knowledge about the candidates, 
again on the basis of managerial criteria. For example, shortlisted candidates will be 
interviewed, whether via telephone or in person. Under the Guidelines, the panel may conduct 
a ‘competency based interview’ which is designed to ascertain the candidate’s ability to deploy 
their skills in real-life scenarios.765 Like the competencies model, the competency-based 
interview requires the applicant to imagine themselves into a hypothetical workplace in order 
to find quick and efficient solutions to common organisational problems. By prioritising their 
efficiency and ability to solve internal problems, the competency-based interview reinforces 
the organisational limits of the applicant’s actions and responsibilities.  
 As the applicant answers the interviewers’ managerial questions with managerial 
answers, those answers will be captured in the interviewers’ notes.766 Once the interview ends, 
the panel will review and compare their notes to determine how close to the managerial ideal 
 
760 ASP Resolution 1/10, ICC-ASP/1/Res.10, 9 September 2002, para. 1. See also the additional ‘core values’ 
outlined in Regs. 1.2–1.3, Staff Regulations for the International Criminal Court, adopted in ASP Resolution 2/2, 
ICC-ASP/2/Res. 2, 12 September 2003. 
761 ICC, Recruitment Guidelines for Established Posts, entry into force 2 November 2009, unclassified 22 
November 2012, para. 3.2 (‘Recruitment Guidelines’). 
762 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 6.1. 
763 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 5.1. 
764 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 7. 
765 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 7.3. 
766 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 7.3. 
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the applicant falls. The panel will then produce an interview report and possibly a ‘rating sheet’ 
which will capture the candidate’s official identity in documentary form.767 
 Like the competency-based interview, written tests may be used to capture particular 
kinds of knowledge about the candidates. These tests gauge ‘the candidates’ technical 
knowledge and skills’ and thus reveal their aptitude as lawyers.768 However, legal or other 
professional expertise must be presented ‘in a form which will allow an objective and 
measurable assessment of relevant skills, competencies and abilities’ and which can be rated 
on paper.769 The competencies paradigm therefore operates in the background of this 
assessment of legal knowledge to judge it according to managerial standards and record it as a 
specific form of managerial knowledge about the applicant.770  
 The combination of these managerial technologies of recruitment – the job description, 
application documents, assessments, and panel evaluations – begin to produce an image of the 
applicant as a managerial subject who can (or cannot) optimise the rational project of ICJ.  
Based on this identity, the panel will decide whether to recruit the applicant. It is not only the 
institution who creates the managerial subject, though, but the applicant themselves. They too 
are implicated in the process of self-creation as they complete their application, attend 
interviews, and complete written assessments. Through those engagements, the applicant 
‘produc[es …] appropriate forms of behaviour in self-discipline fashion’.771 They will 
recognise the institutional parameters of their work and the managerial criteria against which 
they will be evaluated. If their application is successful, they will begin their first day at the 
ICC building with a clear understanding of ICJ as a technocratic project conducted by efficient 
experts like them.  
 
 
 
 
 
767 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 7.3. 
768 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 7.1. 
769 Recruitment Guidelines, para. 7.1. 
770 B. Townley, Reframing Human Resource Management: Power, Ethics and the Subject at Work (SAGE 
Publications 2014) 114–5. 
771 Grey, ‘Career as a Project of the Self’, 487. According to one official discussing the documentation of 
performance, ‘it is nice to have a trace’, ICC Interview 4, 16 August 2018. 
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2. Settling down 
2.1. Managerial socialisation 
 
 
Once the new recruit enters the ICC building, their first direct encounter with the court will be 
mediated by a member of staff from the Human Resources Section, rather than the OTP Gender 
and Children Unit. The human resources (HR) officer will settle the new Legal Officer into the 
organisation, and in so doing plays an important role in socialising the lawyer into the court’s 
managerial reality. The HR officer will have before them the professional’s personal records 
and will begin to add to this documentary archive by providing the lawyer with a letter of 
appointment and by getting them to sign an employment contract. These documents will 
contain important information about the lawyer’s entitlements and salary, their notice period, 
and any ‘special conditions’ of their appointment including any probationary period.772 Having 
been given notice of the probationary period at this stage, the lawyer is made aware of the need 
to meet certain performance benchmarks even before they begin to perform their tasks. 
 In addition to building the lawyer’s official file, the HR officer will also seek to 
habituate the lawyer into the court’s unique mission and organisational culture.773 Within the 
ICC, HR officers managing these ‘first-day’ procedures engage in ‘onboarding’, a process of 
socialisation in which the organisation’s mission, values, and professional culture are conveyed 
to the new recruit in order to align their performance with institutional expectations.774 In the 
context of the ICC, chapter 3 has revealed the managerial orientation of the court’s mission, 
including its aspiration to become a ‘model of public administration’.775 The 2006 Strategic 
Plan sketched a ‘common ICC culture’ which seeks to foster a ‘dynamic’, ‘results-driven’, and 
 
772 Rule 104.1(b)(iv) and rule 104.2(a)(v), Staff Rules of the International Criminal Court (as amended), 
ICC/AI/2015/004/Corr.1, entry into force 27 July 2015. 
773 Like any bureaucracy, the ICC creates ‘a shared discourse, symbols, and values for their staff’, M. Barnett and 
M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell UP 2004) 19. This 
shared discourse is not unlike Bourdieu’s habitus, defined as ‘a subjective but not individualised system of 
internalized structures, schemes of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same group 
or class’, P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (CUP 2013 [1977]) 86 (and transposed to the legal ‘field’ 
in P. Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 
805).   
774 ‘What is Onboarding Exactly?’ (PeopleAdmin, January 2013) https://www.peopleadmin.com/2013/01/what-
is-onboarding-exactly/. At the ICC, onboarding is a task completed by HR officers, see ICC, Job Description for 
Human Resources Assistant (G-5), ID 18427 (posted on 19 July 2018) 2 (on file with author). 
775 Strategic Plan 2006, para. 28. 
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‘service-oriented’ atmosphere among staff.776 In the OTP setting, the lawyer may also be 
informed of more specific values guiding its investigative and prosecutorial activities.777  
 Finally, either at this preliminary stage or in their initial encounters with their 
immediate supervisor in the Gender and Children Unit, the lawyer will also become aware of 
the internal organising model known as the ‘one Court’ principle. This principle recognises 
that while the court’s organs are and must be functionally independent from one another, the 
court’s aims can only be realised through inter-organ coordination of activities and expertise. 
The court’s staff must ‘work together as one court’ because they all ‘form part of the same 
institution and share a common mission’.778 This unifying principle, according to one former 
ICC judge, helps foster ‘a general atmosphere of mutual trust, confidence and reliability 
between all elected officials, organs, units and staff [to] contribute to more efficiency and a 
much better work culture’.779  
 The power of these early practices to shape individuals is evinced by evolving staff 
perceptions towards the one Court principle. According to one former ICC official, staff 
members initially felt that the principle had been externally imposed as yet another 
organisational approach to enhance efficiency.780 This scepticism was, in fact, a common 
reaction to many of the court’s approaches to internal organisation, and was a reaction against 
the frequency with which ideas were implemented, discarded, and replaced with new ones.781 
Yet like other new ideas, the one Court principle was gradually incorporated into the daily 
conduct of staff functions. As the same ex-ICC official observed, the one Court principle 
‘became part of our identity’ after initial feelings of imposition subsided.782   
 Through the gathering together of the abstract mission, values and principles during the 
initial HR meeting, the court gives the amorphous ideals of efficiency and productivity a 
material reality on paper. The new recruit witnesses the importance of personal efficiency and 
 
776 Strategic Plan 2006, para. 48. 
777 E.g. the OTP mission, ICC, OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015, para. 9. 
778 Strategic Plan 2006, para. 15. 
779 H.P. Kaul, ‘The ICC of the Future’, Address at 6th Annual International Humanitarian Law Dialogues, Robert 
H. Jackson Centre, 28 August 2012 4 https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8572B9B0-B827-466C-B67A-
3C9C06A5E46E/284994/30082012_ChautauquaSpeech_THEICCOFTHEFUTURE_provis.pdf. See also ICC, 
Fourth Diplomatic Briefing of the International Criminal Court, Brussels, 8 June 2005, 2 https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ECD36817-DE8D-4F2B-A75F-DA282FED1AA1/278489/DB200506_Info_Pack_En.pdf.  
780 ICC interview 1, 11 July 2018. 
781 NGO Interview 2, 16 July 2019. 
782 ICC interview 1, 11 July 2018. Cf another official who noted that the mission acts more as a ‘reminder’ to staff, 
for whom such values ‘come naturally anyway’, ICC Interview 2, 13 July 2018. 
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commitment to the optimal performance of the institution. They therefore seek to become a 
service-oriented professional for the benefit of this technocratic system of justice.783  
 After this onboarding ritual, the lawyer will meet their immediate supervisor in the OTP 
block of the ICC building. The supervisor will be the lawyer’s line manager and will oversee 
the lawyer’s work on a day-to-day basis and formally appraise their performance. During this 
initial exchange, the supervisor will continue, albeit more substantively, the onboarding work 
begun by the HR officer. They will inform the new recruit of the OTP’s organisational 
hierarchy and the specific structure of the Investigation Division, both represented as 
organigrams (see figs. 6 and 7). These structures and material representations habituate the 
lawyer further into the managerial logic of the organisation. They clarify the guiding logic of 
authority as being based upon a relationship between managerial and operational staff and as 
being assessed according to the manager’s criteria as designated in the competencies model.784  
  
 
783 UN scholars have sought to foster a similar identity for UN staff members to render them ‘truly international, 
specialized, mobile, midcareer, entrepreneurial, and independent’ officials, D. Salomons, ‘Good Intentions to 
Naught: The Pathology of Human Resources Management at the United Nations’, in D. Dijkzeul and Y. Beigbeder 
(eds), Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise (Berghahn Books 2003) 111, 115. 
784 S. Deetz, Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization: Developments in Communication and the Politics 
of Everyday Life (State University of New York Press 1992) 240. 
Figure 6. Office of the Prosecutor organigram 
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By fixing the lawyer’s position in a managerial hierarchy, these organigrams also crystallise 
the outer limits of what is possible in the context of the broader ICJ project. Whatever can be 
achieved as a matter of justice is only possible through institutional structures. The 
organisation, then, becomes the purpose rather than just a means for other professional 
activities and aspirations, narrowing down the parameters of professional success to those 
actions which assist, optimise, and ultimately sustain the institution as opposed to looking 
beyond it. 
 As this analysis shows, the lawyer’s first day at the ICC building is not the first point 
at which their identity as a managerial professional will be formed. But this first day, and other 
initial interactions, are important for establishing the boundaries and expectations within which 
the lawyer is expected to operate.785 In their various exchanges with key managerial figures, 
 
785 Barnett and Finnemore similarly conclude in relation to IOs that they ‘can fix meanings in ways that orient 
action and establish boundaries for acceptable action’, Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 32. 
Figure 7. OTP Investigation Division organigram 
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the lawyer is confronted with ideas, values, cultures, and principles in documentary form. All 
of these coalesce around the desire for an efficient professional fully committed to ICC-centric 
justice. It is this efficiency discourse and the technocratic imaginary into which it feeds that 
gives the lawyer’s work meaning as they begin their job at the Gender and Children Unit.  
 
2.2. The probationary period 
 
 
While the professional begins to carry out their work with managerial standards in mind, they 
will already be subject to a rigorous, paper-based exercise designed to measure their 
performance and reinscribe a managerial understanding of their work. This is the probationary 
process as set out in the Staff Rules and elaborated in detail by a 2013 Administrative 
Instruction.786 
 The probationary process ‘provide[s] the court with an opportunity to assess the staff 
member’s performance and suitability for his or her work with the court’.787 According to rule 
4.1 of the Staff Rules, the probationary process is normally conducted by the lawyer’s 
‘immediate supervisor’ and ‘confirmed by the immediate supervisor’s reviewer’. The 
probationary period commences as soon as the lawyer begins their employment and lasts for a 
period of six months. During that time, the lawyer and their supervisor will meet at least twice 
to formally discuss the lawyer’s performance, after which the supervisor will record the data 
from such meetings in a ‘probationary performance report’.788 Based on this report, the 
supervisor and reviewer will either confirm the lawyer’s appointment after six months, or, in 
case of an ‘unsatisfactory’ finding by the supervisor, extend the probationary period for a 
further six months.789  
 
786 ICC, Probationary Period and Performance Appraisal, ICC/AI/2013/004, 5 April 2013 (‘AI Probationary 
Period’). Performance evaluation was in place in some offices, notably the OTP, from the mid-2000s, according 
to one former ICC lawyer employed by the OTP during that time. Another ICC official describes the context in 
which performance appraisal was systematically implemented. In its early years, the ICC adopted the UN 
Common Employment framework which saw salaries increase incrementally every year based on performance 
targets. Eventually this began to push against the allocated financial envelope for staff salaries. Thereafter, the 
ASP requested information on performance targets which revealed that the cause of this growing financial burden 
was that 99 percent of staff had been evaluated as having exceeded their performance targets. Only then did the 
ASP request that the court ‘institutionalise a well-functioning performance management system, including 
performance-based incentives’, ICC, Report of the Court on Human Resources – Development of a Human 
Resources Strategy: Progress Report, ICC-ASP/7/6, 26 May 2008, 3.  
787 AI Probationary Period, para. 1.1. 
788 AI Probationary Period, paras 4.2–4.3. 
789 AI Probationary Period, para. 5.1. 
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 The probationary process is a central component of the court’s performance 
management regime. It features performance meetings, competency assessments, and official 
reports, all of which appear again in the court’s post-probationary performance appraisal 
system. Considering these practices in turn, I observe their collective ability to produce a 
managerial subject. 
 
2.2.1. Performance meeting 
 
 
The performance meeting is a valuable means of ascertaining the lawyer’s abilities and their 
suitability for the organisation. Indeed, the performance meeting is the key moment on which 
the appraisal turns given that it brings the appraisee and appraiser together, allows information 
to be collected on the appraisee, and is the basis for the appraiser’s determination on whether 
to confirm the appraisee’s appointment. As ordinary as an internal meeting like this may 
appear, it is not a trivial engagement. Nor is it a ‘neutral process of acquiring information’ 
freely given by the appraisee to the appraiser.790 Rather, the performance meeting is the 
institution (through the appraiser) binding the appraisee to a particular professional identity by 
constructing an official truth about them.  
 According to the 2013 Administrative Instruction, the performance meeting should 
‘establish the objectives against which performance will be assessed during the probationary 
period’, identify the staff member’s performance thus far, and signal further training or 
‘guidance on the implementation of his/her performance objectives’.791 More generally, the 
appraisee will be asked how they are settling in and whether they are having any problems in 
their new role. The meeting therefore opens up the professional to examination and subjects 
them to the ‘normalising gaze’ of the institution.792  
 As well as providing an opportunity for the institution to examine the lawyer, the 
meeting also offers an opportunity for individual confession.793 The lawyer is encouraged to 
 
790 Townley, Reframing Human Resource Management, 203.  
791 AI Probationary Period, para. 8.2. 
792 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Modern Prison (Penguin 1991 [1977]) 184. 
793 Townley makes the distinction between the dual examination and confessional functions of meetings, B. 
Townley, ‘Foucault, Power/Knowledge, and its Relevance for Human Resource Management’ (1993) 18 Academy 
of Management Review 518, 533. Originally, it was Foucault who made the connection between the catholic 
confessional and the ‘secular’ confessional as manifested in the modern discipline of psychiatry, M. Foucault, 
History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (Vol. 1, Penguin 1998 [1976]) 59–60. See also P. Findlay and T. 
Newton, ‘Re-framing Foucault: The Case of Performance Appraisal’, in McKinlay and Starkey, Foucault, 
Management and Organization Theory, 211, 214–5. 
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avow their professional self in terms of productivity and commitment. They may confess that 
they are  ‘not working as hard as they might, through accessing their feelings about the job, 
their workmates, their managers, their home life, their anxieties and aspirations’.794 These 
confessions do not undermine the lawyer’s managerial identity, but reinforce it by availing the 
lawyer with an opportunity to repent and rectify their performance.795 After giving the 
institution access to these managerially-relevant aspects of the self, the lawyer can recommit 
themselves to the managerial ideal. The performance meeting is therefore as much a means of 
self-regulation as of exerting institutional control over the individual.796   
 
2.2.2. Core competencies model 
 
 
While the performance meeting is a process of knowledge production, it only hints at the 
content of such knowledge. Performance markers are needed to guide the meeting, determine 
the content of the probationary report, and thus give meaning to the appraisee. This is where 
the competencies model makes its first appearance within the appraisal framework to create 
such meaning. Like the onboarding process, it does so by connecting individual performance 
to the court’s efficiency and wider success.797  
 The core competencies model appears in full-length form in another 2013 
Administrative Instruction. Over 16 pages, it lists seven core competencies which form the 
basic criteria against which staff performance is to be recorded and assessed (see Appendix B). 
As mentioned previously, the competencies model requires the professional to demonstrate 
‘dedication to the mission and values’, ‘professionalism’, ‘teamwork’, ‘learning and 
development’, ‘handling uncertain situations’, ‘interaction’, and the ability to ‘realis[e] 
objectives’.798 Each of these competencies follows an identical format: first, it summarises the 
 
794 Findley and Newton, ‘Re-framing Foucault’, 215; Townley, Reframing Human Resource Management, 109–
11. 
795 Townley, Reframing Human Resource Management, 200–1; Townley, ‘Foucault, Power/Knowledge, and its 
Relevance for Human Resource Management’, 536. This is in keeping with one official’s observation that within 
the organisation ‘there is no big brother’ and that performance and expectations must be ultimately managed by 
oneself, ICC Interview 5, 27 August 2018. 
796 These two effects broadly correspond to ‘technologies of power’ and ‘technologies of the self’ as discussed in 
M. Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’, L. Martin et al. (eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault (University of Massachusetts Press 1988) 16.   
797 See chapter 2.3.2.  
798 ICC, Performance Appraisal System, ICC/AI/2013/003, 6 March 2013 (‘AI on PAS’), Annex: The Core 
Competencies of the ICC, 13 (‘Competencies Model’). 
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competency and its importance to the court’s effectiveness; second, it provides a ‘general 
definition’ of the competency translated in ‘behavioural terms’ to allow the competency to be 
detected in specific circumstances; third, it sets the standard to which the appraisee will be held 
according to their level of seniority; and fourth, it lists positive and negative ‘behavioural 
indicators’ to determine whether the appraisee has met the competency in practice. 
 By way of example, the ‘professionalism’ competency reasons that to conduct ‘fair 
public trials the Court needs strong strategic and analytical core capacity’.799 This capacity, 
according to the court, will only be met by staff who are professional and who know ‘how the 
ICC organisation works’.800 In ‘behavioural terms’, professionalism means being able to apply 
‘professional and technical expertise’, to ‘keep[] abreast of organisational issues’ and to 
produce ‘workable solutions to a range of problems’.801 Given the Legal Officer is employed 
in a professional rather than a managerial category, they will ideally apply their ‘specialist 
skills in [their] own work’, share expertise, understand the organisation’s ‘structure, goals and 
capabilities’, and be an employee who ‘identifies, uncovers and solves problems’.802 Positive 
behavioural indicators of professionalism include advising others on appropriate courses of 
action, clarifying actions, collecting all the evidence, and ‘reach[ing] the right conclusions’.803 
Conversely, negative indicators include a failure to conduct ‘appropriate analysis or 
examination prior to decision-making’ and ‘tak[ing] things at face value’.804 Under this and 
other competencies staff are to be measured and optimised. 
 The ideal professional which emerges from the competencies model is the efficient 
technocrat. They discharge and improve the provision of justice institutionally and see 
themselves as the ‘piecemeal engineer’ of an ever-more rationalised ICJ system.805 Centring 
the ICC, the model sets a high premium on organisational loyalty.  According to the 
‘dedication’ competency, ‘[t]he foundation of the ICC competency model is dedication to the 
Court as a whole’.806 ‘The mission is what drives people to work for the ICC’ while ‘[a]ll ICC 
employees understand the mission and values and are committed to it’.807 When interacting 
outside the institution, the ideal professional ‘portrays and promotes a positive image of the 
 
799 Competencies Model, 17. 
800 Competencies Model, 17. 
801 Competencies Model, 17. 
802 Competencies Model, 17. 
803 Competencies Model, 18. 
804 Competencies Model, 18. 
805 T. Skouteris, ‘The New Tribunalism: Strategies of (De)Legitimation in the Era of International Adjudication’ 
(2006) XVII Finnish Yearbook of International Law 307, 345, quoting Karl Popper. 
806 Competencies Model, 15. 
807 Competencies Model, 15. 
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Court to the public’, ‘shows organisational commitment and loyalty’, and ‘speaks positively 
about the ICC’.808 They will ‘continuously build and maintain [the court’s] credibility’ among 
external groups. This is not only a matter of upholding the court’s reputation, but of committing 
all staff to the ICC itself as the embodiment of ICJ. 
 Beyond instilling dedication, the competencies model ascribes value to professional 
tasks based on their specificity, calculability, and predictability. As observed in chapter 3, these 
knowledge criteria not only benefit the institution as the most capable mechanism for achieving 
justice, but further dilute that technocratic concept of justice by deprioritising activities which 
are non-specific, incalculable, and unpredictable. Activities such as reflecting on the ICC’s 
contribution to conflict situations, the values it espouses, and the blindspots it cements. Such 
activities would require a degree of creativity and good judgment, as well as an appreciation 
of the inevitably political nature of the ICC’s work. These traits, however, lie beyond what the 
current managerial frame allows. Managerial criteria, although designed to prevent ineffective 
and costly activities, also reproduce the existing and often deficient version of justice meted 
out by the ICC as a production line of tangible outputs, to the detriment of other non-
technocratic versions of ICJ. The competencies model instructs professional staff in this 
managerial paradigm to reinforce the ICC’s hegemonic position.   
 In addition to producing the efficient professional via its substantive content, the 
competencies model also inscribes managerial identity aesthetically through its use of 
diagrams, tables, bullet-points, and an authoritative institutional voice. The first page of the 
model contains a diagram of the ICC’s seven competencies (see fig. 8). The competencies fit 
together in the shape of an arrow and thus represent the vehicle by which the professional and 
the institution as a whole travel towards the court’s aims. The arrow also doubles as a building-
like structure, in which ‘dedication to the mission and values’ are the foundations and the 
‘realising objectives’ represent the roof. Symbolically, the competencies become the 
institution, representing both the means by which the court will realise its aims and, as an arrow, 
the aim of the institution itself. Through the competencies model, then, the institution becomes 
the means and ends of professional activity. 
 
 
808 Competencies Model, 15–6. 
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The competencies document has other subtle material qualities. The model is detailed in a 
series of tables. Boxed in through lines and fields, the professional identity is literally fixed 
into place. Bullet-points, which are used to list positive and negative behavioural indicators, 
catalogue managerial and non-managerial traits as incontrovertible fact. As Strathern has 
observed of bullet-points, ‘not only is there no narrative and no plot, there is no record of the 
process of compilation, no internal monitoring of discourse, no authorial self-scrutiny … no 
social observation, no science, and in that sense no facts’.809 Bullet-points are, in fact, 
‘antimeaning … They appear to be text (form) but they are not to be analysed (content)’.810 At 
one level, boxes, lines and bullet-points may evince a clarity of professional purpose. But in 
decontextualizing the lawyer and removing any opportunity for contestation, these traits 
 
809 M. Strathern, ‘Bullet-Proofing: A Tale from the United Kingdom’, A. Riles (eds), Documents: Artifacts of 
Modern Knowledge (University of Michigan Press 2006) 181, 196. 
810 Strathern, ‘Bullet-Proofing’, 198. 
Figure 8. Competencies diagram 
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establishing parameters of good and bad behaviour become the only basis on which to assess 
the lawyer, rather than the broader work of the court, its values, and global impact.811  
 Finally, these material features are bolstered by an authoritative and depersonalised 
institutional voice. The competencies model posits these random collection of behaviours as 
indisputable and official facts about the staff member. The model plays on its own ‘semantic 
vacuousness’ through phrases like client need, innovation, and clear vision to regulate the ideal 
professional without ever fleshing out what these terms mean.812  
 The institutional voice also combines elements of distance and proximity, universality 
and particularity, to sustain institutional hegemony. The competencies model is founded on a 
passive and depersonalised tone. By asserting that the optimal employee ‘acts’, ‘clarifies’, and 
‘seeks’ while the sub-optimal employee ‘fails’ and ‘does not act’, the model’s indicative mood 
expresses personal opinion as institutional fact. Such grammatical moves also create distance 
between the institution and its staff to reify the former.813 The institutional voice seeks to 
embody a collective, universal truth while simultaneously representing individual behaviours 
as personal, particularised deficiencies. In doing so, the model purges institutional or structural 
responsibility for the court’s problems and places such responsibility on individual staff. To 
that individualised problem, the institution posits individualised solutions: when ‘others do not 
deliver what was agreed upon’, the lawyer ‘responds promptly’;814 when situations change, 
they ‘make[] sure that alternatives are available’; in any given moment, the lawyer ‘make[s] 
positive use of the opportunities it presents’.815 Individualising responsibility and fixing 
professional identity binds the fate of the ICJ project to the optimisation of its experts.  
  
2.2.3. Probationary performance report 
 
 
After using the competencies model to frame the performance meeting, the supervisor will 
finally ‘complete the [lawyer’s] performance report and submit it to the reviewer’.816 
 
811 M. Strathern, ‘Bullet-Proofing’, 181. 
812 D. Brenneis, ‘Reforming Promise’, 41, 64. According to Klikauer, ‘[i]n managerially distorted communication, 
nouns govern sentences in an authoritarian and totalitarian fashion’, T. Klikauer, A Critique of an Ideology 
(Palgrave 2013) 122. 
813 On similar linguistic dynamics, see Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law’, 820. The ‘violence’ of management-speak 
is explicated in F. Moretti and D. Pestre, ‘Bankspeak: The Language of World Bank Reports’ (2015) 92 New Left 
Review 75, 80. 
814 Competencies Model, 17. 
815 Competencies Model, 23. 
816 AI Probationary Period, para. 8.2(g). 
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According to the Administrative Instruction, the probationary performance report (PPR) is the 
repository for all appraisal information. It supplies a ‘record of the immediate supervisor’s 
assessment of the ability of the staff member to perform his or her duties, as well as of his or 
her suitability to work with the Court’.817 Upon the supervisor’s completion of the PPR, the 
lawyer will be given the opportunity to add their comments before both the PPR and comments 
are submitted to the reviewer for their signature and final appointment subject to the 
Prosecutor’s confirmation.  
 In the event that the supervisor is unsatisfied with the lawyer’s performance after the 
first appraisal, the supervisor ‘shall record in the [PPR] the ways and means suggested for the 
improvement of the staff member’s performance’.818 If there is no improvement by the end of 
the probationary period, the supervisor may decide either not to confirm the appointment or, if 
the lawyer ‘has the potential to perform adequately if given more time in the job’, the supervisor 
may request the Prosecutor for an extension of the probationary period for up to six months.819 
At the end of that extension, the lawyer will either be confirmed in their post or not. 
 The PPR’s power to determine whether the professional will continue in their post gives 
the report considerable weight. Yet judging by the late and patchy implementation of the 
probationary system throughout the court’s organs, the power of the probationary process to 
remove inefficient individuals is not borne out statistically.820 Rather, the PPR exemplifies the 
court’s power to record, classify, rate, and improve the professional as an efficient, managerial 
subject. Like the competencies model, this power lies both in the content and form of the PPR. 
 The PPR is a four-page form.821 It requires the supervisor to disclose details and ratings 
about the performance of their appraisee, the lawyer. These data include in Part I personal 
information about the appraisee: their name, functional title and level, unit and organ, and 
relevant appointment dates. The remainder of the form is divided into a series of tables designed 
to guide the supervisor to a comprehensive evaluation of the appraisee’s performance. These 
tables detail ‘performance objectives’, ‘core competencies appraisal’, ‘summary performance 
 
817 AI Probationary Period, para. 4.2. 
818 AI Probationary Period, para. 8.2(g). 
819 AI Probationary Period, para. 5.1. 
820 The performance appraisal system framework was implemented systematically after 2010, when the CBF 
recommended that ‘the generic appraisal criteria be more broadly circulated, that systems be reinforced to ensure 
consistent and uniform application of the appraisal system throughout the Court, that the appraisal review process 
be reinforced and that appraisals be further linked to the strategic objectives and the contract renewal process’, 
ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 14th Session, ICC-ASP/9/5, 6 July 2010, para. 63. In 2016/17, the most 
recent cycle for which figures are available, the completion rate for the performance appraisal system was 92 
percent, ICC, Report of the Court on Human Resources Management, ICC-ASP/17/6, 11 May 2018, para. 95.  
821 If the probationary period is extended, the form grows to seven pages. 
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rating’, ‘comments by the staff member’, ‘recommendation’, and ‘decision by 
Registrar/Prosecutor’ (see Appendix C). Most of these tables are filled with boxes which the 
supervisor must tick based on the appropriate rating. The first set of boxes relate to the 
‘performance objectives’ set at the beginning of the probationary period and monitored during 
the performance appraisal meeting. Space is created for the supervisor to list up to five 
objectives. By the end of the probationary period, the supervisor will decide whether the 
appraisee’s ‘progress towards, or achievement of, [the] objective at [the] time of appraisal’ was 
either ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ (see fig. 9). If performance is unsatisfactory, the 
supervisor is required to ‘give full particulars’ in an extended probation report.822 
 
 
 
 
 
The next section is designed to assess the appraisee’s compliance with ‘the most relevant 
competencies’. The supervisor and appraisee would have decided which of the competencies 
to focus on at the beginning of the probationary period. Again, the supervisor will rate the 
appraisee’s achievement of the selected competencies by ticking either the ‘satisfactory’ or 
‘unsatisfactory’ box. The following section captures the ‘summary performance rating’ as a 
final determination on the appraisee’s performance. This, too, distinguishes between 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory ratings which the supervisor must tick (see fig. 10). The 
 
822 The sections contained in the extended probationary report include ‘comments by the staff member’, 
‘recommendation’, ‘decision by Registrar/Prosecutor’, and ‘description of unsatisfactory performance’.  
Figure 9. Probationary report – objectives 
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supervisor, appraisee, and reviewer must then sign and date the form. The signatures of the 
appraisee and the reviewer affirm that they ‘have seen the appraisal of the immediate supervisor 
and [were] afforded an opportunity to provide comments’.  
 
 
 
 
 
As this process suggests, the PPR demands significant time and attention from various 
institutional actors. Yet despite the apparently wide discretion of the supervisor to rate the 
appraisee’s performance, the PPR requires that the supervisor produce a particular kind of 
managerial view of the appraisee. It principally reinforces the technocratic assumptions on 
which contemporary ICJ operates by focusing on ‘minute organisational procedures’ and the 
optimisation of professional experts.823 The axis is one of satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
performance according to such standards (fig. 11). The satisfactory performance of individual 
objectives and the achievement of individualised competencies becomes the definition of 
professional and institutional success. Likewise, unsatisfactory performance of the individual 
is viewed as a major institutional flaw. As such, the institution itself must continue to devote 
resources to the optimisation of its professional staff if it is to remain an effective response to 
global injustice. The form thus reinscribes technocratic ICJ by affirming the centrality of its 
professional experts and the need to gradually improve their individual performance.  
  
 
823 B. Townley, ‘Performance Appraisal and the Emergence of Management’, in C. Grey and H. Willmott (eds), 
Critical Management Studies: A Reader (OUP 2005) 304, 310. 
Figure 10. Probationary report – rating 
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The PPR’s format and layout also affirms the limited discursive space in which the court’s 
actors must operate to reproduce a managerial reality.824 The form is not a timeless and static 
document, but ‘is created in anticipation of being filled in’.825 It is an interactive medium, 
which arranges institutional actors around it and disposes of those actors in particular ways.826 
Within the court, the PPR creates a range of characters in the form of appraiser, appraisee, and 
reviewer. It demands the engagement of all three characters, especially the appraiser, whose 
job it is to complete the bulk of the form by ticking boxes and disclosing details of appraisee 
underperformance.827  Thus, while the form is ‘necessarily interactive’, it is determinative of a 
small number of outcomes, all of which will reaffirm the court’s managerial credentials: either 
by identifying the appraisee as an efficient professional or as an inefficient professional 
requiring optimisation. The form becomes a highly regulated channel for the 
institutionalisation of knowledge and the representation of all staff in managerial terms. 
  The limited space for engagement is embedded in the form’s signs and symbols. All 
the form requires in order to take on the quality of an official record is for the supervisor to 
place a series of ticks in the pages of boxes already provided.828 The need for minimal 
interaction is apparent in how completely the blank form dominates the page: even when the 
form has yet to be filled out, the page is almost entirely blackened by lines and text. Once the 
 
824 M. Hull, ‘Documents and Bureaucracy’ (2012) 41 Annual Review of Anthropology 251, 253. 
825 D. Frohlich, ‘On the Organisation of Form-Filling Behaviour’ (1986) 5 Information Design Journal 43, 43. 
826 M. Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan (University of California 
Press 2012) 134. See also L. Lowenkron and L. Ferreira, ‘Anthropological Perspectives on Documents: 
Ethnographic Dialogues on the Trail of Police Papers’ (2014) 11 Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian Anthropology 76, 83. 
827 Riles, ‘Introduction: A Response’, in Riles, Documents, 19. 
828 D. Brenneis, ‘Reforming Promise’, in Riles, Documents, 47–8. 
Figure 11. Probationary report – achievement 
186 
 
form is completed, the page looks little different. The form of the PPR, then, blends with its 
substance as it creates an enclosed site for the official inscription of the appraisee’s identity. 
 Like the competencies model, the PPR’s bureaucratic paraphernalia and voice 
guarantee its status as purveyor of professional truth. It bears the ICC’s crest on the top of the 
first page as a reminder that the data produced about the professional is the only data that has 
been officially verified. It is also a reminder that the data, in being produced by the institution, 
rather than individual actors, has an objective and scientific quality.829  
 The numerous instances of personal engagement with the form appear not to dampen 
its claim to capture the appraisee’s objective essence. For example, to notice the individual 
ticks in the form’s boxes is to appreciate that the determinations recorded therein are less 
scientific fact than opinion. Similarly, the signatures on the last page of the PPR recall the 
historically situated nature of the ‘facts’ recounted in the form, exposing it, even momentarily, 
as an assorted collection of individual views. Despite these interventions, the form reasserts 
the depersonalised voice of the institution when requiring the appraisee to sign the disclaimer 
that they have read the form and had an opportunity to comment on it. Should the appraisee 
disagree with the supervisor’s findings, these will be captured by the form as individual 
criticisms.830 The institutional voice thus raises the supervisor’s views to the level of official 
truth while simultaneously labelling the appraisee’s views as personal.  
  By the time the PPR is submitted to the HR Section to be placed in the lawyer’s official 
file, the lawyer will have moved through a network of meetings, models, reports, and forms. 
Having gone into the probationary process with some understanding of performance 
expectations, they will come out the other end as a managerial subject committed to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the ICC.831 This identity is not just a feeling, but an officially 
authorised subjectivity contained in the court’s managerial documents as a true and objective 
account of the professional self.  
 
 
 
 
829 Deetz, Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization, 281. 
830 Klikauer notes the tendency of managerialism to create and contain its own contradictions, Klikauer, 
Managerialism, 124. 
831 One ICC official stated that ‘performance management is part of our culture now’, ICC Interview 1, 11 July 
2018. 
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3. Keeping on 
 
 
The settling in period signifies only the first of many professional encounters with the 
performance appraisal regime. The 2013 Administrative Instruction specifies that ‘[o]nce the 
staff member’s appointment is confirmed, the performance appraisal shall be done in line with 
the established performance appraisal system’ and the ‘[PPR] shall no longer be used’.832 A 
new Administrative Instruction on the ‘Performance Appraisal System’ (PAS) outlines its 
procedures, which builds on the identity work of the probationary process. 
 PAS is a continuous process for evaluating the performance of all ICC staff through the 
familiar mechanisms of performance objectives, competencies, appraisal meetings, reports, 
and forms. Like the probationary process, PAS intends to ‘ensure the effectiveness of the Court 
by optimizing performance at all levels and [by] contributing to a positive staff climate’.833 
Unlike the probationary process, PAS is not conducted with a view to confirming appointment, 
but for the long-term benefit of the organisation. It aims to enhance organisational effectiveness 
by ‘[p]romoting a culture of high performance’, ‘[e]mpowering managers and holding them 
responsible’, ‘[e]ncouraging a high level of staff participation in the planning,  delivery and 
evaluation of work’, and ‘[r]ecognising successful performance and addressing 
underperformance in a fair and objective manner’.834 
 PAS follows an annual cycle beginning with the setting of the lawyer’s performance 
objectives for the year and ending with the final storage of the performance appraisal report in 
the lawyer’s official file. At the beginning of the cycle, the lawyer and their supervisor will 
meet to discuss an ‘individual performance plan’.835 The plan, itself informed by the OTP and 
court-wide Strategic Plan and goals, includes individual performance objectives, competencies, 
and ‘staff development needs’.836  Like the probationary process, then, PAS establishes a 
managerial frame for assessing performance, prompting a wealth of managerial data designed 
to  produce an efficient professional. Two new documentary practices are also bolted on at this 
stage as ‘episode[s] of bureaucratic knowledge production’.837 
 
 
832 AI Probationary Period, para. 9.1. 
833 AI on PAS, para. 2.1. 
834 AI on PAS, para. 2.1. 
835 AI on PAS, para. 5.2. 
836 AI on PAS, para. 5.3. 
837 A. Riles, ‘[Deadlines]: Removing the Brackets on Politics in Bureaucratic and Anthropological Analysis’, in 
Riles, Documents, 71, 71. 
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3.1. Mid-term progress monitoring worksheet 
 
Like the probationary process, PAS recruits the lawyer/appraisee, supervisor, and reviewer into 
the project of managerial identity-making. According to the PAS Administrative Instruction, 
‘[d]uring the year, the immediate supervisor and staff member shall hold conversations and 
dialogue, formally and informally, and may have exchange of e-mails and/or other written 
communication on the progress of the individual performance plan’.838 Punctuating these 
informal interactions is the ‘mid-term progress review’, to be completed approximately six 
months into the annual cycle. The review ‘should indicate the progress made and justify any 
updates to the performance objectives and development needs’.839 
 This mid-term review is also recorded in documentary form. The ‘ICC Performance 
Appraisal Mid-Term Progress Monitoring Worksheet’, to use its full name, is a truncated 
version of the PPR. It goes further than the PPR, though, by recording not only the lawyer’s 
end-of-year performance results, but also their ongoing performance. It records ‘what has been 
achieved so far’, and what ‘adjustments’ might be needed to ensure the performance and 
development objectives are realised in time for the end of the cycle (see fig. 12).  
 
 
838 AI on PAS, para. 6.1. 
839 AI on PAS, para. 6.2. 
Figure 12. Mid-term monitoring worksheet 
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The worksheet further refines the lawyer’s identity. The 12-month cycle on which PAS is 
conducted reminds the lawyer that performance can be measured and objectives realised within 
short time periods. The specific, predictable, and time-bound activities in which the lawyer 
engages are taken as the optimal means for achieving justice. That conviction becomes all the 
more acute in the case of the mid-term progress review. It not only requires that objectives be 
realised within 12 months but that progress towards those objectives be observable within six. 
However, all that properly complies with this requirement are the institution-sustaining efforts 
of the court’s experts. Once again, then, the project in which professional experts are engaged 
is imagined as a ‘production line’ of justice, in which aspirations are confined to what is 
institutionally plausible in an environment of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The 
optimisation of the expert and the realisation of justice continue to be fused together.   
 
3.2. Performance appraisal form 
 
 
Approximately five or six months after the mid-term worksheet has been completed,840 ‘end-
of-year formalities’ begin.841 The lawyer will meet the supervisor again to discuss their 
performance for the year. Thereafter, the supervisor provides a final performance rating. This 
process is mediated by the performance appraisal form.  
 The performance appraisal form differs little from the probationary or mid-term 
appraisal forms insofar as it requires the supervisor to record and rate staff performance in a 
series of tick boxes. Yet the form offers an expanded range of rating options which reflect 
possible nuances in the lawyer’s performance (see fig. 13). Performance is no longer rated 
according to the binary distinction between ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ performance but 
along a scale which classifies objectives as ‘not achieved’, ‘partially achieved’, ‘fully 
achieved’, ‘exceeded’, or ‘significantly exceeded’. Similarly, in rating the lawyer’s 
achievement of selected competencies, the supervisor may find them ‘unsatisfactory’, 
‘requir[ing] development’, or ‘fully competent’.  
 
840 The mid-term worksheet must be signed, dated, and ‘attached to the performance appraisal form at the end of 
the performance appraisal period’, AI on PAS, para. 6.3. 
841 AI on PAS, para. 7. 
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Setting out these additional categories, the performance appraisal form further refines the 
professional identity via an in-built normativity.  The form places the five ratings along a 
spectrum ranging from the undesirable to the desirable. Objectives which are ‘not achieved’ 
attract the lowest rating while those which are ‘significantly exceeded’ attract the highest. 
Professionals are therefore encouraged to aim for the top ratings by either exceeding or 
significantly exceeding their performance objectives for the year.  
 What is more, this normative scale construes the lawyer who has ‘fully achieved’ their 
objectives as a merely ‘average’ employee. It no longer suffices to complete the tasks for which 
one was recruited, the lawyer must instead strive to align themselves with the ideal-type of the 
efficient professional. The overall rating is similarly skewed, turning the lawyer who has ‘fully 
met performance expectations’ into an average staff member, with only those who have 
‘significantly exceeded performance expectations’ achieving the highest rating. The reason for 
this enhanced burden on staff lies in the central position which the expert is ascribed within the 
current vision of technocratic ICJ. When justice is understood as an office-based project, 
professional and institutional optimisation define the pace and outer limits of justice-seeking 
and institutional energies become invested in producing the most productive expert.  
 This enhanced rating system reflects the heightened responsibility and self-discipline 
expected of the lawyer once they have been confirmed in their post after probation. In addition 
Figure 13. Performance appraisal form - objectives 
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to their core duties, the lawyer must also internalise the managerial discourse. Under the PAS 
Administrative Instruction the lawyer is responsible for ‘[u]nderstanding the larger 
organizational goals and the strategic objectives of the Court’ and soliciting clarification on 
individual performance expectations’.842 They must also discuss and finalise performance 
objectives with their supervisor and ‘tak[e] steps to complete each stage of the process for 
which they are responsible, without unnecessary delay’.843 Through these additional 
responsibilities, the lawyer becomes pivotal to their own self-regulation. 
 PAS also institutes procedures for staff non-compliance and adjustment. The PAS 
Administrative Instruction notes that failure to comply with the system, whether in failing to 
complete the relevant documents or to submit them on time, ‘shall be recorded in his/her 
performance appraisal form and be reflected in his/her overall performance rating’.844 
Moreover, ‘remedial measures’ may be needed to readjust the lawyer during the appraisal 
cycle. These may include ‘counseling, additional training and/or the establishment of a time-
bound performance improvement plan’.845 The improvement plan has its own micro-processes 
and is recorded in a separate form. 
 Findings of non-compliance or underperformance may have serious repercussions for 
the professional. PAS informs decisions not only on the continuation or termination of the 
lawyer’s employment, but also salary increases and career advancement.846 As such, there is a 
punitive quality to the appraisal system. Yet both staff dismissal and staff promotion are rare 
at the ICC, both because of limited financial resources and because once staff get into the court, 
the near-automatic nature of renewal means they often stay for many years.847 Moreover, these 
kinds of events, while important for the staff member, are rare occurrences in their professional 
journey and do not define the everyday life of the ICC lawyer. Thus, such black marks on the 
lawyer’s official record are less a means of official sanction than practices of identity correction 
which prompt the lawyer to realign themselves to the court’s managerial vision.  
 
842 AI on PAS, para. 4.2. 
843 AI on PAS, para. 4.2. 
844 AI on PAS, para. 4.6. 
845 AI on PAS, para. 9.1. 
846 Cf. the CBF recommendation ‘that the Court develop proposals to introduce a culture of personal accountability 
including rewards for good performance and sanctions for poor performance’, ICC, Report of the CBF on the 
Work of its 18th Session, ICC-ASP/11/5, 9 August 2012, para. 49.  
847 For example, in 2014 only 14 staff members left the court due to non-extension of contracts or dismissal, ICC, 
Report of the Court on Human Resources Management, ICC-ASP/14/7, 4 May 2015, para. 12. In 2017, this figure 
dropped to 6 staff members with the Human Resources Section observing an average staff turnover rate since 
2014 of 8 percent, ICC, Report of the Court on Human Resources Management, ICC-ASP/17/6, 11 May 2018, 
paras 8–9. Even these statistics do not particularise the reasons behind dismissal, which may include factors 
unrelated to underperformance.  
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 That identity-making function is further explicated by the appraisal appeals procedure.  
A 2010 Administrative Instruction outlines that before the lawyer can challenge a performance 
rating with which they are unsatisfied, they must first exhaust other grievance mechanisms, i.e. 
by speaking to their supervisor informally or in the presence of an HR officer. Only once this 
avenue has been unsuccessful can the lawyer bring their complaint to a nine-member Rebuttal 
Panel.848 The lawyer must submit a written rebuttal statement to the Human Resources Section 
‘setting forth briefly the specific reasons why he/she should have received a different 
assessment or rating’.849 The panel will consider this and any other documentation submitted 
by interested staff, and may decide to hold a hearing. The panel will then issue a report on the 
validity of the original rating, either upholding the supervisor’s original assessment or 
substituting its own where they find that the original assessment was not ‘fair, objective and 
consistent with the underlying arguments and facts’.850 
 The appeals procedure reveals the vast institutional network which shapes the lawyer. 
The procedure requires the lawyer to justify themselves in terms of performance objectives and 
competencies. Given that the entire rebuttal process is geared towards the ‘correct’ designation 
of the professional’s competency levels, it offers them an opportunity to publicise their 
managerial credentials. Once the process has ended, the procedure’s paper-trail will be added 
to the lawyer’s official file to update the story of their refinement as an efficient professional.851 
Through such a mechanism, one again witnesses both the institutional and individual regulation 
of the lawyer. 
 Through its recurring yearly cycles, the performance appraisal system imbues the 
institution (and the lawyer) with heightened responsibility to produce the managerial subject 
fully committed to technocratic ICJ. Through the dense network of meetings, procedures, and 
documents, the ICC lawyer is positioned by themselves and other institutional actors at the 
centre of a rationalised project of justice. 
  
 
 
 
848 ICC, Performance Appraisal Rebuttals and Procedures, ICC/AI/2010/002, 22 December 2010, para. 2.1. (‘AI 
on Rebuttal’). 
849 AI on Rebuttal, para. 3.1. 
850 AI on Rebuttal, para. 3.4.  
851 AI on Rebuttal, paras 3.2–3.6.  
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4. Moving up 
 
 
As the lawyer proceeds through the practices of recruitment, probation, and performance 
appraisal, they become habituated into the court’s culture of efficiency, becoming an efficient 
cog in the machine themselves. This managerial subjectivity is further entrenched through the 
practices associated with and following from career progression. As the Legal Officer is 
promoted to Legal Adviser, or head of the OTP Gender and Children Unit after a number of 
years at the court, their professional existence will increasingly become that of a manager.852 
Without repeating many of the above practices to which they will continue to be subjected, I 
discuss here several additional processes specific to the manager’s identity. These include the 
role of supervisor during performance appraisal and assisting in the work of auditors and the 
Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM). 
 
4.1. Managerial responsibilities 
 
 
The lawyer’s ascent through the organisational hierarchy does not shield them from earlier 
managerial practices. In fact, because of their additional responsibilities over operational staff, 
their position within the managerial network is even more pivotal to the construction of a 
managerial court. It is therefore worth considering the manager-lawyer as an important 
character in the court’s managerial network.853  
 In their role as Legal Adviser or head of unit, the manager-lawyer will combine their 
legal duties with a range of managerial responsibilities. In the Gender and Children Unit, for 
example, they will be involved in producing and negotiating strategic documents, policies, and 
guidelines of organisational best practice. They may also engage more widely with other OTP 
bodies such as the Executive Committee. Through these new tasks, the manager-lawyer will 
encounter other managerial staff and will develop a more strategic understanding of how the 
 
852 Speaking to current and former ICC staff occupying similarly senior roles within organ units, they described 
their functions as ‘managerial’ and their identity as ‘managers’, ICC Interview 3, 31 July 2018; NGO Interview 
2, 16 August 2019.  
853 This term is adapted from ‘manager-academic’ in higher education studies, R. Deem and K. Brehony, 
‘Management as Ideology: The Case of “New Managerialism” in Higher Education’ (2005) 31 Oxford Review of 
Education 217, 232, fn 2. The term ‘manager-lawyer’ refers to legal professionals who assume management roles 
within the ICC, as distinct from organisational staff trained in and occupying management roles, e.g. human 
resources or accounting officers.  
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court’s activities fit together to achieve broader objectives. In this role, they will discharge 
three additional managerial functions. 
 
4.2. Performance appraisal revisited 
 
 
As in their previous role, the manager-lawyer remains responsible for meeting their own 
performance targets and evaluating their progress. They are still a staff member and must 
therefore understand the court’s goals, clarify their performance expectations, and achieve and 
report on individual objectives throughout their own appraisal cycle.854 Their existence on 
paper also expands as probationary reports, mid-term worksheets, and appraisal forms record 
their performance in the official file just as before.855 Their identity thus continues to be 
produced within a managerial frame as either an optimal or sub-optimal professional. 
 Nonetheless, the managerial category of their new post demands that in appraising their 
performance, the institution will now hold the manager-lawyer to a higher professional 
standard. This is reflected in the competencies model which expects the manager-lawyer to 
display an additional set of behavioural indicators. In demonstrating their commitment to the 
court’s mission and values, they must ‘encourage[] employees to act consistently in accordance 
with the mission and values’ and ‘lead[] by example’.856 A ‘professional’ manager ‘develops 
clear goals’, ‘communicates a clear vision of the future’, and ‘encourages others to consider 
long-term organisational strategy’.857 Through these additional traits, the manager-lawyer 
comes to affiliate more closely with the aims and work of the organisation. 
 Another component of managerial life is the new duty to manage, appraise, and improve 
the performance of those under the manager-lawyer’s responsibility. In addition to discharging 
their duties as a staff member, the manager-lawyer acts as an ‘immediate supervisor’. They are 
responsible for ‘developing [staff members’] performance objectives’, ‘conducting the mid-
term progress monitoring and annual evaluation’, ‘providing ongoing feedback’, ‘advising, 
supporting and coaching the staff member’, and completing all relevant documents and 
forms.858 As we have seen, the immediate supervisor completes the appraisal documentation 
 
854 AI on PAS, para. 4.2. 
855 According to one ICC official, ‘the file gives a sense of how the professional has progressed’, ICC Interview 
4, 16 August 2018. 
856 Competencies Model, 16. 
857 Competencies Model, 18. 
858 AI on PAS, para. 4.3. 
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on the appraisee’s behalf. Completing the appraisal and meeting their subordinates, the 
manager-lawyer looks at performance from the other side of the desk. They will adopt the by-
now familiar performance management criteria, as well as the instructions in the appraisal 
documents, to reproduce the managerial identity of their staff. 
 The manager-lawyer will not only reproduce that identity among staff because of their 
own habituation into that identity. They are also obliged to do so as part of their performance 
appraisal. As a manager dedicated to the court’s mission, they must ‘[i]nform[] (new) staff 
members about the ICC, its mission and values’.859 Such a committed manager will also 
‘correct other people when they pre-judge the ICC mission and tasks’.860 Establishing the 
importance of efficiency, they will ‘[f]ormulate[] clear expectations for staff on working 
together’ and ‘encourage[] others to change inefficient working practices’.861  
 Assuming a managerial role, the lawyer not only takes on additional management tasks 
but is charged with embedding the managerial discourse within their unit and staff. They will 
utilise their own prior identity as a managerial subject, and the additional practices of 
performance appraisal, to create an efficient and committed ICJ professional.862 The centrality 
of the efficient professional to the technocratic project of ICJ means that the manager-lawyer, 
too, becomes a crucial tool for optimising the ICJ project. 
 
4.3. Audit 
 
 
The manager-lawyer’s strategic responsibilities in relation to the Gender and Children Unit or 
the wider OTP will bring them into contact with the court’s oversight apparatus. These are not 
the individualised processes of staff appraisal but the general frameworks of audit and 
independent oversight. In the case of audit, expert auditors will access institutional accounts 
and records to ‘make observations with respect to … the administration and management of 
the Court’.863 The court has an elaborate and sometimes overlapping framework for evaluating 
 
859 Competencies Model, 16. 
860 Competencies Model, 16. 
861 Competencies Model, 20 and 22. 
862 Indeed, the CBF’s attempts to introduce ‘360 performance reviews’, in which the professional is appraised also 
by their own subordinates, also helps refract and reproduce the managerial logic within and between individual 
staff members, see ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 24th Session, ICC-ASP/14/5, 18 June 2015, para. 
99. One official interviewed during the course of research welcomed this method, ICC Interview 3, 31 July 2018. 
863 Reg. 12.3, FRR. 
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the financial and administrative coherence of the court’s organs, procedures, and projects.864 
The primary actors involved are the Office of Internal Audit, the External Auditor, and external 
consultants. The court’s audit framework is overseen by the Audit Committee, who ‘provide[s] 
the [ASP] with independent advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the Court’s 
management practices’.865  
 Evaluating an office such as the Gender and Children Unit, auditors may ‘assess the 
extent to which [its] priority objectives … are achieved or are in the process of being 
achieved’.866 Unit-specific audits therefore function as collective versions of the individualised 
performance appraisal system. During the audit, auditors may decide to conduct ‘on-site 
checks’ as part of their enquiries.867 They may coordinate these enquiries through the unit head 
in conjunction with the organ’s senior management such as the Prosecutor or the head of the 
Investigation Division. Managers may therefore be required to answer specific questions posed 
by the auditors and to back up their answers with supporting documents and statistics, ‘a bit 
like litigation’, to quote one ICC official.868 As in previous audit exercises at the court, the 
professional may have sight of a first draft of the audit report and be given an opportunity to 
provide comments, clarify points, and suggest amendments.869 
 As with the court’s regime for non-compliance with performance appraisal, the lawyer 
may encounter the audit framework only rarely and indirectly during their professional journey 
at the court. Moreover, unless the lawyer assumes a managerial role, or is otherwise asked to 
assist the auditors in their enquiries, they may never come into contact with the court’s audit 
framework. However, the lawyer’s scarce and irregular encounter with audit does not leave it 
in the margins. The power of audit lies in its capacity to reinforce managerial discourse 
‘spontaneously and without noise’.870 Thus, the imminent character of audit ensures that a 
record of the office’s efficient management will have to be kept at all times, even if that record 
reveals the office to be inefficient. At its most efficient, audit would be able to imbue offices 
and their staff with an efficiency mindset without ever intervening.871  
 
864 On project-related audit, see ch 6.4.3. 
865 ICC website, ‘Establishment and Mandate of the Audit Committee’, 4 June 2019 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/AuditCommittee/Pages/default.aspx.  
866 ICC, Final Audit Report on the Implementation of a Division of External Operations, ICC-ASP/16/27, 10 
October 2017, para. 4 (‘DEO Audit Report’). 
867 DEO Audit Report, para. 7. 
868 ICC Interview 2, 13 July 2018. 
869 DEO Audit Report, para. 10; ICC Interview 2, 13 July 2018. 
870 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 206. 
871 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 206. 
197 
 
 When an audit does take place, the manager-lawyer is integral to the auditor’s rituals. 
One Registry official noted that internal staff regarded auditors with some suspicion because 
of their lack of legal and specifically ICL knowledge.872 Yet despite this deficiency, the 
context, problems, and solutions proffered by such managerial experts continued to provide the 
basis for organisational reform.873 The manager-lawyer therefore becomes central to the 
application of this managerial expertise by reporting and translating the unit’s legal and other 
activities into a vocabulary understandable to the auditors. They provide evidence of the 
functionality and optimal performance of the unit’s particular objectives and how these fit into 
wider court aims. Later, the manager-lawyer may be asked to review a draft of the audit report 
and suggest amendments, again because auditors may have misunderstood the court’s 
procedures.874 The manager-lawyer here acts as a knowledge conduit between the institution 
and the auditors. Along that conduit, they convey an institutional truth about the unit as an 
‘auditable’ body, to which managerial problems and solutions can be applied.875 
 
4.4. Independent Oversight Mechanism 
 
 
A final technique for governing the manager-lawyer and their subordinates is the IOM. Under 
article 112(4) of the Statute, the ASP is mandated to ‘establish such subsidiary bodies as may 
be necessary, including an independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and 
investigation of the Court, in order to enhance efficiency and economy’. The IOM was 
established in 2009 and gradually assumed these three functions by 2017. Being operationally 
independent of the court’s organs, the IOM has a broad remit to investigate allegations of 
misconduct and complaints against elected officials on request of the ASP Bureau or on a 
proprio motu basis. It may ‘provide evaluations of any programme, project or policy as 
requested by the Assembly’.876 And it may ‘conduct unscheduled/ad hoc inspections of any 
premises or processes’.877 
 
872 NGO Interview 2, 16 July 2019. 
873 For an in-depth account of the closure enacted by reform exercises, see ch 6. 
874 ICC Interview 2, 13 July 2018. 
875 M. Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (OUP 1999) 91. 
876 ASP Resolution 12/6, ICC-ASP/12/Res.6, 27 November 2013, Annex: Operational Mandate of the Independent 
Oversight Mechanism, para. 16 (‘IOM Operational Mandate’). 
877 IOM Operational Mandate, para. 6. 
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 Unlike many other managerial tools, the IOM has attracted the attention of ICL 
scholars, many of whom have welcomed its establishment as signifying a trend within the court 
towards accountability, transparency and ‘good governance’.878 Some have also taken the 
creation of the IOM as a sign of the court’s maturity as a justice mechanism.879 Yet its work 
(or lack thereof) suggests that, like audit, the IOM’s power lies beyond its mandated function 
to enhance efficiency and economy. Since it began operating, the IOM has considered 51 cases 
of professional misconduct, only a handful of which have required further action. Crucially, 
the IOM has yet to receive any formal requests for inspection or evaluation from the ASP 
Bureau.880  
 The IOM in fact imbues the court and its staff with an efficiency mindset. The criteria 
by which the IOM evaluates the court’s programmes and policies are ‘relevance, 
appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability’.881 Moreover, the IOM 
seeks to alter staff via its broad functions. Its inspection mandate allows the IOM to conduct 
‘special, unscheduled, on-the-spot verifications’ of any court activity,882 while evaluations 
involve ‘a rigorous, systematic and objective process in the design, analysis and interpretation 
of information’.883 In discharging its functions, the IOM ‘shall have the authority to initiate on 
a reasonable basis, carry out and report on any action which it considers necessary to fulfil its 
responsibilities with regard to its functions without any hindrance or need for prior 
clearance’.884 IOM staff ‘shall have access to all (electronic or otherwise) Court records, files, 
documents, books or other materials, assets and premises, and shall have the right to obtain 
such information and explanations as they consider necessary to fulfil their responsibilities’.885 
 With such broad powers, the IOM governs organs and projects from the outside to 
ensure they comply with efficiency standards. Through its power to conduct unscheduled visits, 
 
878 J. Alvarez, ‘The Proposed Independent Oversight Mechanism for the International Criminal Court’, in R. 
Steinberg (ed), Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 143; Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court, ‘Independent Oversight Mechanism Team: Comments and 
Recommendations to the Ninth Session of the Assembly of States Parties’, 26 November 2010  
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICC_IOM_Team_Paper.pdf.  
879 E. Tsui, ‘Towards Mature Justice: Expanding the ICC’s Independent Oversight Mechanism’ (E-International 
Relations, 11 October 2015) https://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/11/towards-mature-justice-expanding-the-iccs-
independent-oversight-mechanism/.  
880 These data are correct as of November 2018, ICC, Annual Report of the Head of the Independent Oversight 
Mechanism, ASP-ICC/17/8, 8 November 2018, para. 23. One exception was an IOM inspection of the 
‘administrative arrangements’ of the ICC field offices, ICC, Annual Report of the Head of the Independent 
Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/16/8, 17 October 2017, para. 26 (‘IOM Report 2017’). 
881 IOM Operational Mandate, para. 6. 
882 IOM Operational Mandate, para. 6. 
883 IOM Operational Mandate, para. 16. 
884 IOM Operational Mandate, para. 4. 
885 IOM Operational Mandate, para. 43. 
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the IOM ensures that staff engage in periodic self-regulation to ensure they are performing 
efficiently even when IOM staff are absent. When IOM staff do appear, their ability to access 
documents and records means that such papers must always evince the unit or project’s 
efficient management. ‘An inspector arriving unexpectedly … will be able to judge at a glance, 
without anything being concealed from him, how the entire establishment is functioning’.886  
 As with audit, the manager-lawyer ensures staff and documents are ripe for analysis as 
managerial units. The manager-lawyer will have to translate structures and policies into a 
language amenable to IOM inspection or evaluation based on the criteria of effectiveness, 
efficiency, and impact. After their enquiries have finished, the IOM will leave an exclusively 
managerial account of the unit’s structures or policies in a documentary report and make 
recommendations based on that reading.   
 Finally, the IOM governs staff through other, more individualised, measures. This is 
particularly visible in the IOM’s whistleblowing role. The ICC’s Whistleblowing Policy, 
promulgated in a 2014 Presidential Directive, provides staff with an avenue to report, 
anonymously and in good faith, suspected instances of wrongdoing or misconduct.887 
Whistleblowing allegations – as well as any potential retaliation by staff in response to such 
allegations – must be reported to the IOM. Only rarely has the IOM considered such cases.888 
 The IOM has been more active in rolling out oversight guidelines and in informing staff 
of the availability and workings of its whistleblowing function than in investigating instances 
of actual misconduct. Despite its rare application, the whistleblowing mechanism is an 
important route for reporting misconduct without fear of individual reprisal. Yet through this 
mechanism, the IOM also extends its managerial gaze into individual staff. One ground of 
misconduct which staff may report on is ‘serious alleged inefficiencies or poor use of resources 
in Court processes or procedures’.889 This ground exists to ‘reinforce the “economy” objective 
of [the IOM’s] oversight mandate’.890 It also establishes a system of internal and individualised 
discipline by recruiting staff into the managerialisation of themselves and their colleagues. As 
with the many other managerial techniques and tools which the lawyer will have encountered 
and which will have encountered them, the IOM’s whistleblowing policy requires that staff 
 
886 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 204. 
887 ICC, ICC Whistleblowing and Whistleblower Protection Policy, ICC/PRESD/G/2014/003, 8 October 2014, 
para. 1.1. 
888 In 2018, the IOM devoted only 1 percent of its time to whistleblowing-related activities, ICC, Annual Report 
of the Head of the Independent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/17/8, 8 November 2018, para. 31.  
889 IOM Report 2017, para. 13. 
890 IOM Report 2017, para. 13.  
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adopt an efficiency lens in their individual interactions with colleagues to affirm the court’s 
managerial reality. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The account offered in this chapter replicates, at the micro level, the account of the ICC 
organisation provided in chapter 3. As noted in that chapter, managerial practices produce 
knowledge about the court as an efficient, cost-effective institution thereby reinforcing a 
technocratic understanding of ICJ as institutionalised and expert-driven. Tracing the lawyer’s 
professional journey through the court, this chapter focuses on the expert-led nature of the ICJ 
project and how it is crystallised by practices like recruitment, appraisal, and audit. These 
practices manifest in the concrete and everyday work of the court’s professional staff, including 
its lawyers.  
 As in the case of institutional optimisation, professional optimisation is enacted by 
experts (whether internal or external) and their tools (whether individualised or collective). 
Bodies of experts and professional staff create and are created within a ‘massive and invisible’ 
managerial apparatus.891 As this chapter reveals, that apparatus is a largely bureaucratic archive 
of documents, models, reports, and forms. Together, recruitment materials and processes, 
onboarding, probationary and performance appraisal, audit, and independent oversight record 
and produce the lawyer’s official identity as an efficient resource fully committed to the 
technocratic project of ICJ. As also noted in chapter 3, that technocratic imaginary is but one 
of those which may be adopted in the attempt to alleviate global injustice. Yet as confirmed 
here, those alternative imaginaries have been crowded out, largely as a result of the effort to 
produce the ICC and its staff as optimal units in a rationalised global justice system. To further 
explicate how ‘[a]lternative institutions or social arrangements are pushed beyond our line of 
sight or even our imagination’, I turn in Part III to two specific illustrations of managerial 
discursive closure at the ICC.892 
  
 
891 S. Deetz, ‘Disciplinary Power in Modern Corporations’, in M. Alvesson and H. Willmott (eds), Critical 
Management Studies (SAGE Publications 1992) 21, 37. 
892 T. Krever, ‘Quantifying Law: Legal Indicator Projects and the Reproduction of Neoliberal Common Sense’ 
(2013) 34 Third World Quarterly 131, 144.  
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5 Discursive Closure I: The ICC 
Presidency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Successive Presidents of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have made organisational 
efficiency a foundational aim of the fledgling court. The ICC’s first President, Philippe Kirsch, 
stated in 2008 that while court officials had ‘built a solid foundation’ for the permanent 
institution, more needed ‘to be done to maximize the effectiveness of the Court’.893 Recalling 
one of the core aims of the 2006 Strategic Plan, Kirsch affirmed that ‘[t]he Court continues to 
aim to be a model of public administration and is focused on eliminating any inefficient 
bureaucratic policies or procedures’.894 A year later, Kirsch’s successor, Sang-hyun Song, 
listed his priority ‘to strive to be a model of public administration’, adding that ‘efficiency is 
paramount in this regard’.895 Finally, Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi declared at the beginning 
of her mandate as President in March 2015 that her ‘main priority’ was ‘to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the institution’.896 Collectively, these senior officials have made 
efficiency a central pillar of the court since 2002.  
 
893 Statement of President Kirsch to the ASP 7th Session, 14 November 2008, 10 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EB40944C-C250-4466-B99A-
2F5ACDC8C941/0/ICCASPASP7GenDebePresident_Kirsch.pdf. 
894 Statement of President Kirsch to ASP 7th Session, 11. 
895 Statement of President Song to the ASP 8th Session, 18 November 2009, 8–9 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-statements-President-ENG.pdf. 
896 Statement of President Fernández de Gurmendi to the ASP 14th Session, 18 November 2015, 1 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/GenDeb/ASP14-Opening-ST-PRE-ENG.pdf. 
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 The regularity of these interventions hints at another role for the Presidency which goes 
beyond instilling an amorphous organisational culture. By shaping the institutional discourse 
through speech-making but also through the exercise of the Presidency’s statutory functions, 
successive presidents have constructed a managerial institution guided by the logic of 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. As a small and largely administrative organ, the Presidency 
does not engage in this discursive work alone – as seen in previous chapters, other court organs, 
officials, state representatives and experts, as well as NGOs, scholars, and the media are all 
engaged in this task. However, the Presidency’s size and functions do not prevent it from 
managerialising the court. Indeed, it is precisely because of the Presidency’s non-legal 
functions, and its location within the ICC structure, that it plays such a significant role in 
shaping the court into a managerial body.897 Through the back-room work of coordinating 
inter-organ administration, implementing a managerial apparatus, and liaising with an array of 
court supporters, the Presidency produces a technocratic reality of the court and the ICJ project 
of which it is part. 
 This first of two illustrative chapters elucidates the effects of managerial discursive 
closure, or the dynamics through which the Presidency helps shape the ICC into a managerial 
institution. I begin by replacing the conventional understanding of the Presidency as the ‘lesser-
known organ of the court’ with that of an organ uniquely and centrally situated within the 
court’s managerial network.898 It is the Presidency’s location within this network which allows 
it to translate the interests and concerns of certain external ‘stakeholders’ into a set of suitable 
institutional practices and priorities. With this insight, I then analyse the work of the court’s 
first three presidencies, with a focus on their efficiency-seeking efforts. Although I structure 
the sections of this chapter around the prominent judges who head the Presidency, I do not 
attribute the court’s discursive closure to these figures alone.899 Rather, reading the Presidency 
chronologically through successive presidencies, I emphasise the narrowing discursive space 
 
897 Despite being comprised of judges, the Presidency’s only direct legal function is to judicially review 
administrative decisions made by the Registrar, P. Ambach and K. Rackwitz, ‘A Model of International Judicial 
Administration?: The Evolution of Managerial Practices at the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 76 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 119, 131. 
898 H. Abtahi et al., ‘The Judicial Review Powers of the Presidency of the International Criminal Court: Safeguards 
for the Protection of Human Rights’ (2013) 12 Law & Practice of International Court & Tribunals 281, 281. 
899 To borrow from Orford, the chapter is ‘not primarily interested in studying those professional men [and women] 
and their internal struggles for status and power, but rather in redescribing the attributes of their practices as seen 
from the perspective of those upon whose bodies discipline [is] administered’, A. Orford, ‘International Law and 
the Limits of History’, in W. Werner et al. (eds), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi 
(CUP 2017) 297, 307. 
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within which each successive President operated and the ways in which they reinforced that 
confined space. To elucidate these dynamics I begin by reappraising the organ. 
 
1. The Presidency in the managerial network 
 
 
The status and functions of the Presidency are contained in article 38 of the Rome Statute. 
Under article 38(3)(a) and (b), the Presidency is responsible for the ‘proper administration of 
the Court’ and ‘other functions conferred upon it in accordance with th[e] Statute’. Most of 
article 38 deals with the composition of the Presidency and its location within the court 
structure. Thus, the Presidency comprises a President and two Vice-Presidents. All three are 
elected by an absolute majority of ICC judges and shall serve for a term of three years with the 
possibility of re-election.900  
 Structurally, the Presidency sits at the apex of the court’s administrative apparatus. 
Despite the Registrar’s role as the court’s chief administrative officer, he/she acts under the 
ultimate authority of the Presidency. The Registrar often meets the President to provide ‘regular 
input into the development of administrative policies’.901 The exception to the Presidency’s 
administrative authority is the Office of the Prosecutor, which maintains control over its own 
administrative functioning in the interests of judicial and prosecutorial independence. 
Nevertheless, the Presidency will often have cause to liaise with the Prosecutor and shall 
therefore ‘coordinate with and seek the concurrence of the Prosecutor on all matters of mutual 
concern’.902 To complete this ‘challenging management model’, the ASP bears management 
responsibility over the Presidency, Prosecutor and Registrar under article 112(2)(b).903 
 As a result of article 38’s focus on the division of administrative responsibilities, the 
main scholarly debates on the Presidency have centred on the question of its functional 
independence.904 The late John Jones, for example, consistently critiqued the Statute for 
cementing an inequality of arms to the benefit of the OTP. Commenting on article 38, Jones 
cautioned that ‘virtually any matter affecting the Court may be deemed by the Prosecutor to be 
 
900 Art. 38(1), Rome Statute. 
901 ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/4/16, 16 September 2005, para. 25. 
902 Art. 38(4), Rome Statute. 
903 H. Abtahi and R. Young, ‘Article 38: The Presidency’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn, C.H. Beck, Hart and Nomos, 2016) 1236, 1239. 
904 See Ambach and Rackwitz, ‘A Model of International Judicial Administration?’, 127 et seq.; Abtahi and 
Young, ‘Article 38’, 1239. 
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a matter “of mutual concern”’, thereby allowing the Prosecutor much greater opportunity for 
collaboration with the Presidency than the defence.905 In a similar vein, a more recent 
intervention by Woolaver and Palmer focuses on the challenges to independence arising from 
the court’s relationship to the ASP.906 
 These scholarly interventions look to the Presidency’s position within the ICC’s formal 
structure and the problematic overlaps arising from that position. However, by accounting only 
for the Presidency’s formally-prescribed functions, this concern obscures the informal and 
indirect ways in which the Presidency impacts other organs and the wider imaginary of ICJ, 
specifically by shaping institutional discourse. This discursive role is enabled by – though not 
limited to – the Presidency’s statutorily-inscribed position within the court’s structure. 
Crucially, the Presidency is positioned at an arm’s length from states parties and ASP bodies 
while also representing the court as a whole both internally and externally. As such, it is 
informed by the priorities and agendas of the ASP while also having the freedom to translate 
those priorities into a suitable institutional lexicon.  
 There are numerous formal and informal connections between the ASP and the 
Presidency which bring the Presidency into contact with state interests and agendas. Article 
112(2)(b) requires that the ASP ‘[p]rovide management oversight to the Presidency … 
regarding the administration of the Court’. Alongside the Prosecutor and Registrar, the 
President participates in meetings of the ASP Bureau – the Assembly’s executive body.907 The 
President also makes an annual presentation to states parties at the ASP plenary session and 
participates in many diplomatic events with both members and non-members throughout the 
year. Under article 112(2)(d), the Presidency and Registry participate in the ASP’s annual 
budget negotiations and the Assembly relies heavily on both organs to formulate the court’s 
annual budget projections.  
 The Presidency also liaises with other ASP bodies. The most well-established link 
between the court and states parties is arguably to be found in the Presidency’s relationship 
with the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF). As I detail below, the Presidency and CBF 
are constantly engaged in the exchange of information both ‘on the court’s main administrative 
areas’ and on the implementation of efficiency savings.908 During her last speech to the ASP 
 
905 J. Jones, ‘The Registry and Staff’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Vol. 1, OUP 2002) 261. 
906 H. Woolaver and E. Palmer, ‘Challenges to the Independence of the International Criminal Court from the 
Assembly of States Parties’ (2017) 15 JICJ 641. 
907 Art. 112(5), Rome Statute. See art. 112(3) on the ASP Bureau. 
908 ICC, Proposed Programme Budget for 2006 of the International Criminal Court’, ICC-ASP/4/5, 24 August 
2005, para. 29. 
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as President, Silvia Fernández thanked the CBF for ‘the guidance it provide[d] to the Court’ 
and expressed her gratitude to the then chair of the CBF whose ‘frank discussions and … candid 
feed-back helped [Fernández] and the Court to understand the Committee’s perspectives and 
concerns’.909  
 Despite the ASP’s oversight over the Presidency, its interventions do not amount to 
total administrative control. Woolaver and Palmer find that ‘the ASP has generally carried out 
its duties in a manner respectful of the ICC’s independence’.910 Most commentators agree that 
under article 38, ‘the Presidency is granted a wide ambit of authority capable of including 
almost all activities pertaining to the daily functioning of the Court’.911 Thus, the Presidency 
directs and shapes the coordination activities of all the court’s organs. As noted above, the 
President and Prosecutor are in constant communication on administrative issues ‘of mutual 
concern’.912 The 2010 report clarifying the responsibilities of the organs observes that both the 
Presidency and OTP operate under a ‘common, unified system for the setting of Court rules, 
policies and procedures’.913 They also coordinate their activities in relation to the court’s 
Strategic Plan and other plans such as the Outreach Strategy.914 
 A similar dynamic exists between the Presidency and Registry. Free from concerns 
about judicial and prosecutorial independence, the Presidency and Registry have deep 
administrative ties. Under article 43(2), the Registrar acts under the authority of the President. 
The court has also clarified that the Registry is ‘in its entirety, hierarchically subordinate to the 
Presidency’.915 Moreover, the Presidency has a constructive role in shaping the Registry by 
‘provid[ing] strategic guidance to the Registry’ and ‘monitor[ing] activities of the Registry 
which may have a more strategic or significant impact’.916 Importantly for the following 
discussion, the Presidency offers guidance in the Registry’s ‘efforts to become a model of 
 
909 Statement of President Fernández to the ASP 16th Session, 4 December 2017, 3 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-PICC-E.pdf.  
910 Woolaver and Palmer, ‘Challenges to Independence’, 642. 
911 Abtahi and Young, ‘Article 38’, 1238; Ambach and Rackwitz, ‘A Model of International Judicial 
Administration?’, 133.  
912 Art. 38(4), Rome Statute. 
913 ICC, Report of the Court on Measures to Increase Clarity on the Responsibilities of the Different Organs, ICC-
ASP/9/34, March 2010, para. 16 https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/ICC-ASP-9-34-ENG.pdf 
(‘Clarifying Report’).  
914 Clarifying Report, para. 23. The Presidency and OTP also coordinate their activities through a series of inter-
organ working groups including the Security Coordination Committee and the Information Security Management 
Forum, Clarifying Report, para. 25. 
915 Clarifying Report, para. 11.  
916 Clarifying Report, para. 28(a); ICC, Report on Programme Performance of the International Criminal Court 
for the year 2010, ICC-ASP/10/16, 5 July 2011, para. 5. 
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public administration’.917 For its part, the Registry ‘proactively seeks the guidance of the 
Presidency on strategic or otherwise significant issues’ and ‘provides the Presidency with the 
means to monitor Registry performance’.918 Through these inter-organ activities, the 
Presidency takes ‘an active approach with regard to all problems and challenges facing the 
court’.919 
 As well as harmonising strategic priorities internally, the Presidency discharges a range 
of external functions as the ‘public face’ of the court.920 It acts on the court’s behalf in 
establishing and maintaining relations with states and international organisations. In 2004, the 
Presidency concluded a relationship agreement with the United Nations, and the President has 
periodically appeared before the UN Security Council and General Assembly to provide 
updates on situations affecting international peace and security.921 The Presidency also 
concluded a headquarters agreement with The Netherlands922 as host state and has signed many 
bilateral cooperation agreements with both states and non-states parties on the court’s behalf923. 
For Schabas, the Presidency’s ‘special responsibility’ towards external actors not only requires 
the signing of bilateral agreements, but ‘broadening [the court’s] support and promoting its 
values and ideals’.924 Thus, the Presidency engages with many constituencies, including NGOs 
and academics, both in The Hague and on national visits, and has sought to publicise the court 
through media appearances and academic scholarship. In all of these external functions, the 
Presidency has the power to shape debates and perceptions about the court among the ICJ 
community. 
 The result of the Presidency’s position between states parties on one hand and other 
court actors and constituencies on the other is that it has become a crucial node in the court’s 
regulatory framework. As I detail below, the discursive space occupied by the Presidency 
allows it to translate the concerns, demands, and aspirations of states and other actors into a 
distinct institutional lexicon. This means that the Presidency neither freely shapes the court’s 
 
917 ICC, Proposed Programme Budget for 2011 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/9/10, 2 August 
2010, para. 45.  
918 Clarifying Report, para. 28(b). 
919 H.P. Kaul, ‘The International Criminal Court of the Future’, in W. Schabas (ed), The Cambridge Companion 
to International Criminal Law (CUP 2015) 335, 338. 
920 Abtahi and Young, ‘Article 38’, 1240. 
921 Art. 2, Rome Statute; Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the 
United Nations, 7 June 2004.  
922 ICC, Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the Host State, ICC-BD/04-01-
08, 1 March 2008.  
923 Statement of President Kirsch to the UN General Assembly, 9 October 2006 https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/53692E4E-2B35-41BD-8B90-91828D55880A/278543/PK_20061009_en.pdf.  
924 W. Schabas, ‘Article 38: The Presidency’, in W. Schabas (ed), The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute (OUP 2016) 700, 700–2. See Abtahi and Young, ‘Article 38’, 1240. 
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context, activities, and priorities nor directly mirrors the interests of states parties. In particular, 
the Presidency’s moves to shape the institutional discourse may be ‘licensed’ by states parties, 
and may even be to their benefit, but these moves are not captured by states in the crude manner 
often described by realists.925  
 Similarly, the Presidency’s discursive work does not flow entirely from the independent 
choices of individual actors like the President. Influential though the President is, they are also 
produced by the surrounding context and the dominant discourses of the field.926 Theirs is a 
‘regulated autonomy’.927 In short, the Presidency, as an assemblage of actors, structures, and 
interests, governs by translating that assemblage into a (managerial) institutional discourse.928 
It is this translating function which I now trace through the court’s first three presidencies. 
 
2. The Presidency’s managerial origins 
 
 
In chapter 3, I detailed how the ICC’s organisational structure was moulded by efficiency 
concerns, both during and immediately after the drafting of the Statute. The decision to 
establish a Presidency was guided by a similar rationale. The idea of establishing the 
Presidency as a separate organ of the court was an innovation going beyond the structure of the 
ad hoc tribunals. The ICTY and ICTR Statutes had not provided for such an organ, but the 
judges of both tribunals created in the respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence a ‘Bureau’ 
with which the President could consult ‘on all major questions relating to the functioning of 
the Tribunal’.929 The Bureau provided the basis for the ICC Presidency’s structural form and 
functions. 
 However, the Presidency also had more explicit efficiency origins. As Karim Khan, a 
prominent international defence counsel, has noted, ‘[t]he creation of the Presidency, as a 
 
925 G. Burchell, ‘Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing “the System of Natural Liberty”’, in G. Burchell 
et al. (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (University of Chicago Press 1991) 119, 142. 
Kennedy provides a useful list of the different ways in which scholars have conceived of international law’s 
capture by states, see D. Kennedy, ‘The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the Politics 
of Expertise’ (2001) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 463, 473–9. 
926 See ch 4.1. 
927 N. Rose and P. Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government’ (1992) 43 British 
Journal of Sociology 173, 173. 
928 Translation here means the ‘movement from one space to another, and an expression of a particular concern in 
another modality’, Rose and Miller, ‘Political Power beyond the State’, 181. 
929 Rule 23(B), ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (as amended), IT/32/Rev.50, 8 July 2015. See Jones, ‘The 
Registry and Staff’, 260. 
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separate organ from the rest of chambers was also the result of a bid to reduce costs and to give 
organizational form to the Court’.930 Moreover, the Presidency was placed on a statutory 
footing in order to provide an immediate roster of judges to preside over the court’s first cases. 
Given that ‘it was not anticipated that the full complement of judges permitted under the Statute 
would be needed from the outset’, having an initial group of full-time judges was expected to 
save money.931 The Presidency was borne out of managerial concerns even before the election 
of the court’s first President, Philippe Kirsch. Planted into that setting, the Kirsch Presidency 
would internalise and refine such concerns as the court’s activities got under way.   
 
2.1. The Kirsch Presidency 
 
 
Shortly after the ICC was established, the Presidency set about organising the court’s 
administrative framework in conjunction with the other organs. Through the Regulations of the 
Court, the judges created a Coordination Council comprising the President, Prosecutor, and 
Registrar.932 Convened on a monthly basis by the President, the Council exists to ‘discuss and 
coordinate on, where necessary, the administrative activities of the organs of the Court’.933 In 
practice, the Council has also addressed ‘Court-wide matters of strategic significance’, which 
has allowed it to propose and implement various managerial practices. These include practices 
relating to ‘human resources, budget and finance, as well as public information, outreach [and] 
documentation’.934  
 In budgetary matters, the Council is involved in setting the annual priorities for the 
budget and approves the court’s budget proposal before it is sent to the ASP.935 To this end, 
the Council established in 2004 a Budget Steering Committee ‘to facilitate the sound, efficient 
and transparent preparation’ of the budget’.936 Similarly, the Council also adopted the court’s 
Charter for Internal Audit ‘which clarifie[d] the mandate of the Office of Internal Audit and 
establishe[d] an Oversight Committee’.937  
 
930 K. Khan, ‘Article 34: Organs of the Court’, in Triffterer and Ambos (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, 1199. 
931 Khan, ‘Article 34’, 1199. 
932 Reg. 3(1), Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04, adopted 26 May 2004. 
933 Reg. 3(2), Regulations of the Court. 
934 Abtahi and Young, ‘Article 38’, 1244–5.  
935 Clarifying Report, para. 22. 
936 ICC, Report on Programme Performance of the International Criminal Court for the Year 2004, ICC-ASP/4/13, 
6 September 2005, para. 6.  
937 ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-ASP/4/16, 16 September 2005, para. 14. 
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 Notably, the President, Presidency and Council were given responsibility in the court’s 
early phase for ‘developing and overseeing the implementation of the court’s Strategic Plan’.938  
Establishing a Strategic Planning Project Group in 2005, the Council began to define the court’s 
strategic goals in collaboration with the CBF.939 Although states were consulted on the goals, 
the Planning Group, spearheaded by the Presidency, was responsible for setting the court’s 
long-term aims, among which it listed the aim of becoming a model of public administration. 
President Kirsch was a fervent advocate of strategic planning and publicised the Planning 
Group’s efforts among states parties. At the ASP’s 5th session in 2006, Kirsch announced the 
publication of the ‘first-ever ICC Strategic Plan’ as an ‘internal management tool’ designed to 
create an ‘efficient, flexible and transparent administration’.940 Kirsch hoped that states parties 
would endorse the Plan and welcomed their comments. To ensure its smooth implementation, 
Kirsch later requested that the court recruit a Strategic Planning and Coordination Officer to 
be housed in the Presidency.941 
 Devising the Strategic Plan, the Council took on a central role in embedding an 
efficiency logic within the court. It was also heavily involved in developing the Court Capacity 
Model which instituted a production line approach to the court’s justice-seeking efforts.942 In 
this and other practices, the Presidency construed the court in a managerial image through the 
production of statistical knowledge about it.  
 This discursive power is evident in the Presidency’s efforts to create ‘a system of Court-
wide administrative issuances’.943 This system, comprising Administrative Instructions, 
Presidential Directives, and Information Circulars, lies ‘at the core of the Court’s operational 
administration on a day-to-day basis’.944 Presidential Directives, for example, ‘are required for 
the promulgation of procedures for the implementation of regulations, resolutions and 
decisions adopted by the Assembly’.945 ‘They may also be promulgated in connection with any 
other significant policy decision’ and are binding on the entire court.946 The Whistleblowing 
 
938 Report on Activities 2005, para. 22. 
939 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 4th Session, ICC-ASP/4/2, 15 April 2005, para. 42.  
940 Statement of President Kirsch to the ASP 5th Session, 23 November 2006, 2 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/presidency/PK_20061123_en.pdf. 
941 ICC, Proposed Programme Budget for 2008 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/6/8, 25 July 2007, 
para. 61. This request was rejected by states. 
942 See ch 3.3.2. 
943 Clarifying Report, para. 16. 
944 Clarifying Report, para. 16. See Abtahi and Young, ‘Article 38’, 1244–5; Schabas, ‘Article 38: The 
Presidency’, 703. 
945 Clarifying Report, para. 17. 
946 Clarifying Report, para. 17. 
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Policy was established by way of Presidential Directive in 2014.947 Administrative Instructions 
‘are used to prescribe procedures for the implementation of Presidential Directives’ including 
financial regulations and staff rules, and to otherwise ‘regulate the administration of practical 
and organizational matters of general concern’.948 As noted in chapter 4, the court’s 
performance appraisal regime is elaborated via a series of administrative instructions.  
 According to the ICC itself, administrative issuances have ‘contributed significantly to 
the sound governance of the Court’.949 They have also been the channels through which the 
Presidency has solidified the court’s managerial credentials, by introducing certain knowledge 
practices about the institution and its staff on oversight and appraisal. This has been made 
possible through the Presidency’s position within the court apparatus. Moreover, the President 
regulates the official stream of knowledge in deciding which documents should be published 
in the Official Journal of the Court.950 The journal predictably contains the Statute, Rules, and 
Elements of Crimes, as well as other documents such as the Code of Judicial Ethics. It also 
contains the Staff Regulations and Financial Regulations and Rules, which ascribes the 
managerial content of those documents greater authority as official texts of the organisation.951 
The decision whether to publish in the journal – and indeed on the court’s website952 – 
determines what the court considers to be important for its successful functioning and dictates 
what the outside world sees and values when confronting the court. 
 Existing alongside these practices and procedures is the President him/herself as the 
organ’s internal and external representative. Within the court’s managerial web, the President 
conducts much of the Presidency’s discursive work. That contribution was evident in President 
Kirsch’s efforts to promote the court’s first Strategic Plan among states parties. It is also visible 
in his attempt to foster close ties between the court and the CBF. Initially, Kirsch hoped to 
‘strengthen our dialogue in order to ensure sufficient understanding by the Committee of the 
Court’s positions’.953 This was deemed necessary during the early stages of the court’s 
operations after certain CBF recommendations were said to have a damaging impact on 
essential court functions.954  
 
947 See ch 4.4.4. 
948 Clarifying Report, para. 18. 
949 Clarifying Report, para. 22. 
950 Reg. 7(1)(n), Regulations of Court. 
951 Reg. 7(1)(i) and (j), Regulations of Court. 
952 Reg. 8, Regulations of Court. 
953 Statement of President Kirsch to ASP 5th Session, 5.  
954 Statement of President Kirsch to ASP 5th Session, 5.  
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 However, Kirsch’s attempts to resist isolated and potentially damaging 
recommendations of the CBF did not challenge the deeper efficiency logic which guided them. 
In 2007, Kirsch stated that the court ‘has worked with the [CBF] to continue to improve both 
the structure and content of the budget’.955 He expressed anxiety over proposed budget cuts 
which were due to target the legal aid budget and the budget for the interim premises. Yet these 
sentiments did not trickle down to the institutional grammar, which continued to be guided by 
efficiency rules. In an interview with the International Committee of the Red Cross in 2006, 
Kirsch stated that the court was ‘seeking to make efficient use of resources, both as regards the 
internal organization of the Court and the management of its external relations.956 Kirsch’s 
isolated concerns as to the deleterious effects of austerity appeared not to dent his belief in the 
promise of efficiency. 
 Kirsch also embodied the professional ideal of an efficient and committed ambassador 
for the court during its establishment phase. He had served as the chair of the Rome Conference 
and subsequently as chair of the Preparatory Commission during its formulation of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes. As his interview with the ICRC 
demonstrates, Kirsch was eager to promote the court as a modern, efficient organisation to a 
global audience. And like other senior figures, he often elided that rational image of the court 
with the broader ICJ project, notably in a 2005 speech to the OAS entitled ‘The International 
Criminal Court and the Fulfilment of International Justice’.957 After leaving the court in 2009, 
Kirsch continued to promote its work pedagogically – through the Philippe Kirsch Institute958 
– and in the search for efficient staff as chair of the ICC’s Advisory Committee on the 
Nomination of Judges959. 
 Through such activities, the President and Presidency solidified the court’s nascent 
managerial infrastructure, not least by adopting the efficiency mindset and ‘leading the Court 
in becoming a Model of Public Administration’.960 The Presidency took the financial concerns 
 
955 Statement of President Kirsch to the ASP 6th Session, 30 November 2007, 6 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/president_speech_english_version_6th_asp_30_nov.pdf. 
956 T. Pfanner, ‘Interview with Philippe Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 88 
International Review of the Red Cross 9, 13. 
957 Global Foundation for Development and Democracy, ‘Dr. Philippe Kirsch Delivers Conference as Part of OAS 
Lecture Series of the Americas’, 14 April 2005 https://globalfoundationdd.org/fulltext.asp?t=a&id=233. See also 
ICC, ‘ICC President, Judge Philippe Kirsch, addresses United Nations General Assembly’, ICC-CPI-20081031-
PR367, 31 October 2008 https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/b2fdc5/pdf/.  
958 Philippe Kirsch Institute, http://www.kirschinstitute.ca/.  
959 ICC, Report of the Advisory Committee on Nomination of Judges on the Work of its First Meeting, ICC-
ASP/12/23, 31 May 2013, para. 2. 
960 ICC, Proposed Programme Budget for 2007 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/5/9, 22 August 
2006, para. 35.  
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of states parties and broader support for enhancing effectiveness as the basis for advocating 
and implementing managerial practices. The Presidency therefore utilised its powers to 
construct a managerial court and cement its reputation as ‘a fully functional judicial 
institution’.961   
 
2.2. The Song Presidency 
 
 
The election of a new Presidency in 2009 coincided with major developments in the global 
economy. As noted above, ICC states parties most affected by the global financial crisis – 
among whom were the court’s largest contributors including France, Germany, and Japan – 
began advocating greater budgetary restraint and fiscal scrutiny of the court. The German 
representative to the ASP reminded the court that ‘[i]nternational criminal justice costs money 
– and money is a scarce resource, particularly in times of deep economic and financial crisis’.962 
At a time when Western states parties were implementing policies of austerity in their domestic 
economies, the court was said to ‘derive its legitimacy not only from the full implementation 
of its mandate, but also from aspiring to the highest standards of good governance and 
management, transparency and efficiency[,] and cost-effective executive operations’.963 The 
court would therefore have to live within its means if it was to continue to attract the support 
of its members. This financial reality was officially inscribed via ASP resolution 7/4. Therein, 
states parties noted ‘the current exceptional and extraordinary circumstances in 2009’ and 
‘urge[d] the court to make every effort to find efficiency savings’.964  
 The CBF adopted these concerns when reflecting on the court’s achievements. As the 
financial crisis unfolded, the Committee stated that ‘it was an appropriate point in the life of 
the Court to take stock of progress so far, to examine the factors likely to drive further growth 
in the Court, and to improve the productivity of administrative processes’.965 Moreover, by 
2008 the court had ‘largely completed its establishment phase’ and would ‘soon be in full 
 
961 ICC, ‘International Criminal Court “Now a Fully Functional Judicial Institution”, Assembly of States Parties 
Told as it Begins One-Week Session, ASP2004.003-EN, 6 September 2004, 1 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP20040906.003-E.Rev.21.pdf. 
962 Statement of Germany at the ASP 8th Session, 19 November 2009, 3 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-GenDeba-Germany-ENG.pdf. See also ch 3.4. and 
Statement of France at the ASP 7th Session, 14 November 2008. 
963 Statement of Denmark at the ASP 7th Session, 15 November 2008, 2 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-ASP7-GenDebe-Denmark-ENG.pdf.  
964 ASP Resolution ICC-ASP/7/Res. 4, 21 November 2008, section D, paras 2 and 5. 
965 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 11th Session, ICC-ASP/7/15, 31 October 2008, para. 51. 
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operation with the commencement of trials’.966 It would ‘increasingly need to live within the 
means available to it’, and on this basis the CBF recommended ‘action to consider cost drivers 
in the Court and to manage workload and reform administrative processes’.967 To this end, the 
CBF requested, among other things, that the Presidency report on the responsibilities of the 
different organs to increase clarity and efficiency.968 
 Sang-hyun Song commenced his duties as President in this climate of economic 
austerity and internal pressure for reform. At the beginning of his term, Song was asked by the 
UK representative to the ASP to ‘seek ways to further strengthen the governance of the 
court’.969 Song responded by following in the pattern set by Kirsch, consolidating the 
managerial discourse of efficiency and performance. In his first appearance before the ASP as 
President, Song reiterated the court’s priority of ‘continu[ing] to strive to be a model of public 
administration’.970 He noted that ‘[e]fficiency is paramount in this regard’.971  
 Song combined the financial imperatives of states parties with the desire for 
institutional effectiveness to justify the extension of the court’s managerial practices. He 
continued to direct the meetings of the Coordination Council, which was by then overseeing 
the implementation of the Strategic Plan and addressing issues of internal governance.972 After 
state interventions and the CBF’s recommendations, the Council also began to strengthen the 
relationship between the Strategic Plan and the court’s annual budget.973 The court noted that 
it was ‘specifically through budgetary allocations that the strategic orientations should be 
translated into operational policies’, thereby consolidating cost-effectiveness as the standard 
by which strategic goals were to be evaluated.974 
 While operating through bodies such as the Coordination Council, the Presidency was 
also directly responsible for extending the managerial logic throughout the organisation. Until 
2009, the court’s audit matters had been managed by the Coordination Council. Thereafter, 
responsibility for ‘oversight’ and ‘internal and external control’ of the Presidency and Registry 
 
966 CBF 11th Report, para. 51. 
967 CBF 11th Report, para. 51. 
968 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 13th Session, ICC-ASP/8/15, 16 November 2009, para. 26.  
969 Statement of the United Kingdom at the ASP 8th Session, 19 November 2009, 3 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-GenDeba-United%20Kingdom-ENG.pdf. The UK 
noted that such measures ‘are vital if the Court is to continue to progress and develop in future years’. 
970 Statement of President Song to the ASP 8th Session, 18 November 2009, 5 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-statements-President-ENG.pdf.  
971 Statement of President Song to ASP 8th Session, 9.  
972 Clarifying Report, para. 25. 
973 ICC, Report of the Bureau on the Strategic Planning Process of the International Criminal Court, ICC-
ASP/8/46, 4 November 2009, para. 21.  
974 Report of the Bureau on the Strategic Planning Process, para. 21. 
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was allocated to the Audit Committee by way of a Presidential Directive. The Committee was 
to ‘provide strategic advice on organizational matters to the heads of organs’, assisting them in 
their oversight, financial reporting, risk management, and audit responsibilities.975 The 
Committee itself would comprise the President, Prosecutor, and Registrar as well as four 
independent members with audit expertise.976   
 The Presidency also embedded the court’s risk regime. In 2010, the President 
(alongside the Prosecutor) adopted the Corporate Governance Statement which asserted that 
‘[d]ivisions among the organs, whether real or perceived, are among the most significant risks 
facing the Court’.977 The Presidency was also involved in a ‘comprehensive risk-mapping 
exercise’ in 2011 with a view to creating a ‘risk identification and management structure’ the 
following year.978 The court did not, however, follow through on this objective and instead 
substituted it with a ‘high level Court-wide approved risk register … as the basis for the 
identification of risk-control and -mitigation strategies’.979 In extending the risk framework, 
the Presidency ensured that risk was perceived in terms of risk to the institution and its 
performance.980 
 The most wide-ranging of the Presidency’s managerial efforts was the assessment 
conducted into the court’s organs with a view to clarifying their responsibilities. This was 
conducted ‘in the context of the court’s goal of becoming a model of public administration and 
the corollary commitment to achieve excellence with minimal resources through streamlined 
structures and processes’.981 Setting the managerial boundaries of the court’s enquiries, the 
Presidency proceeded to solidify its own position within the court’s managerial network. The 
Registry was said to be ‘in its entirety, hierarchically subordinate to the Presidency’ which 
would ensure ‘a sound, efficient and well-directed administration by placing the Registry under 
the control of the Presidency’.982 The Presidency would offer ‘strategic guidance’ to the 
Registry, monitor its activities, and oversee compliance with the court’s objectives.983 The 
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2010 report thus crystallised the court’s managerial discourse, while also entrenching the 
Presidency’s position therein. 
 Within this network, the Presidency not only produced managerial practices but was 
produced by them. Song reinforced the image of the court – and of the Presidency – as 
‘responsible managers of the funds which the States Parties have provided’.984 Continuing to 
translate state concerns into an institutional form, Song moulded the Presidency into a model 
for the court’s other organs. This self-production was evident in the Presidency’s efforts to 
revise the staffing structure of Chambers. The Presidency reiterated that ‘[t]he current 
allocation of staff in Chambers reflects a considered effort to maximize resources and increase 
efficiencies’.985 It justified the need for reform based on one of the goals contained in the 
court’s Strategic Plan, namely the goal to ‘conduct fair, effective and expeditious public 
proceedings … with high legal standards’.986 
 The Presidency also bolstered its managerial credentials through its work with the 
Study Group on Governance (SGG). The SGG was created in 2010 to ‘strengthen[] the 
institutional framework of the Rome Statute system and enhanc[e] the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Court’.987 Although the SGG considered many legal issues, including the 
allocation of judges and proposed amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it also 
dealt with managerial concerns. Song’s Vice-President, Judge Sanji Monageng, chaired the 
SGG’s Working Group on Lessons Learnt which instituted several ‘efficient working practices’ 
within chambers.988 Monageng emphasised at various points the need to balance between civil 
and common law systems ‘while promoting efficiency’.989  
 To secure its reputation as a managerial organ, the Presidency also began to provide 
more detailed information to the CBF as part of the court’s budget process. As early as the 
Kirsch Presidency, the CBF had requested a ‘more comprehensive and detailed’ format for the 
court’s annual Proposed Programme Budget, and had asked that performance indicators be 
SMART: ‘Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant [and] Time-bound’.990 By Song’s 
election, the Presidency was also producing expenditure forecasts alongside the court’s annual 
 
984 Statement of President Song to the ASP 11th Session, 4 https://asp.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0EEEED0E-5BA8-
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the heavy responsibility of ensuring that public funds are put to their proper use, with no tolerance for waste’ (9). 
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budget proposal,991 and was implementing ‘zero-based budgeting’, a system wherein ‘the value 
of each activity is systematically re-examined’ to ensure the court’s resources are not put to 
unpredictable and unquantifiable purposes992. Through these practices, the Presidency 
internalised the ideals of ‘transparency, predictability and efficient conduct of the entire budget 
process and each phase therein’, moulding itself into the ideal, efficient organ.993 
 Despite responding to many financial pressures both within and without the court, Song 
did not accept state demands in their entirety. He was wary of allowing the demand for 
efficiency to affect the conduct of court proceedings. He stated that ‘no trial of the ICC should 
be delayed for financial reasons’ and that any further budget cuts beyond those prescribed by 
the CBF ‘would risk seriously affecting the Court’s ability to fulfil [its] mandate’.994 By 2011, 
some states had begun to advocate for a ‘zero-growth’ budget which would seek to find 
additional financial resources not in a larger annual budget but in internal cost savings. Song 
lobbied strongly against such a budget when appearing at the 10th session of the ASP, arguing 
that ‘imposing such a budget in 2012 would be profoundly damaging to the Court’s ability to 
deliver fair and expeditious justice’.995 For Song, ‘the search for efficiencies and economies 
must be realistic’.996  
 Yet Song’s seemingly balanced approach nonetheless reinforced the managerial 
discourse by continuing to instantiate the concerns of states and the CBF in the court’s internal 
operations. As the foregoing analysis illuminates, Song was a steadfast proponent of 
managerial practices and believed in the power of rationalisation to improve the delivery of 
justice. He also accepted the CBF’s reading of the organisation as inefficient and argued in 
2010 that the most recent round of efficiency savings proposed by the CBF ‘[could] be 
accommodated without fundamentally altering the court’s ability to carry out its core work’.997 
By the time he came to resist the zero-growth budget in 2011, he had already accepted that the 
budget needed to reflect a ‘rational balance between the task-driven needs of the court and the 
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requirements of economy and efficiency’.998 Song thus left the underlying austerity policies of 
the major donors unchallenged, reaffirming that ‘some important efficiencies have already 
been achieved, but more will be needed’.999  
 Externally, the Presidency was cognisant that its activities ‘have a profound impact on 
the perception of the Court as an institution and on the development of international criminal 
law’.1000 Thus, while Song was aware of the need to promote the court’s managerial credentials, 
he understood that not all of the court’s constituencies were equally behind the efficiency drive. 
Proposing a balanced approach to the budget in 2011, he stated that this would also be in the 
interests ‘of all those affected by the tragic situations with which the court deals’.1001 At the 
UN, Song reaffirmed that the court had managed its growing workload by ‘simply work[ing] 
harder’.1002 Many external supporters, including NGOs, assumed the same set of concerns: in 
2012, FIDH published ‘10 recommendations for an efficient and independent International 
Criminal Court’ to mark the court’s tenth anniversary.1003  
 Song’s external activities sought to promote managerialism with a human face even if 
they entrenched the efficiency demands of states and the CBF. Yet Song also operated in a 
more confined space than his predecessor who did not experience the same degree of austerity 
as the post-2008 court. Within that space, the Presidency was ‘heavily engaged’ in extending 
the court’ managerial apparatus.1004 It also marketed this more efficient institution to those 
external groups less sympathetic to cost-cutting efforts. Song thus attempted to turn 
managerialism into an acceptable priority for all the court’s constituencies, even while 
recognising the origins and consequences of efficiency concerns.  
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2.3. The Fernández Presidency 
 
 
By the end of the Song Presidency in 2014, court officials, diplomats, academics, and parts of 
the media had embraced the vocabulary of efficiency and cost-effectiveness in debates about 
the ICC.1005 The court’s uptake of managerial practices and the routine implementation of 
efficiency measures had inured many of the court’s supporters, both inside and out, to the value 
of optimisation. Indeed, as the court’s largest donors saw the court adopting a managerial lens, 
they continued to ask for more. In 2015, Japan emphasised that ‘[alt]hough the ICC is a judicial 
organ, the Court is not immune from any examination of its management and governance by 
the States Parties as being an organization established by international agreement’.1006 Through 
the commingling of state and ASP pressure and the build-up of managerial practices, the range 
of issues up for discussion had gradually narrowed down to the question of how best to optimise 
the court. 
 Within this regulatory web, the Presidency often acted as a conduit through which 
external concerns (particularly from Western donors) could be translated into a palatable 
institutional discourse. It was partially as a result of this endorsement of the efficiency mindset 
by successive presidencies that the CBF could proceed to articulate a new position in relation 
to court efficiency. In a 2013 report, the CBF stated that ‘the Court’s efforts have evolved from 
efficiency improvements, linked to the start-up of its operations, to a stage for which 
measurement of progress relates to harmonization of business processes across the 
organization, analysis of mutual influence on the organization’s goals and implementation of 
ideas for improvement’.1007 After a decade of operations, the court ended its ad hoc approach 
to efficiencies, replacing it with a long-term vision of organisational reform as a comprehensive 
and ongoing process of measurement and evaluation. In short, ‘[t]he court [was] moving away 
from strict “efficiency improvements” efforts towards a review of its “efficiency and 
effectiveness”’.1008 
  The third Presidency, headed by Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi, consolidated this 
managerial vision. Fernández ran for election as ICC President on the slogan of ‘efficiency and 
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effectiveness’. Once elected in March 2015, Fernández confirmed that her ‘main priority’ as 
President would be ‘to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the institution’.1009 She took 
an interest in all aspects of court administration to foster ‘good governance, cohesion of action 
and alignment of vision’.1010 In this vein, a few months after assuming office Fernández 
organised a retreat for ICC judges in Nuremberg to ‘consider ways of improving the Court’s 
judicial work’ and ‘to ensure an ongoing focus on key issues which may enhance 
efficiency’.1011  
 Internally, the Presidency continued to discharge a wide range of administrative 
functions which allowed it to managerialise the court and itself. The Presidency continued to 
manage the Coordination Council, provide spending and performance data to the CBF, and 
‘further streamline the Court’s governance and control structure’.1012 It attempted to improve 
the strategic planning process and presented an updated Strategic Plan to states and other 
constituencies.1013 It was at this stage that the court began to institute court-wide performance 
indicators, and the Presidency reported to states and the ASP on their execution and results. 
The Presidency also engaged with the SGG, specifically on the issue of the court’s budget 
process.  
 Through these practices, the Presidency created further managerial knowledge about 
the court. But as well as producing managerial practices to shape the court’s organisational 
reality, the Presidency was itself produced in a managerial image. It complied in full with the 
CBF’s recommendations to find ‘synergies’ within the Presidency and with other organs.1014 
The Presidency reiterated its own objectives to ‘ensure effective resource management, 
including identification and implementation of possible further efficiency measures, and 
improving the measurement of staff performance, and to develop appropriate performance 
indicators’.1015 In 2016, Fernández reiterated the efforts of all court organs to pursue ‘a path of 
reforms to improve the Court’s performance’.1016 Through these activities and external 
engagements, the Presidency reinforced its own image as a model for other organs.  
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 Externally, Fernández assumed an even more ambassadorial role during her three years 
as President than her predecessors. The Fernández Presidency emphasised ‘renewing 
relationships with key external partners and informing a broad range of the Court’s 
stakeholders about the new Presidency’s strategic priorities, in particular the President’s focus 
on enhancing the Court’s efficiency and effectiveness through internal reforms’.1017 This 
priority manifested in Fernández’s repeated slogan of ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ both at the 
ASP and further afield. At the UN General Assembly and at a session of the Pacific Islands 
Forum, she reiterated these ideals as her top priority.1018 
 Fernández also deployed her own diplomatic and academic credentials assiduously in 
promoting the managerial court. She participated in academic discussions on the court’s 
performance indicators.1019 She published several book chapters and scholarly articles in which 
‘efficiency and effectiveness’ are listed among the court’s most pressing future challenges.1020 
Fernández has also sought to appeal to a wider public audience, either in writing op-ed pieces 
for global news outlets,1021 or in interviews on national radio and in print1022. Through these 
myriad interventions, Fernández has pursued the efficiency discourse and the ideal of a 
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managerial institution as a personal project.1023 Through the individual and collective efforts 
of the Presidency, ICJ has been reproduced as an efficient and institutionalised project pursued 
by committed technocrats. 
  
3. Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the Presidency regulates the ICC’s discursive space by 
discharging not only its statutory powers, but by harnessing informal practices and personal 
projects. Identifying that space, and the Presidency’s unique position therein, I reveal some of 
the same features and tendencies of managerialism as have been discussed in previous chapters. 
The Presidency’s limited legal mandate is dwarfed by a range of formal and informal 
administrative activities, many of which operate in and around the court’s legal activities. It is 
these non-legal functions which have allowed the Presidency to determine how the court’s 
future priorities are to be framed and who is to be involved in solving them. Indeed, the 
Presidency has prioritised the budgetary and financial expertise of bodies such as the CBF and 
the pressures of major financial contributors in its bid to address institutional challenges. And 
the Presidency and President have utilised such expertise to justify the ostensibly neutral and 
universal tools of management.  
 Although alluding to these common themes, this chapter also reveals how discursive 
closure comes about in specific institutional locations. The space in which the Presidency has 
operated since 2002 has been framed by various actors. Of the court’s multiple constituencies, 
wealthy states parties and the CBF have been most influential in identifying the context of the 
court’s work, its most pressing problems, and the type of solutions needed to make the court a 
success. Thus, the institutional veil which formally divides the court from its members does 
not preclude states from shaping court priorities and the ‘reality’ of ICJ.  
 Yet this ability to shape the institution does not render the Presidency a fig leaf for state 
interests. Indeed, were it not for the Presidency, the various realities and demands posited by 
states and others would not penetrate its everyday work. The Presidency is therefore a 
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mechanism for stabilising certain background norms, against which policies and priorities are 
set. Through background work, the Presidency ‘figur[es] out what to do, what is appropriate, 
what will work, or what is right’.1024 It posits sub-optimal performance as the principal problem 
and thus looks to managerial practices as the most appropriate solution. In doing so, it 
depoliticises the court’s faults and challenges, ensuring that they can only be addressed in the 
language of organisational reform and management.  
 As for Kirsch, Song, and Fernández, this chapter is not designed to negate or question 
their own sincere and tireless commitment to improving the court’s effectiveness. Yet 
paradoxically, their commitment has manifested as a form of managerial fine-tuning consistent 
with the technocratic vision of ICJ. Their discursive contributions are visible both internally in 
the managerialisation of the Presidency and the court, and externally, in producing a consensus 
around the need for an efficient ICJ system. As a particularly visible expert, it would be easy 
to attribute the managerialisation of the court to these senior officials. It is true that the 
President is able to embed the managerial discourse while simultaneously saying ‘it really was 
not me: it was our policy … the requirements of sound economic management or institutional 
process’.1025 However, successive Presidents have also been unable to throw off the economic 
pressures emanating from states and the CBF and as the ICC has matured its Presidents have 
become increasingly committed to optimising the court. In this way, the Presidents themselves, 
like the organ of the Presidency, and the court as a whole, are the objects of a discursive closure 
which has produced a managerial institution and reinforced the technocratic coordinates of 
international criminal justice. 
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6 Discursive Closure II: ‘ReVision’ of 
the ICC Registry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The ICC’s managerial practices range from the ad hoc and individualised to the cyclical and 
collective. Of the court’s many attempts at organisational reform, the reorganisation of the 
Registry ranks as one of the largest and most consequential practices carried out by the ICC 
since its creation. The reorganisation, branded ‘ReVision’ by its chief planners (see fig. 14), 
officially ran from January 2014 until July 2015. The name ReVision was intended to reflect 
the project’s focus on the Registry’s ‘long-term needs and vision’.1026 At the outset, one of 
ReVision’s most committed proponents, Registrar Herman von Hebel, defined the project’s 
goal as ‘clarifying and ensuring the realisation of the vision, mission, culture and values of the 
Registry, improv[ing] Court-wide and Registry-wide coordination, and ensur[ing] the 
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Figure 14. 'ReVision' logo 
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continuous and efficient delivery of quality services in the most effective manner’.1027 On this 
basis, and over the subsequent 18 months, court officials, senior Registry managers, and 
external experts rearranged the structure, functions, and staffing of the court’s largest organ.   
 Despite its scale, though, ReVision has attracted little attention from ICL scholars.1028 
This is surprising insofar as legal scholars have often led the campaign for legal and managerial 
reform of the court, and have continued to advocate similar measures post-ReVision before 
having assessed its legacy.1029 Added to this is the Registry’s indispensability to the court’s 
everyday functioning as the organ responsible for all ‘non-judicial aspects of the administration 
and servicing of the court’.1030 This includes assisting victim representation and participation 
in court proceedings, applying protective measures to victims and witnesses, providing legal 
aid to defendants, and supporting defence counsel. It also extends to outreach activities with 
victim communities, managing court filings, and maintaining the Detention Unit. Unsurprising, 
then, that the Registry ‘accounts for about half of the total expenditures of the ICC’.1031 Any 
reform of this vital organ is thus worth analysing in detail. 
 However, as with the Presidency, the following analysis locates ReVision’s power not 
in its capacity to optimise court performance, but in the power to define the organ – and by 
extension, the court – as an optimal and efficient mechanism for the pursuit of international 
criminal justice (ICJ). This second illustrative chapter therefore reveals in the reorganisation 
saga similar discursive effects to those identified elsewhere in the court. Through ReVision, 
experts were able to define the court’s organisational context, justify reform, identify problems, 
and pose solutions, all to reproduce the Registry as an ‘efficient service provider’ and its staff 
as efficient and institutionally committed human resources.1032 
 
1027 Registrar’s Presentation of the 2014 Proposed Programme Budget, 23 November 2013, 6–7. 
1028 Only a handful of scholarly articles address the project, and even then in passing rather than as the central 
focus, F. Boehme, ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty: State Rhetoric about the International Criminal Court’ (2018) 22 
International Journal of Human Rights 420, 424; S. Shoamanesh, ‘Institution Building: Perspectives from within 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court’ (2018) 18 ICLR 489, 497. 
1029 J. O’Donohue, Financing the International Criminal Court’ (2013) ICLR 269, 295–6; Z. Al Hussein et al., 
‘The International Criminal Court Needs Fixing’ (Atlantic Council, 24 April 2019) 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-international-criminal-court-needs-fixing. On the 
patterns of ‘reform talk’, see S. Vasiliev, ‘The Crises and Critiques of International Criminal Justice’, in K.J. 
Heller et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law (OUP 2017) (forthcoming). 
1030 Art. 34, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, entry into force 1 July 2002. For a 
detailed overview, see J. Jones, ‘The Registry and Staff’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Vol. 1, OUP 2002) 275.  
1031 ICC, Final Audit Report on the Implementation of a Division of External Operations, ICC-ASP/16/27, 10 
October 2017, para. 56 (‘2017 Audit Report’). 
1032 ICC, Report of the Registry on the Outcome of the ReVision Process, ICC-ASP/14/19, 15 July 2015, Executive 
summary, para. 6 (‘Outcome Report’). 
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 To map this reality, and the larger technocratic imaginary of contemporary ICJ which 
it sustained, I begin my account of the reorganisation several years before it began. Only by 
appreciating the context, the justifications, and recurring expert diagnoses prior to 2014 can we 
understand why managerial reform guided by efficiency and cost-effectiveness came to be seen 
as appropriate and necessary for improving the ICJ project. After providing this backdrop, I 
consider the reorganisation itself which now appears as the latter stage of a much longer and 
constitutive process. Nonetheless that stage reinscribed the Registry’s managerial image via 
expert vocabularies, tools, and documents. ReVision thus created a potent reality for the 
Registry and court to operate in. From time to time, alternative realities appeared during this 
change process. I thus consider some of these alternatives as articulated at various stages of 
reorganisation to expose the essentially constructed nature of technocratic ICJ.  
   
1. ‘PreVision’: Elements of a managerial worldview 
 
 
Throughout this thesis I have approached managerialism as a particular reality of ICJ. As seen 
above, managerialism is one of multiple realities which compete with one another to establish 
themselves as the dominant way of thinking about and doing ‘justice’ at the global level.1033 In 
contrast to the technocratic version of contemporary ICJ, then, other non-institutionalised 
versions of the project have been posited both before and after 2002. Even after the creation of 
the ICC, the court’s reading of the ICJ project as an ever-widening patchwork of accountability 
contrasts with other, less celebratory interpretations, such as the image of a neo-colonial court 
as articulated by some African states parties and scholars. 
 Between these competing interpretations, the question is how managerialism, 
specifically in this instance, the optimisation of the Registry through managerial reform, came 
to be seen as a central pillar of the court’s success, and indeed the success of ICJ. The answer, 
which can be found in the court’s reliance on context, justifications, and technical problems, 
again points to management’s power in enacting discursive closure. ReVision’s managerial 
frame solidified the court’s own reading of ICJ as a largely settled project needing only minimal 
tweaking thus reinforcing ‘the sense that questions of distribution and preference’, as well as 
 
1033 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Global Governance and Public International Law’ (2004) 37 Kritische Justiz 241, 243. 
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of justice ‘have already been decided elsewhere, so all that remain are technical questions, 
questions about how to smooth the prince’s path’.1034 
 
1.1. Creating context 
 
 
David Kennedy has observed that ‘the assertion that something is the context and the 
interpretation of its consequences are the acts of experts’.1035 Experts, as lawyers, economists, 
or management consultants, define the parameters of action or rules of engagement, which then 
serve as the basis for decision-making by ‘sovereigns and legislators’.1036 In the years 
preceding the reorganisation of the ICC Registry, experts including senior court managers and 
external consultants occupied this role by crafting the context within which the court was said 
to exist. They identified two factors which placed comprehensive Registry reform on the 
agenda: an increasing workload and financial restraint.  
 In July 2004, the Office of the Prosecutor was seized of only one investigation; exactly 
ten years later while ReVision was under way, the OTP was dealing with 11 preliminary 
examinations and eight investigations, not to mention the trial and sentencing phases of several 
cases.1037 This steady growth had a direct effect on the Registry’s own workload. Between 
2009 and 2011 the number of victim participation requests rose from 757 to 5,865, and field 
offices were opened in several situation countries.1038 From the outset, the Registry sought to 
adapt to these changes. For example, it produced an Outreach Strategy in 2006 to manage the 
court’s relationship with victim communities. It also sought to deal with the growth in Registry 
staff by instituting a performance appraisal system. Nonetheless, as Registry officials conclude 
from these early efforts, it developed ‘without benefiting from a Registry-wide organisational 
vision or review’.1039 Such a review was deemed necessary for the Registry to remain 
‘sustainable in the long term [and] better able to absorb fluctuations in workload’.1040  
 
1034 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’ (2009) 20 EJIL 7, 16. 
1035 D. Kennedy, ‘Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 1, 
5. 
1036 Kennedy, ‘Challenging Expert Rule’, 5. 
1037 ICC, Report on the Activities of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/13/37, 19 November 2014, part 
I.C. 
1038 Statement of President Song to the ASP 10th Session, 12 December 2011, 2 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ASP10-ST-Pres-Song-Remarks-ENG.pdf.  
1039 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 28. 
1040 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry: Outcomes of Phase 4 of the 
ReVision Project, ICC-ASP/14/18, 4 May 2015, para. 2. 
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 Citing the court’s existing workload,  Registry managers and experts framed the 
context as one of continuous expansion. Although based on workload projections – as obtained 
via tools like the Court Capacity Model – this assumption of future growth occluded other 
concurrent developments which might have thrown up a different context. The first ICC 
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo surmised that the greater success lay not in more court cases, 
but in fewer, as this would signify greater domestic involvement in and ownership over the 
prosecution of international crimes.1041 Moreover, an expanding court docket was by no means 
inevitable in an era characterised by African frustration. By 2008, the sole focus of the 
Prosecutor’s activities had been the African continent. Concerns about selectivity and ICC-
centrism only grew when Ocampo applied for an arrest warrant against President Al-Bashir of 
Sudan despite worries voiced by African states that ICC intervention might derail ongoing 
peace-building efforts in the country.1042 These developments might have precipitated further 
complementarity efforts by the court to domesticate international prosecutions and reduce the 
court’s workload. Yet in visualising an ever-expanding court docket, officials looked to 
minimise the institutional and managerial challenges likely to arise from that expansion, rather 
than to structural arrangements which may have aligned with the court’s potentially peripheral 
future. 
 Complementing this backdrop was the court’s economic condition, particularly in the 
wake of the global financial crisis. In the preceding chapters I considered the importance of the 
2008 crisis and its aftermath for the crystallisation of the court’s managerial reality. The crisis 
required the court to respond to state demands for fiscal prudence and budgetary cuts, even as 
its workload was growing. Notably, by the time an organisational review of the Registry was 
commissioned by the ASP in 2011, the court had already identified yearly efficiency gains and 
reported to the Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF) on cost-cutting efforts.1043 On the 
question of Registry reform, the CBF observed that ‘economic constraints and limited self-
financing … needed to be taken into account’.1044  
 The austerity context was not only apparent in preliminary discussions about reform 
but functioned as the raison d’être of any future exercise. Once elected as Registrar, Herman 
 
1041 T. Benjamin, Interview with Luis Moreno Ocampo (International Bar Association, 1 February 2013) 
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=81213DCF-0911-4141-AD29-A486F9B03D37. 
1042 M. du Plessis and C. Gevers, ‘The Sum of Four Fears: African States and the International Criminal Court in 
Retrospect – Part I’ (Opinio Juris, 8 July 2019) https://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/08/the-sum-of-four-fears-african-
states-and-the-international-criminal-court-in-retrospect-part-i/. See ch 3.5.1. 
1043 ICC, Seventh Status Report on the Court’s Progress regarding Efficiency Measures, ICC-ASP/11/9, 4 May 
2012, para. 3.  
1044 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 20th Session, ICC-ASP/12/5/Rev.1, 7 June 2013, para. 65. 
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von Hebel was asked by the CBF to ‘set a tentative target of 3 per cent savings in his plan’ to 
reorganise the Registry.1045 The Committee further requested that von Hebel report on 
efficiency measures taken ‘together with the realised and anticipated improvements and 
savings’ throughout ReVision.1046 During the reorganisation, von Hebel confirmed that ‘[c]ost-
efficiency is both the Registry’s day-to-day concern and its ultimate long-term 
commitment’.1047 Some months later, he was ‘happy to say that, as requested by the States 
Parties … the Registry has achieved the three per cent savings target in the implementation of 
the 2014 budget’.1048 Despite asserting that ReVision’s aim was ‘not to generate significant 
cost savings’, officials were nonetheless guided by an economic climate of budgetary restraint, 
thereby prompting a sustained focus on resource allocation and internal efficiencies.  
 Much like the growth narrative, the narrative of austerity relied on the convenient 
obscuring of contrary factors, the acknowledgment of which might have inspired alternative 
visions of the court’s context. The damage caused to mainly Western states parties by the 2008 
crisis, and the policies of budgetary restraint which many of them advocated in its wake were, 
of course, real obstacles which the court attempted to mitigate. Yet the cause of Western 
restraint was only partly due to their flagging economies. By 2014, the ICC had financial 
arrears amounting to €69 million, or over half the court’s annual budget.1049 Moreover, many 
of the most indebted members – Germany, Japan, and the UK – had been advocating efficiency 
savings within the court even before the 2008 crash. Although ICC President Song had urged 
states to comply with their financial obligations at various times, most court officials 
advocating reform located the problem in internal inefficiency and waste rather than in under-
investment. This context of economic scarcity, alongside that of organisational growth, set up 
internal reform as a seemingly necessary solution to the court’s malaise.  
 
 
 
 
1045 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 21st Session, ICC-ASP/12/15, 4 November 2013, para. 83. 
1046 CBF 21st Report, para. 83. 
1047 ICC, Proposed Programme Budget for 2015, ICC-ASP/13/10, 18 September 2014, para. 272. 
1048 Statement of Registrar von Hebel to the ASP 13th Session, 15 December 2014, 7 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/ASP13-BG-Statement-Registrar-ENG.pdf.  
1049 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 22nd Session, ICC-ASP/13/5, 18 August 2014, Annex 1.  
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1.2. Justifying reform1050 
 
 
Still some years before ReVision commenced, internal officials and other experts began to 
build a case for reform based on the narratives of organisational growth and economic austerity. 
Pursuant to that context, experts looked to justify a reform exercise with efficiency and cost-
effectiveness as its primary aim. One of the earliest expert assessments of the Registry was 
conducted by the Office of Internal Audit (OIA) in May 2010. Evaluating the structure of the 
Registry’s field operations, the OIA framed its problems as organisational. It identified 
‘functional silos and no overall authority in the field structure’ and raised concerns over the 
‘lack of a Registry representative in the field’.1051  
 Such findings were complemented by pronouncements of the CBF. In August 2011, the 
CBF expressed its concern with the ‘organizational structure of the Registry, where there 
appeared to be a proliferation of senior positions that reported directly to the Registrar’.1052 The 
Committee recommended that the court ‘undertake a thorough evaluation/review of its 
organizational structure with a view to streamlining functions, processes and corresponding 
structures’.1053 These expert assessments began to create a picture of administrative complexity 
and fragmentation within the Registry. The 2016 Comprehensive Report on ReVision 
retrospectively reproduces that picture. Citing not only OIA and CBF assessments, but also the 
‘unplanned’ nature of Registry reform prior to reorganisation, the 2016 report recites the 
Registry’s history as one of growing managerial deficiency.1054 These interventions turned 
organisational reform into an urgent task.   
 Experts unanimously endorsed a managerial reform process guided by efficiency. The 
aim of any reform exercise would be to ‘modernise [the Registry’s] methods’ and to simplify 
and streamline what was perceived to be an ‘over-complex’ organ.1055 Yet even as managerial 
experts justified reform, they also articulated their arguments as collectively-held positions 
having universal appeal. Remnants of these consensus claims are visible in the Registrar’s 
updates to states prior to ReVision. Two months before the project, the Registrar noted the 
 
1050 Parts of this section are adapted from R. Clements, ‘ReVisiting the ICC Registry’s ReVision Project’ (2019) 
17 JICJ 259, 263–5. 
1051 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 28.  
1052 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 17th Session, ICC-ASP/10/15, 18 November 2011, para. 45.  
1053 CBF 17th Report, para. 46.  
1054 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 28.  
1055 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 28. 
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‘widespread agreement across the Court that change is necessary’.1056 Such apparent consensus 
was also used to justify more sensitive issues arising from reform, namely staff reductions and 
redundancies. Von Hebel impressed upon all stakeholders the importance of finding an optimal 
size for the Registry. This was not a question of ‘downsizing, but rightsizing’.1057 Such a 
construction framed redundancies as a necessary sacrifice ‘to implement the new structure and 
to sustain the reorganisation process’.1058 Thus, the damaging consequences of ReVision were 
characterised as unavoidable and as ‘universally’ demanded by ‘Registry staff members 
themselves’ as well as experts, states, and civil society groups.1059  
 The Registrar was eager to remind stakeholders of the detailed consultations conducted 
prior to ReVision. Upon assuming office, he hosted a meeting for all Registry staff to discuss 
common issues within the organ.1060 According to von Hebel, those discussions ‘categorically 
showed the need for urgent change’.1061 He also presented the reorganisation proposal to the 
Hague Working Group, a body comprised of state representatives established by the ASP. The 
proposal was ‘positively received’ and the Registrar promised to keep the group, as well as 
states and the CBF, constantly updated about the progress of reform.1062 This broad consensus 
was cited throughout ReVision and subsequently, in an ex post facto legitimation of the project. 
The Comprehensive Report stated that ‘[f]or a number of years in the lead-up to the 
reorganisation of the Registry, there was a collective and widespread understanding that 
organisational change was necessary and long overdue’.1063 Through these different exchanges 
over several years, officials made organisational reform appear urgent and universally desired 
among the court’s key constituencies. This not only legitimised the court’s reform efforts but 
confined the outcomes to different kinds of technical solutions. 
 
 
 
 
1056 Statement of Registrar von Hebel to the ASP 14th Session, 21 November 2015, 6 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/ASP14-BDGT-REGISTRAR-ST-ENG-FRA.pdf. 
1057 Statement of Registrar von Hebel to ASP 14th Session, 6. 
1058 Statement of Registrar von Hebel to ASP 14th Session, 6. 
1059 Comprehensive Report, para. 560. 
1060 Presentation of the 2014 Proposed Programme Budget, 23 November 2013, 8 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ASP12-Statement-REG-ENG.pdf.  
1061 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, ICC-ASP/13/26, 28 October 2014, 
para. 10. 
1062 Presentation of the 2014 Proposed Programme Budget, 23 November 2013, 8. 
1063 Comprehensive Report, Foreword, ix. 
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1.3. Problems 
 
 
Under conditions of perceived urgency, the broad parameters and expectations of reform 
slowly began to settle. With these components in place, the court notified the CBF that ‘external 
expertise would need to be engaged to support the development of a strategy aimed at such a 
review’.1064 The CBF agreed and proposed that external consultants familiar with large-scale 
restructuring be recruited to diagnose the Registry’s problems. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
were contracted to provide this organisational diagnostic while other ‘high level experts’ were 
approached for ‘strategic guidance on a pro-bono basis’.1065 The report which PwC submitted 
to the court in April 2013 offered some guidance for reform. Broadly-speaking, the Registry 
would need to ‘modernise its methods to achieve a Court model which merits the expectations 
of the community of States Parties’.1066 Those methods were largely managerial in nature and 
were recommended to include  
 
 ‘(a) Defining a new organisational chart for the various departments and teams; (b) 
 Ensuring the involvement and accountability of management; (c) Maintaining work 
 capabilities at a high level of efficiency; (d) Defining tasks associated with the strategic 
 plan, and (e) Ensuring that directorates and sections take ownership of the objectives 
 assigned to them’.1067  
  
Although previous assessments by the OIA and CBF had prioritised efficiency, they had not 
articulated precisely how that aim was to be realised. PwC was the first to offer specific 
managerial tools such as a new organisational chart and further involvement and accountability 
of managers as the solution.  
 This expert analysis was reiterated by another management consulting firm, Mannet, 
during the ReVision process. Specialising in ‘change management’, Mannet was recruited to 
assist in the ‘organisational development of the new Registry’.1068 Deploying its managerial 
expertise, Mannet offered ‘procedural input on the ReVision recommendations’ and 
‘support[ed] the Registrar in preparation for an implementation of the reorganisation-related 
 
1064 ICC, Report of the Court on its Organizational Structure, ICC-ASP/11/6, 4 May 2012, para. 16.  
1065 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 19th Session, ICC-ASP/11/15, 29 October 2012, para. 71. 
1066 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 20th Session, ICC-ASP/12/15/Rev.1, 7 June 2013, para. 62. 
1067 CBF 20th Report, para. 63. 
1068 Comprehensive Report, para. 89. 
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decisions, as well as coaching the Directors and Section Chiefs in the preparation of the 
reorganisation’.1069  
 These expert diagnoses added flesh to the bones of organisational reform by defining 
ICJ’s underperformance as a problem of organ mismanagement. This characterisation would 
define the project’s parameters from the outset. Thus, the ReVision team divided problems into 
‘structural’ and ‘non-structural’ issues, with the former concerning ‘the distribution of 
functions and reporting lines’ and the latter dealing with ‘work processes and workflows; 
systems and databases; communication, cooperation and coordination; regulatory framework; 
human resources management; and staff morale’.1070 Collectively, the pre-ReVision 
assessments of context, need, and problems coalesced to render managerial reform the most 
appropriate and desirable fix to the institutional project. These manoeuvres represented key 
elements of a managerial worldview, in which the answer to the court’s problems were located 
in the technical solutions of experts.  
 
2. Phases1071 
 
 
ReVision formally commenced in January 2014. However, the foregoing discussion illustrates 
the pre-ordained discursive space in which that formal process was to be conducted. As a result, 
the components which the court lists as the ‘official’ background to ReVision appear as mid-
points in a much longer process. First, the court identified the election of Herman von Hebel 
as Registrar in April 2013 as the ‘political’ justification for launching the reorganisation.1072 
Von Hebel had gained administrative experience at several international criminal tribunals and 
had served as Registrar of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon since 2009. Von Hebel extolled 
his accomplishments in these organisations including the development of a fundraising strategy 
at the Lebanon tribunal and implementation of a ‘downsizing policy’ for staff at the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone.1073 Following this trend, von Hebel made comprehensive reform of the 
Registry a central plank of his campaign during the ICC’s Registrar elections.  
 
1069 Comprehensive Report, para. 89(b). 
1070 Comprehensive Report, para. 54. 
1071 Parts of this section are adapted from Clements, ‘ReVisiting the ICC Registry’s ReVision Project’, 265–9.  
1072 ICC, Audit Report of the ReVision project of the International Criminal Court’s Registry, ICC-ASP/15/27, 9 
November 2016, para. 14 (‘2016 Audit Report’). 
1073 ICC, Statement of Qualifications for Herman von Hebel, 2012, 2 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Elections/ER2012/ICC-ASP-ER2012-VONH-ST-ENG.pdf.  
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 Von Hebel was successful in this campaign (principally due to his promise of 
reform1074) and ICC judges duly elected him Registrar in April 2013. In his swearing-in 
ceremony, von Hebel recommitted to ‘strengthen and fine-tune the services of the Registry in 
the coming five years’.1075 As well as having impressed the judiciary, the CBF also found von 
Hebel an attractive candidate. During the elections, the CBF observed that reforms ‘must be 
based on resource allocation … for this project to succeed’ and that ‘economic constraints and 
limited self-financing also needed to be taken into account’.1076 It elaborated that ‘[t]he 
appointment of a new Registrar provides an opportunity to drive through reforms of this 
nature’.1077 Such statements show von Hebel to have been planted into an already managerial 
reform trajectory, as opposed to having been completely responsible for its execution. Yet 
through his own experience and his promises of reform, von Hebel translated the wishes of 
states, judges, and the CBF into a cohesive institutional discourse by bringing reorganisation 
to fruition.  
 The second official pretext for ReVision, namely the ASP’s formal authorisation of the 
project, also confirmed its managerial slant. ASP resolution 12/1 of November 2013 authorised 
von Hebel ‘to reorganize and streamline the Registry’s organizational structure within the 
envelope of the approved programme budget for 2014 and the maximum number of established 
posts and approved positions’.1078 The Assembly requested that the Registrar ‘achieve at least 
three per cent savings in the approved programme budget for the Registry’ as part of the 
reorganisation.1079 The ASP’s authorisation thus solidified the economic constraints as well as 
the managerial coordinates of reform. 
 The five official phases of ReVision reflected the desire to optimise Registry structures 
and functions. Indeed, the quasi-scientific manner in which the project was conducted allowed 
ReVision to appear comprehensive and methodical even while reinforcing a narrow, 
technocratic view of how to improve the ICJ project.  
 Phase 1, the set-up phase, saw the establishment of a Project Team and Project Board. 
The Project Team initially comprised three external experts ‘experienced in working with 
international jurisdictions’ and five Registry staff.1080 The team would later grow in size to 15 
 
1074 ICC Interview 2, 13 July 2018 (on file with author). 
1075 ICC, Statement of Registrar von Hebel during Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Registrar, 18 
April 2013, para. 7 https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/pr899/Registrar-Statement-18-04-2013-Eng.pdf.  
1076 ICC, Report of the CBF on the Work of its 20th Session, ICC-ASP/12/5/Rev.1, 7 June 2013, para. 64.  
1077 CBF 20th Report, para. 64. 
1078 ASP Resolution 12/1, ICC-ASP/12/Res.1, 27 November 2013, pt. H, para. 3. 
1079 ASP Resolution 12/1, para. 3. 
1080 2016 Audit Report, para. 46; see Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 25.  
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members, and finance and human resources experts numbered among those recruited from the 
Registry.1081 The Project Board, which oversaw and offered guidance to the Project Team, was 
chaired by the Registrar and comprised ‘four representatives of the Registrar’s users (the ASP, 
the Presidency and Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and a defence lawyer), [and] the 
President of the ICC’s Staff Union’.1082 It also contained two members ‘with leadership 
experience in an international judicial institution and/or extensive experience in one or more 
of the Registry functions’.1083  The first task of the Project Team was to publish ReVision’s 
Terms of Reference. By the end of Phase 1, the team had also provided a reorganisation plan 
covering the ‘goals, scope, assumptions, deliverables, project team and governance structure, 
project methodology as well as detailed description of the phases and activities envisaged’.1084 
The plan received the assent of the Project Board and was submitted to the CBF for approval 
in April 2014.  
 Phase 2 entailed the ‘redefinition of the Registry’s vision, mission and common values, 
a review of Registry mandates and inherent functions in order to identify areas of overlap or 
gaps, an analysis of existing and newly collected data, and a recommendation for a new 
organisational structure of the Registry’.1085 This preparation for organisational redesign 
required a review of existing information and the collection of additional data from Registry 
staff throughout the spring of 2014.1086 The results of staff surveys revealed that ‘81 per cent 
of Registry staff participating in the May 2014 survey called for change in the Registry’.1087 
The ReVision team also consulted with judges and Registry managers on future models for the 
Registry’s ‘new high-level structure’.1088 This structure, based on three consolidated divisions 
within the organ, was formally announced to Registry and court staff in July 2014.1089 
Towards the end of Phase 2, the ReVision team commenced a detailed review of 
Registry functions, the findings for which were captured in an October 2014 report to the CBF. 
The ReVision team’s diagnosis also depicts the solidly managerial coordinates on which the 
project would proceed: 
 
 
1081 2016 Audit Report, paras 10 and 29. 
1082 2016 Audit Report, para. 11. 
1083 Comprehensive Report, paras 49–50. 
1084 ICC, Report of the Court on the Organizational Structure, ICC-ASP/13/16, 23 May 2014, para. 4. 
1085 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, ICC-ASP/13/26, 28 October 2014, 
para. 4(a). 
1086 Comprehensive Report, para. 55(a). 
1087 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary 25. 
1088 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 29. 
1089 See below section 4.1. 
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The results of a detailed analysis of the Registry functions reveal fragmentation and 
inefficiency in several operational areas, leading to uneconomical use of resources, 
bureaucracy and sub-optimal operations. In particular, there is overlap or fragmentation 
of functions in field operations; victim participation; assistance and support to victims 
and victims’ representatives; assistance and support to defence counsel; State co-
operation and external relations; general legal function; and approval and certification 
of expenditure … A number of gaps were also identified in areas such as internal 
communication; policy-making; organisational performance management; risk 
management practices; crisis management procedures; political analysis staff-
management relations; and internal conflict resolution.1090 
 
The 2014 report further articulates ReVision’s ‘guiding principles’, which entrench the court’s 
aspirations. These principles include the desire to establish management teams throughout the 
organ, to be a good ‘service provider’ to its ‘clients’, and to ensure ‘effectiveness and 
efficiency’.1091  
 The detailed review paved the way for the third phase or the ‘identification of urgent 
measures considered necessary to tackle Registry-wide operational or managerial issues, which 
can be implemented swiftly without any structural changes’.1092 These measures included the 
adoption of principles and procedures concerning the rights and duties of Registry staff 
impacted by future reorganisation. At this stage, the team also initiated the process of producing 
the Registry’s new ‘vision, mission and values’, and centralising management of the court’s 
budget.1093 
Phase 4, the ‘Functions Performance Review’, was the most lengthy and far-
reaching.1094 The team reviewed the performance of each of the Registry’s 46 units and 
proposed measures to deal with underperformance, fragmentation, and duplication. In total, 
‘18 detailed reports and 539 recommendations were put forward covering all functions of the 
Registry’.1095 The team then submitted this advice to the Registrar and Registry section 
chiefs.1096 
 Two substantive recommendations are worth mentioning here as they were discussed 
and ultimately rejected during Phase 4. In March 2015, the Registry began to collect the views 
 
1090 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, Executive summary. 
1091 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, para. 11.  
1092 Comprehensive Report, para. 55(b). 
1093 2016 Audit Report, fn 7. 
1094 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, para. 4(c). 
1095 2016 Audit Report, para. 12(d). 
1096 Comprehensive Report, para. 55(d). 
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of judges and NGOs on a proposal to consolidate all victim and defence functions into two 
consolidated offices. The Victims Office would merge the Victim Participation and Reparation 
Section and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims.1097 The Victims Office was designed, 
inter alia, to enhance Registry involvement in the appointment of victims’ counsel.1098 The 
Defence Office would amalgamate the Office of Public Counsel for Defence and the Court 
Services Section. In the end, neither proposal was implemented, principally as a result of 
judicial anxieties about possible infringement of victims’ and defendants’ rights.1099 Given that 
the assent of judges was required to make changes to the regulations dealing with victims and 
defence issues, the team’s proposals were ‘abandoned’.1100  
Aside from these rejected proposals, the Project Board approved the team’s 
recommendations in April 2015. In June, the Registrar submitted the ReVision Outcome Report 
and an implementation roadmap, ‘marking the end of the ReVision project’.1101 With the five 
phases complete, the Registry could now move to implement the team’s recommendations. 
New structures and reporting lines were put in place by July 2015. The new divisions and 
sections were rolled out throughout the following year with the Registry observing that 
implementation of the new structure was ‘at its peak’ in July 2016.1102 
After the ReVision project officially ended, the Registry began to implement staff 
alterations and, in some cases, redundancies. The Principles and Procedures for staff alterations 
had already been promulgated in 2014, before being circulated among Registry staff in June 
2015. The Principles provided that posts would be abolished where functions were no longer 
required or where structural changes resulted in ‘substantial changes’ to the position 
necessitating staff redeployment elsewhere.1103 For those staff whose posts were being 
 
1097 ICC, Basic Outline of Proposals to Establish Defence and Victims Offices (Draft), undated, 4 
http://michaelgkarnavas.net/files/Basic_Outline_Defence_and_Victims_Offices.pdf.  
1098 FIDH, Comments on the ICC Registrar’s ReVision Proposals in Relation to Victims, 18 November 
2014, 2. 
1099 Ex-ICC judge Adrian Fulford encapsulated judges’ concerns about these changes, J. Rozenberg, ‘UK’s First 
ICC Judge Attacks Proposed Restructuring of International Court’, The Guardian, 4 November 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/nov/04/uks-first-icc-judge-attacks-reforms-court-adrian-fulford. Several 
NGOs also came out against aspects of the proposals, see International Bar Association, IBA Comments on draft 
Registry Revision Project Paper: Basic Outline of Proposals to Establish Defence and Victims Offices, December 
2014, 8 http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/here.pdf; Avocats san Frontieres, 
ICC Registry ReVision Project – Basic Outline Proposals to Establish Defence and Victims Offices, 22 April 
2015, 2 https://asf.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ASF_IJ_PositionPaperReVision_20150422.pdf.  
1100 2016 Audit Report, para. 70. 
1101 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 32. 
1102 Although the official end of ReVision was set at June 2015, with the publication of the final ReVision report, 
the reforms continued to be implemented for at least 18 months thereafter. In November 2016, the court’s External 
Auditor noted that the implementation had yet to be fully implemented, 2016 Audit Report, para. 19. 
1103 ICC Information Circular, Principles and Procedures Applicable to Decisions Arising from the ReVision 
Project, ICC/INF/2014/011/Rev.1, 13 June 2015, para. 9 (‘Principles and Procedures’). 
237 
 
abolished, the Principles offered a choice between an ‘Enhanced Agreed Separation Package’ 
and priority candidacy for new positions at a similar level.1104 In July 2015, staff were therefore 
notified if their post was to be abolished or substantially changed and by November all affected 
staff had vacated their positions. 
 
3. Results 
 
 
By focusing on the expert mechanics of the reform process, I have intentionally neglected the 
substantive changes arising from ReVision. Yet to understand the dynamics of discursive 
closure, the measures enacted by the ReVision team and the Registry illuminate the kind of 
organisational reality which experts had in mind. Below I consider ReVision’s main outcomes. 
Due to the vast and minute array of changes which ReVision brought about, I offer a non-
exhaustive list of only the most notable achievements:  
• Restructuring. A basic comparison of figures 15 and 16 reveals that the Registry’s two 
existing divisions were restructured, and another division added. Several sections were 
relocated under different divisions thereby ‘facilitating intra-Registry synergies and 
ensuring a cohesive Registry approach in all of its areas of responsibility and 
activities’.1105  
• New ‘Division of External Operations’. Under the old structure, the court’s external 
operations such as the field offices, public information and documentation, and the 
victims and witnesses section, operated in isolation. The new Division of External 
Operations consolidated these functions to provide management oversight where none 
had existed before.1106 
• Reduced number of Registry units. The new Registry structure comprised 39 units, 
down from 46. In most cases, this resulted from the merger of two or more units, as in 
the Human Resources Section, where the Entitlements and Payroll Unit, Staffing Unit, 
and Staff and Administration Unit merged into a new Operations Unit.1107 
• Reduced reporting lines to the Registrar. Previously, the heads of the Common 
Administration Services Division, Division of Court Services, and seven isolated 
 
1104 Principles and Procedures, para. 17. 
1105 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 3. 
1106 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 13. 
1107 Comprehensive Report, para. 265. 
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sections, reported directly to the Immediate Office of the Registrar (see fig. 15). This 
was said to have detracted from the Registrar’s strategic responsibilities and made lines 
of authority among Registry managers unclear.1108 Under the new structure, reporting 
lines to the Registrar were reduced to four. 
• New management teams. ReVision inserted new management teams with ‘strategic 
leadership’ and oversight functions into each hierarchical layer of the Immediate 
Office, Divisions, and Sections.1109 The Registry Management Team in particular 
would be the organ’s ‘highest-level forum to inform, advise and assist the Registry on 
strategic decisions, policies and major operational challenges’.1110 Within these new 
management teams, Division and Section heads would focus on strategic guidance, 
while operational staff such as lawyers and translators, would be left to perform their 
core functions.1111 
• Absorbing workload increases. According to the Registry and the auditors of ReVision, 
Registry sections were much better placed to deal with increases in workload after 
reorganisation. Although two sections – the Victims and Witnesses Section and the 
Language Services Section – still had limited capacity to absorb such increases post-
ReVision, this was attributed to their dependence on the size and scale of investigations 
and trials.1112 
• Financial benefits. Among ReVision’s most-cited achievements, the Registry listed its 
short-term and long-term financial benefits. In 2016 alone, savings and efficiencies 
were calculated at €5.3 million. These were principally achieved through reductions in 
Registry staff, lower travel costs, and staggered recruitment of new staff.1113 The cost 
of reorganisation was €6.1 million and was said to have been offset by financial savings 
and efficiencies by the end of 2016.1114 
• Reduction in staff numbers. Officials calculated that approximately 120 Registry staff 
were affected by the staffing alterations either as a result of relocation within the new 
structure or post abolitions.1115 However, in the end the project created a net reduction 
in Registry staff of only 10.4 posts, from 560.4 to 550. The vacancies resulting from 
 
1108 Comprehensive Report, para. 212. 
1109 2016 Audit Report, para. 142. 
1110 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 3. 
1111 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 10. 
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239 
 
ReVision were gradually filled throughout late 2015/early 2016 via a policy of 
staggered recruitment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Old Registry structure 
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As far as the experts and officials involved in the project were concerned, these were the main 
achievements of ReVision. In his foreword to the 2016 Comprehensive Report, Registrar von 
Hebel asserted that as a result of reorganisation, ‘the new Registry will indeed be a more 
efficient and effective service provider to all those who rely on it’.1116 However, ReVision’s 
effects went beyond the optimisation of the Registry. Appreciating the discursive effects 
already uncovered in previous chapters, ReVision’s power can be said to lie beyond its capacity 
to functionally repair deficient organisational structures and processes. The more significant 
effects of ReVision are found in its reproduction of a managerial institution and the managerial 
identities of its staff. The following section maps that process of discursive closure as enacted 
via expert vocabularies, tools, and documents. 
  
 
 
1116 Comprehensive Report, Foreword, x. 
Figure 16. New Registry structure 
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4. Refining organisational reality and professional identities 
4.1. Managerial voices 
 
 
The reform process refined and reproduced the Registry’s organisational reality in managerial 
terms over several years. In keeping with the genealogical method, I trace these discursive 
moves more or less chronologically but with an eye on their constructed and contested 
emergence. From the outset, ReVision prized the voices and vocabularies of managerial experts 
above all others which largely restricted the options for organisational change to various, 
though generally unvaried, managerial solutions. Both the ReVision team and Project Board 
were populated by managerial experts recruited either from within or without the Registry and 
no victims representative sat in either group.  
Several NGOs involved in the ReVision consultation process raised concerns about this 
expert monopoly over organisational design. The International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH), for example, observed that ‘none of the members of the Project Board have direct 
experience working and interacting on a daily basis with victims of mass atrocities’.1117 They 
go on to state that ‘benefiting from the view of those who support victims and outside observers 
acquainted with the realities of victims in the situation countries is crucial’.1118 Another NGO, 
REDRESS, regretted that ‘external stakeholders, including NGOs and external Counsel 
representing victims … were not meaningfully involved from an earlier stage in the process’ 
and encouraged the Registry to ‘take into account the views of those directly benefiting from 
the Registry’s services’.1119 Even ReVision’s auditors observed that spending more time on 
recruiting experts ‘would have made it possible to construct a more rounded team’.1120  
Registry officials made much of their efforts to consult with internal and external 
‘stakeholders’ throughout the project. The project timeline contained in the Comprehensive 
Report highlights sustained periods of consultation with Registry managers, Registry and field 
staff, judges, NGOs, experts, and states parties. Internal reform proposals were discussed with 
staff during ‘brown-bag lunch[es]’ and ‘town hall meetings’.1121 The Registry’s mission and 
common values were updated ‘following a Registry-wide consultation with staff members and 
 
1117 FIDH letter, 1. 
1118 FIDH letter, 1. 
1119 REDRESS, Comments to the Registrar in relation to the ReVision Project as it relates to Victims’ Rights 
before the ICC, February 2015, 2–3 https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/February-Comments-to-the-
Registrar-in-relation-to-the-ReVision-project-as-it-relates-to-victims%E2%80%99-rights-before-the-ICC.pdf. 
1120 2016 Audit Report, para. 28. 
1121 Comprehensive Report, Executive summary, 29 and 31. 
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with the active participation of the Staff Union’.1122 In terms of external parties, an expert 
conference was held to gauge NGO views on the proposed Victims and Defence Offices. From 
these consultative efforts, the Registrar pointed to a ‘huge consensus on the big design’ of the 
new Registry.1123 In an interview with International Justice Monitor in July 2014, von Hebel 
concluded that ‘overall there is consensus for 70 to 80 percent as to what the new registry 
should look like’.1124 
Placing these consultative efforts in context, they appear less as means of garnering and 
incorporating feedback from key actors than as highly controlled processes for manufacturing 
consensus.1125 The years preceding ReVision had seen an institutional convergence around 
managerial reform by the CBF, external experts, auditors, and senior Registry staff. Their 
diagnoses had reduced the range of available change measures down to how best to fine-tune 
the organ. Thus, the Overall Plan for the ReVision project, which was based on the 2013 PwC 
report, was approved by the Project Board without wider consultation.1126 Following this, 
discussions with Registry directors and section chiefs centred on ‘proposed models for the 
Registry’s new high-level structure’, leaving them to choose between different flavours of 
managerial reform.1127 The Comprehensive Report recalls that ‘[c]onsensus among the 
participants was reached’ on a range of organisational measures ‘for a more efficient and 
effective Registry’.1128 
Consultations with staff illustrate a similar dynamic. Surveys revealed that 81 percent 
of Registry staff ‘called for change in the Registry’.1129 However, this was on a 60 percent 
turnout. In fact, only 59 percent of participating staff believed a ‘change in organisational 
structure’ was ‘necessary’ with 37 percent of respondents remaining ‘neutral on this 
question’.1130 In any event, the team’s consultations with Registry staff centred on the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of ‘three alternative organisational models’.1131 One of these was 
approved by the Project Board on 17 July 2014 and at a town hall meeting the following day, 
 
1122 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, para. 5. 
1123 T. Reisman, ‘ICC Registrar Discusses Restructuring and Need for Larger Budget’ (International Justice 
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‘the Registrar announce[d] to all staff the new three-pillar structure of the Registry’.1132 It took 
a further three months after this announcement before the team began to present the 
reorganisation plans to a small pool of NGOs led by the Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court.1133 
The consensus which the Registrar and others sought to build around the need for 
managerial reform was achieved only against a managerial backdrop which had been 
assembled over the preceding months and years. By the time the ReVision team began to collect 
feedback on the proposed changes, the options were severely restricted to different types of 
managerial reform, leaving little real choice. Nonetheless, gathering staff feedback and the 
views of external groups was necessary to ‘drive through reforms of this nature’ and legitimise 
the ReVision project in the eyes of the wider ICJ community.1134  
Yet prioritising managerial voices and solutions did not completely expunge the 
alternatives to this organisational change process. Some consultees not only lamented the lack 
of wider consultation with those caught up in mass atrocities but challenged the ICC-centrism 
of the project itself. FIDH noted that the right of victims to participate in proceedings would 
only be realised ‘if legal representation is exercised in such a way that it puts victims at the 
centre of consultation initiatives and allows them to practically and really be a part of the 
proceedings, even through remote non-physical intervention’.1135 Yet FIDH protested the 
technocratic mindset which placed the ICC at the centre and positioned its beneficiaries and 
other external actors at a distance. Contesting that mindset, FIDH observed that ‘the victims 
are where they ought to be, they are where the crimes were committed, they live in areas where 
they have always resided’.1136 Accordingly, ‘[w]hat is far is not the victims, but the seat of the 
Court’, meaning that ‘[t]he premise must be that the Court needs to adapt to victims; it is not 
for the victims to adapt to the Court’.1137 
This brief intervention by FIDH offers a clear alternative to the managerialism of the 
ReVision project by resetting the basis and motivations for organisational change. Victims’ 
needs and interests are placed front and centre which may, as FIDH suggest, require that the 
ICC be peripheralized. As the NGO concludes in its consultation response, ‘[v]ictims have a 
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myriad of needs and justice is one of them’, meaning that reform projects can have other 
orientations than institutional efficiency and cost-effectiveness.1138 Although it may be difficult 
for such alternative meanings to pierce the hegemonic discourse of managerial efficiency, 
‘[c]alls for a bottom up orientation are nonetheless worth repeatedly making as they serve to 
highlight the contradiction of excluding from strategic decision-making processes those who 
are most immediately affected by the decisions made’.1139  
 
4.2. Managerial tools 
 
 
ReVision saw the deployment of by now familiar managerial tools with their equally familiar 
claims to objectivity and universality. As elsewhere, ReVision’s managerial tools also 
reproduced a hyperrational image of ICJ as an expert project with the potential for achieving 
optimal justice. Four tools notably reinscribed the Registry’s managerial reality and the 
professional identity of its staff as human resources.  
The first was the organisational chart or organigram. As seen previously, the 
organigram is a useful artefact for cementing the institution as the outer limit of professional 
action and already appears throughout the court’s managerial documents. In the ReVision 
context, a new organisational chart was first proposed by PwC in their 2013 report to the ASP. 
This proposal was taken up by the ReVision team and the Comprehensive Report depicts the 
Registry’s new organisational structure alongside the old. That depiction, contained in figures 
15 and 16 above, continues in the representation of the institution as synonymous with ICJ. 
The updated organigram produces the court’s new managerial reality as a modern and 
streamlined structure as against the confused and illogical structure of the old Registry. Sitting 
side by side in the Comprehensive Report, the two organigrams narrate a story of gradual 
optimisation as the key to ICJ’s successful realisation.  
The second managerial practice is the project management tool known as PRINCE2. 
PRINCE2, short for ‘Projects in Controlled Environments’, was originally developed by the 
UK Office of Government Commerce.1140 It is a project methodology which ‘emphasises 
dividing projects into phases and established quality control to reduce risks inherent in projects 
 
1138 FIDH letter, 6. 
1139 Alvesson and Willmott, Making Sense of Management, 152. 
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during implementation’.1141 Given the technical aspirations of the reform project, such a quasi-
scientific method emerged as the most appropriate means for tweaking this institutional organ. 
However, PRINCE2 also had the avoidance of risk as one of its underlying aims. The risk 
culture permeating the ICC through its uptake of audit mechanisms now reached into projects 
of internal redesign like ReVision. As in other internal locations, though, risk was defined in 
terms of risk to the Registry itself as a means of protecting and sustaining the institution. 
As a methodology, PRINCE2 also refined the ICJ community’s understanding of 
success (and failure). That understanding was already coming to fruition in the 2013 PwC 
report. Therein, the consultants noted that a successful Registry would be one that implements 
modern methods, institutes a new organisational chart, and defines its tasks according to the 
strategic plan.1142 Furthermore, a successful Registry would have clear reporting lines, would 
empower managers, and adapt to shifting workloads. It would be ‘One Registry’, working 
together for the collective benefit of all ‘clients’.1143 Insofar as the Registry was successfully 
managerialised, it would be deemed a success.  
Thus, PRINCE2 demarcated the criteria of success based on the completion of internal 
targets and compliance with deadlines. The effectiveness of this redefinition is visible during 
and after ReVision. The Registrar kept the ASP regularly updated on the project’s progress and 
its compliance with set deadlines. Proposing the 2015 annual budget to states parties, the 
Registrar outlined the objective of ‘finaliz[ing] the Registry ReVision project by mid-2015’.1144 
Officials noted that ReVision would be complete with the ‘delivery of final ReVision report 
end June 2015’.1145 These indicia were later affirmed by the auditors. They found that ‘the 
deadlines laid down for the end of each phase were met’ and treated this as a key 
achievement.1146 Recording these achievements, the success of the organisation in furthering 
ICJ depended on whether a restructuring exercise had sufficiently met its deadlines, achieved 
savings, and published reports.  
PRINCE2 also redefined the meaning of failure in terms of damage or risk to the 
organisation. It anticipated failure as an issue of organisational deficiency as opposed to more 
fundamental problems with the project. Taking PRINCE2’s methodological framework, failure 
takes place when a deadline is not met, or when an internal report is not published. As a result, 
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failure comes to be seen as something which can always be optimised out of existence. This is 
apparent in the closing paragraphs of the Comprehensive Report dedicated to taking stock of 
‘lessons learnt’ from the project.  
The Registry cites only two deficiencies of ReVision, namely an ‘inability to 
communicate effectively’ during the project and ‘the length of the process’.1147 Officials note 
that communication with Registry staff and external constituencies could have been more 
effective during the process, in particular to avoid misperceptions and damage to ‘the 
reputation of the project and that of the Registry and the Court as a whole’.1148 The solution for 
future reference is said to lie in the allocation of additional human resources to the effective 
marketing of the project. The possibility that the problem is not a failure of communication, 
but a failure of that which is being communicated, is not considered and responsibility for this 
failure is essentially attributed to those who ‘lack[ed] adequate or timely information’.1149 
The second failure is said to lie in the difficulty of balancing the length of the process 
with fairness to those affected by it, with adverse consequences for staff morale and job 
insecurity.1150 This problem is attributed to the need for a ‘fair, transparent and inclusive’ 
consultation process and the Registry is trenchant in its view that the process was conducted to 
a ‘high standard’ of fairness even if ‘different stakeholders’ may have different perceptions 
about the balance between length and fairness.1151 Failure here, i.e. staff anxiety, is attributed 
not to the project which made redundancies possible, but to the failure to communicate said 
project effectively and to balance certain principles within the reform process. ReVision thus 
comes away free of any lasting criticism. 
Two additional tools, which dealt with individual staff members, further shaped the 
institution through the professional identities of its staff. As noted in chapter 4, managerial 
practices such as performance appraisal already produce the ICC professional as an efficient 
human resource. ReVision refined that subjectivity to identify Registry staff in terms of their 
value to the organisation, thereby entrenching the image of ICJ as an expert-run enterprise.  
The process of staff redundancies demonstrates this discursive effect of ReVision. Once 
the new structure was decided,  
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detailed job surveys were made for all new or modified positions, based on the 
recommendations of the ReVision team and the Registrar’s decisions. For modified 
positions, it was necessary to determine whether the changes in the job description 
amounted to a “substantial change”. If there was no substantial change, the staff 
member occupying that position would continue in that same position. However, if 
there had been a “substantial change” in the position, the position was abolished and a 
new, or rather materially different, position was created.1152 
 
Although the final decision as to post alterations and abolitions rested with the Registrar, 
evaluations of substantial change were made by ‘an internal classification expert’.1153 With 
these expert deliberations, Registry staff either found themselves protected from change and 
thus characterised as necessary human resources, or exposed to reallocation or redundancy, 
and thus designated as unnecessary.  
That this had a material effect on staff identity is confirmed by subsequent judgments 
of the ILO Administrative Tribunal. As a result of the court’s handling of ReVision 
redundancies, several (ex-)staff members brought complaints to the tribunal, having exhausted 
the ICC’s own internal grievance mechanisms. In one such case, the tribunal stated that ‘the 
answer to the question of whether there had been a substantial change to the functions, duties 
and responsibilities of the position influenced, indeed determined, the path the occupant of the 
position would take in order to secure ongoing employment with the ICC’.1154 Whether or not 
Registry staff would continue to bear that professional identity at all therefore turned on the 
question of organisational need as calculated by managerial experts. 
Another managerial tool drew on the designation of Registry staff as ‘the core 
stakeholders and clients of the new vision’.1155 On that basis, ReVision instilled a new vision 
among Registry staff via a statement on core values (see fig. 17). Their mission included 
managing human and financial resources and ‘empower[ing] our staff to provide high quality 
services, in the fastest and most cost-effective way’.1156 The core values include ‘commitment’, 
‘service-orientation’, and ‘collaboration’. The document imagines Registry staff as ‘hard-
working, dedicated and… hav[ing] a sense of purpose’. They ‘find solutions not problems’ and 
 
1152 Comprehensive Report, para. 74. 
1153 Comprehensive Report, para. 75. The Registrar treated these determinations as binding. 
1154 International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal, L (No. 3) v ICC, case no. 3908, para. 11. 
1155 Outcome Report, para. 24. 
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248 
 
‘are positive rather than negative in how [they] think, talk and act’. Registry staff are ‘service 
and client-oriented’ and ‘[e]verything [they] do is done for the right reasons’.1157  
Such individualised values and duties evince the dual regulation of the professional 
identity. On one hand, their inclusion in the process is ‘a deliberate choice enabling Registry 
staff to take ownership of the process and its outcomes’.1158 This recruited professionals into 
their own self-regulation and aligns them with their role as efficient service provider to 
institutional clients. On the other hand, these values were later re-imposed on staff by the organ, 
notably through training programmes, performance management, and ‘activities aimed at 
improving staff morale’.1159 These mechanisms of power were required ‘to carry through an 
effective change management embraced by all Registry staff’ hence the high importance 
ascribed to the statement of values.1160  
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Figure 17. Registry core values statement 
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These tools helped to refashion the Registry and its staff in a managerial image. They did so 
by limiting the scope of action to technical fine-tuning and by viewing success as a question of 
published reports and met deadlines. Simultaneously, failure was located in organisational 
deficiencies such as bad communication or the length of the project. ReVision also inculcated 
Registry staff in the process of discursive closure by recruiting them into their own regulation 
and imagining the ideal Registry professional as an efficient and dedicated human resource. 
 
4.3. Managerial documents 
 
 
ReVision, like other organisational processes such as performance appraisal, was conducted 
and recorded via a range of expert documents. And like those processes, the documents did not 
merely record the Registry’s reform processes but entrenched a managerial way of seeing the 
organ. That lens is visible in the very layout of ReVision’s main documents. The ‘Report of the 
Registry on the Outcome of the ReVision Process’, published in July 2015, provides an 
overview of each Registry section by ‘identifying the major (i) issues; (ii) solutions; and (iii) 
costs’.1161 These precipitate a managerial diagnosis. Thus, the IOR exhibited a ‘complex 
structure’ and ‘sub-optimal use of resources’.1162 Its solution lay in stronger ‘executive 
management’ and a greater focus on ‘strategic management’.1163 The costs of such measures 
are defined in exclusively monetary terms. 
The Comprehensive Report published the following year offers an even more elaborate 
framework for assessing the project’s results, outlining 
 
(i) the main problems identified in the previous structure; (ii) the solutions found for 
these problems and the efficiencies achieved; (iii) an overview of the structural 
changes; (iv) staffing implications at the level of each post; (v) a detailed explanation 
of the staffing and work of the Section in the new structure; (vi) the capacity of the new 
structure to absorb workload increases; and (vii) organisational development plans.1164  
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This step-by-step analysis is an apt metonym for the priorities and choices included and 
excluded by managerialism. Problems are framed as problems of inefficiency, bureaucracy and 
so on, for which efficient and cost-effective solutions must be found. The Comprehensive 
Report also provides a detailed ‘benefit-cost analysis’, which prioritises financial savings and 
other quantifiable benefits. Under this yardstick, costs which are unquantifiable are simply not 
included. This creates a somewhat skewed reading of the project’s consequences. Thus, staff 
cuts are not included as costs, but as benefits, which will reduce the court’s ‘budgetary 
needs’.1165  
Similarly, an ASP decision not to provide the Registry with the proposed budget 
amount for 2016 meant that managers had to stagger recruitment of new staff over several 
months. As von Hebel acknowledged, this created serious problems such as ‘delays in the 
delivery of transcripts’, ‘delays in and postponement of missions to the field’, and ‘delayed 
investigations and proceedings’.1166 These costs are not recorded in the benefit-cost analysis, 
and indeed the only consequence of the staggered recruitment is recorded as a benefit insofar 
as it produced savings of €3.4 million. Such are the blindspots created by a managerial lens.  
 Documents produced after ReVision, ostensibly for the purpose of evaluating its 
procedures and effects, retrospectively affirmed this managerial outlook. The External Auditor 
was authorised in November 2015 to conduct a ‘full assessment’ of ReVision.1167 The auditor 
would ‘assess the compliance, efficiency and effectiveness of the approach followed [by the 
ReVision team] and the measures adopted pursuant to the final report’.1168 These terms of 
reference were consistent with the auditor’s mandate to ‘make observations with respect to the 
efficiency of the financial procedures, the accounting system, the internal financial controls 
and, in general, the administration and management of the Court’.1169 
 Based on this framework, the two audits which followed ReVision unsurprisingly 
reproduced a managerial understanding of the Registry. The 2016 report evaluated the project 
based on the comprehensiveness of the project plan, the justification behind reform, 
compliance with deadlines, and the structure of project phases. It concluded that since ReVision 
redefined the Registry’s values and principles, rationalised its divisions, and strengthened intra-
 
1165 Outcome Report, para. 41. 
1166 Comprehensive Report, Foreword, x.  
1167 ASP Resolution 14/1, ICC-ASP/14/Res.1, 26 November 2015, part J, para. 13. 
1168 2016 Audit Report, para. 4. 
1169 Reg. 12.3, Financial Regulations and Rules, ICC-ASP/7/5, Part II-D, adopted 21 November 2008. 
251 
 
organ coordination, it was ‘justified in a technical and political view’.1170 A 2017 audit into the 
new Division of External Operations made a similar finding, observing the ‘unanimous positive 
assessment among the major stakeholders of the ICC, both inside and outside the Registry’ of 
the consolidated DEO.1171 Both reports recommend further managerialisation in the form of 
standard operating procedures for Registry staff and definition of new working methods with 
the possible assistance of a ‘firm of consultants or specialists’.1172 
 Alongside the Registry’s own reports, the 2016 and 2017 audit reports provide the 
official history of the reorganisation project. Assessing the efficiency and efficacy of the new 
Registry in comparison with the old, these experts act as the project’s official historians, with 
their reports representing the complete and truthful record of events. And due to the managerial 
tools and vocabularies they possess, these experts solidify the dominant image of ICJ as a 
technocratic enterprise pursued by experts whose job it is to optimise the current ICJ regime.  
 
5. Redescribing ReVision’s results  
 
 
From these expert manoeuvres one can recharacterize ReVision as a process of closing the 
institutional discourse on how to improve ICJ around the solution of organisational reform. 
This prompts a similar perspectival shift when it comes to analysing ReVision’s substantive 
outcomes. Rather than tracing a series of more or less successful measures designed to optimise 
the Registry, one witnesses an expanding managerial apparatus which privileges managerial 
experts and knowledge to the exclusion of other actors and knowledges.  
Managerial experts, whether within the court or without, possessed the most authority 
when it came to diagnosing and solving the Registry’s problems. This began as early as 2013, 
when PwC were recruited to develop a strategy for the forthcoming organisational review.1173 
Thereafter, ‘change management experts’ were recruited to manage and oversee the project 
within the ReVision team and Project Board, to provide training to Registry managers, and to 
implement parts of the project, as with the Human Resources Task Force which evaluated staff 
posts for the purposes of reclassification. Internally, management teams were inserted 
throughout the Registry’s organisational hierarchy and Registry managers were given greater 
 
1170 2016 Audit Report, para. 130. 
1171 2017 Audit Report, para. 118(a). 
1172 2016 Audit Report, para. 5; 2017 Audit Report, para. 11. 
1173 Report of the Court on its Organizational Structure, ICC-ASP/11/6, 4 May 2012, para. 16.  
252 
 
authority over ‘strategic resource planning’, ‘organisational performance’, and ‘risk 
management’.1174 The aim was ‘to empower managers in the Registry to take responsibility for 
running their respective  organizational units; take decisions within their delegated authority; 
achieve results; and manage their human and financial resources themselves’.1175  
 Cost-effectiveness also took on greater significance as a guiding principle for the new 
Registry. This was reflected in the decision to divide the Budget and Finance Section into two 
distinct sections. This decision reflected a ‘desire to elevate the budget function to a strategic 
long-term priority’.1176 By centralising management of the court budget in the new Budget 
Section, the ReVision team delegated ‘complete overview of all funds and an oversight 
authority’.1177 This mandate covered not only budgeting but also ‘planning and monitoring 
activities’.1178 This comprehensive set of powers would ‘strengthen[] the organisation’s budget 
function … mark[ing] a shift from an operational support role to a more strategic role’ and 
allowing the Budget Section to partner with other organs and sections ‘in devising long-term 
plans and strategies, determining resource needs and measuring performance’.1179 
The changes which ReVision brought about in the area of human resources – both 
structurally and for individual staff – reflects a similar hierarchical ordering of managerial 
knowledge. Within the Human Resources Section a new Organisational Development Unit 
(ODU) was established with responsibility for ‘strategic workforce planning, talent 
management, identifying training needs and implementing training programmes’.1180 This Unit 
would also devise ‘strategies, programmes and policies to ensure that the Court hires and 
develops the right staff and thus maximises the return on its investment in human 
resources’.1181  
Through the ODU, the Registry also hoped to foster the professional ideal of the 
efficient and dedicated staff member. A Performance Management Officer was recruited to 
strengthen performance management as well as to provide ‘policy, compliance, guidance, and 
support to managers’.1182 They would be joined by a new Learning and Development Officer 
 
1174 ICC, Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry: Outcomes of Phase 4 of the 
ReVision Project, ICC-ASP/14/18, 4 May 2015, para. 15. 
1175 ICC, Outcomes of Phase 4 of the ReVision Project, ICC-ASP/14/18, 4 May 2015, para. 10. 
1176 Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, ICC-ASP/13/26, 28 October 2014, para. 
17(h). 
1177 Report on the Review of the Organizational Structure of the Registry, para. 17(h). 
1178 Comprehensive Report, para. 158. 
1179 Comprehensive Report, para. 59. 
1180 Comprehensive Report, para. 152. 
1181 Comprehensive Report, para. 260. 
1182 Comprehensive Report, para. 262. 
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and a Human Resources Legal and Policy Officer to assist in staff development. This 
professional subjectivity would not only be imposed from above but fostered by Registry staff 
individually. Equipped with the new Statement on Registry Values, and having come out the 
other side of the reclassification exercise as a necessary human resource, Registry staff were to 
discharge their responsibilities with efficiency and dedication. The Registry and wider 
institution were reinscribed as the outer limits of their activities and the optimisation of those 
structures were instilled as their primary aspirations.  
 The privileged status which ReVision afforded to managerial knowledge contrasts with 
its simultaneous devaluation of non-managerial knowledges and roles. The division of 
concerns into structural and non-structural issues pre-empted solutions such as streamlining, 
better strategic management, and better work culture. Were the exercise to have been based on 
the effect of the Registry’s work on key constituencies – defendants, victims, witnesses, and 
even staff – a plurality of ideas and reflections would have been sought on questions of fair 
trial rights, implications of victim outreach activities, and fostering a staff body geared towards 
the positive treatment and well-being of those caught up in mass atrocities. Though less formal 
and scientific forms of ‘expertise’, such knowledge might have cut through the desire for 
efficiency and new organigrams.  
The official record reveals very little engagement with the court’s primary 
constituencies to devise appropriate organisational models, the assumption being that internal 
and managerial experts were best-placed to do so. If managerial experts were the primary 
beneficiaries of ReVision, Registry staff fared less favourably. Many staff members 
experienced ReVision’s darker sides, including low morale, job insecurity, and higher 
workloads. The judges distributed a memo to President Fernández expressing their concern at 
the project’s damage to staff morale and requested a suspension of the exercise while its 
implications were assessed.1183 The auditors noted that the redundancy process, particularly the 
decision to notify 120 staff of their potential separation when only 10 posts were abolished in 
the final determination, caused unnecessary stress and could have been conducted differently 
to minimise anxiety.1184 
 
1183 J. Easterday, ‘Major Changes at the ICC: the Registry’s ReVision’ (International Justice Monitor, 24 August 
2015) https://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/08/major-changes-at-the-icc-the-registrys-revision/. In a 2016 memo 
circulated among judicial colleagues, Judge Cuno Tarfusser claimed the President had ‘systematically side-lined 
and tried to marginalise’ those judges who had questioned ReVision’s cost and methods. Tarfusser ultimately 
called for von Hebel to resign as a result of ReVision’s mishandling, S. Maupas, ‘ICC Under Fire for Internal 
Mismanagement’, (JusticeInfo.net, 26 February 2018) https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/36556-icc-
under-fire-for-internal-management.html.  
1184 2016 Audit Report, para. 66(a). 
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 These psycho-social costs are not recorded in the official history of ReVision. Instead, 
low morale and job insecurity become unfortunate side-effects of a necessary process, rather 
than as factors which might lead the court to question the application of managerial expertise 
in the first place. The then President of the court, Silvia Fernández, acknowledged that despite 
ReVision’s aim to recommit Registry staff to the court’s mission and values, morale was 
‘probably at a low point’ during the project.1185 Nonetheless, she proposed only ‘a staff survey 
to evaluate morale and potential areas for improvement’.1186 For his part, the Registrar 
attributed job insecurity and low morale not to the project itself, but its length1187 and to bad 
communication as the project wore on.1188 Here, as in other lessons learnt, institutional 
reflection does not extend to questioning the assumptions and pathologies associated with 
managerial reform itself, with officials being content to tinker at the edges. The effect again 
was to side-line issues of staff morale while continuing to extoll management’s virtues.   
 Beyond its effect on staff members, ReVision also marginalised the voices of those 
most proximate to mass atrocities and thus most likely to engage the Registry’s services 
directly. With such a heavy focus on streamlining, workflows, and new management structures, 
any effect which ReVision had on defendants, victims, and victim communities, was tenuous. 
Officials thus resorted to broadly-termed benefits of ReVision intending to capture those more 
proximate to mass atrocities. For example, at the end of the project, von Hebel wished to 
reassure the court’s supporters ‘that the new Registry will indeed be a more efficient and 
effective service provider to all those who rely on it’.1189  
ReVision’s consequences for victims and defendants were also visible in the ultimately 
failed proposals for Victims and Defence Offices. As the only proposals impacting victims and 
defendants directly, even they appeared detrimental to their interests. FIDH and REDRESS 
outlined their objections to the proposed changes, warning that reforms made from the 
‘perspective of the courtroom’ would only have damaging effects on victim participation and 
the broader desires of victim communities.1190 Ex-ICC judge Adrian Fulford expressed concern 
at the potential curtailment of defence and victims’ rights to choose their own counsel. He 
suggested that managerialism was the wrong prism through which to view the ICC’s victims 
regime, noting that ‘[t]he managerial and financial problems that accompany significant victim 
 
1185 Easterday, ‘Major Changes at the ICC: the Registry’s ReVision’.  
1186 Easterday, ‘Major Changes at the ICC: the Registry’s ReVision’.  
1187 Comprehensive Report, para. 565. 
1188 Comprehensive Report, para. 567. 
1189 Comprehensive Report, Foreword, x. 
1190 FIDH letter, 2. 
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participation in individual trials should not be an excuse for partially or substantially 
abandoning the whole project’.1191 The interests of those most proximate to mass atrocities 
were thus peripheralized as the reform project prioritised the structural well-being and optimal 
performance of the institution.  
   
6. Conclusion 
 
 
To its most ardent supporters, ReVision represented a successful and seamless reform process 
which improved the functioning of the ICC Registry. Through both structural and non-
structural changes, the ReVision team, with the aid of Registry managers, external experts, 
auditors, states parties, and civil society, made the court’s largest organ more streamlined, more 
cost-effective, and better able to absorb future increases in the court’s activities. For those most 
heavily involved in the project, this was no easy task and took a great deal of institutional 
resources and creativity to achieve over a number of years. Yet their hope was that such efforts 
had set the Registry ‘on the necessary path of organisational change’ so that it might function 
better for those within and without the court. 
Against, or instead of, this reading I have posed an alternative description of ReVision. 
First, I have looked further back into the Registry’s organisational history to detect early and 
persistent elements of a managerial worldview. By crafting the court’s wider context, justifying 
organisational reform, and defining managerial problems, court officials and experts gradually 
turned managerial reform of the Registry into an urgent task necessary for the long-term 
viability of the ICJ project. Thus, ReVision’s parameters, even the broad outline of its results, 
were visible long before von Hebel was elected as Registrar, and persisted long after he lost 
his bid for re-election in 2018.1192 Indeed, ReVision was said to mark only the ‘beginning of 
th[e] pursuit’ towards greater efficiencies.1193  
Second, the commonly acknowledged tools of the ReVision project such as PRINCE2, 
staff surveys, and job reclassifications, were not tools in the traditional sense of neutral 
scientific instruments. Instead, they entrenched a dominant institutional discourse which saw 
 
1191 J. Rozenberg, ‘UK’s first ICC judge attacks proposed restructuring of international court’ (The Guardian, 4 
November 2014) https://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/nov/04/uks-first-icc-judge-attacks-reforms-court-
adrian-fulford.  
1192 Von Hebel was replaced by British candidate, Peter Lewis, ICC, ‘Peter Lewis elected as ICC Registrar’, press 
release no ICC-CPI-20180328-PR1374, 28 March 2018 https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1374.  
1193 Comprehensive Report, Foreword, x. 
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the Registry reproduced as a managerial organ driven by efficiency concerns and refined 
Registry staff into productive and dedicated human resources. They were not the only facets of 
managerial reform, though, having been guided by a near-exclusive managerial voice and 
subsequently reinforced and recorded for posterity in the project’s official records. Through 
voice, tools, and documents, ReVision enacted a discursive closure which saw the Registry and 
its staff produced in a managerial image.  
Third, the value ascribed to managerial expertise and the managerial character of the 
new Registry contrasts against the devaluation of non-managerial actors and knowledges. 
Although hidden, efforts to challenge ReVision’s ‘truncated version of organisational 
possibilities’ were apparent in the brief interventions of FIDH and REDRESS, even if these 
NGOs broadly accepted the need for efficiency and cost-effectiveness.1194 However, their 
interventions point to an alternative set of epistemological and spatial assumptions upon which 
discussions of ICJ might be based, and on which improvements to that project might take place. 
Their exchanges, as well as some of ReVision’s damaging effects on staff morale, alert us to 
management’s potential inadequacy as a vocabulary for governing ICJ. They direct us to 
reconsider management’s underlying concepts – ‘efficiency’, ‘organisational need’, ‘success’ 
and ‘failure’ – to ask: efficient, necessary, or successful according to whom? As Koskenniemi 
has alluded to, and as the preceding chapters confirm vis-à-vis the ICJ project, ‘[t]he more we 
insist on [international law’s] technical character, the more we look away from its role in 
strengthening one narrative over others’.1195 
  
 
1194 C. Grey, Studying Organizations (SAGE Publications 2005) 121. 
1195 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 197, 210. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efforts to reform the International Criminal Court continue apace. After the intervention of the 
four former Presidents of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), the topic of a wider stocktaking 
exercise promptly made it onto the agenda of the ASP Bureau. A retreat took place in The 
Netherlands in June 2019 to help Bureau members ‘gain a better understanding of the current 
challenges facing the Court and to examine the ways forward’.1196 Members expressed a desire 
for a review of court performance, possibly by independent experts. Among the various topics 
addressed at the retreat, participants considered the possibility of instituting a ‘strong 
management and governance culture’, more optimal use of human resources, and a 
strengthened performance management framework.1197 Alongside other procedural and 
substantive recommendations such managerial reforms premised on enhancing efficiency 
would assist in ‘meeting the challenges of today for a stronger Court tomorrow’.1198 As only 
one recent example, such institutional discussions affirm that aspirations towards a more 
justice-seeking international criminal justice (ICJ) project continue to culminate in calls for 
technical reform to the project’s central institution. 
 
1196 ICC, Agenda of the 5th Meeting of the ASP Bureau, 7 June 2019, 2. 
1197 ICC, Summary of the ASP Bureau Retreat, Santpoort, The Netherlands, 13 June 2019, 3. 
1198 ICC, Summary of the ASP Bureau Retreat, 1. 
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 One point of this thesis has been to show that such aspirations – based as they are on a 
conventional reading of managerial practices as adopted by international lawyers and other 
actors in the ICJ community – are misplaced. Managerial practices are not objective tools 
which enhance efficiency and effectiveness in an organisational and historical vacuum. They 
are practices of governing international criminal justice by reinforcing its credentials as an 
institutionalised and expert-led enterprise. The historical emergence of management and its 
efficiency discourse reveal its Western origins, but also, more importantly, its coexistence 
alongside and often within Western strategies and counter-strategies to secure their hegemonic 
position in a changing geopolitical landscape. Similarly, management’s reiteration at the ICC 
exposes it not as a neutral means towards any end, but as a vessel bearing the interests and 
aspirations of many actors – states parties, institutional managers and lawyers, and external 
‘stakeholders’ – engaged in the ICJ project. As such, managerial practices are predominantly 
conditioned by the Anglo and Western penchant for oversight and cost-effectiveness, and in 
turn condition the very parameters of ICJ as an individualised, penal, and juridical system. 
Management’s own organisational and professional focus has also led it to reproduce the 
technocratic imaginary of ICJ as one particular way of realising justice. 
 Looking closely at management’s effects, these cannot (or cannot only) be deduced 
from a narrow range of largely numerical hypotheses and results revealing fewer fair trial 
challenges to court judgments or more interactions with the court’s social media channels.1199 
Rather, management’s impact must be understood in terms of the broader discursive effects 
which it has upon the court’s context and the ‘reality’ of the court’s own position and 
contribution vis-à-vis that context. These effects are visible in the court’s Strategic Plans which 
identify an efficient ICC as the optimal form of ICJ, and in the Presidency’s efforts to 
managerialise itself and other organs to reaffirm the court’s status as an accountable and well-
managed organisation. Management’s discursive effects are also to be found individually, 
among the lawyers who carry out the ICC’s core legal and policy functions. From the 
performance appraisal form to the human resourcing decisions made during ReVision, the ideal 
type of justice-seeker within the ICJ project is understood as an efficient human resource 
operating within the hyper-rational ICC. 
 
1199 ICC, Report on Activities and Programme Performance of the International Criminal Court for the Year 2015, 
ICC-ASP/15/3, 14 September 2016, para. 196: ‘The Court successfully bolstered its public presence on Twitter 
… This has proved to be an efficient and cost-effective way of distributing information and reaching a wider 
global audience … The Court’s Twitter audience grew by 42 per cent in 2015, from 119,000 to 161,000 followers 
worldwide’. 
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 In problematising the mainstream reading of managerial practices, I have sought to do 
more than question the resort to managerial reform as a way out of the ICC’s current malaise. 
I have also elucidated management’s reality- and identity-making effects and thereby shown 
how the very effort to managerialise is itself a limited and limiting strategy for improving 
justice-seeking efforts on a global scale. It removes questions of organisational reform from 
the realm of politics to the sphere of technique, it tends to reproduce itself and colonise other 
vocabularies to become the dominant lens through which to judge institutional performance, 
and it fits too easily alongside the Western preference for budgetary restraint and oversight in 
contrast to the more fundamental questions and changes posed by others, especially African 
states parties.  
 The most urgent and recurring consequence of managerial practices which emerges 
from these pathologies is the tendency to say that a technocratic vision of ICJ is the best – 
perhaps the only – vision of justice worth pursuing. Behind all the strategic planning and 
efficiency measures is an acceptance of the ultimately settled status of the ICC’s – and ICJ’s – 
basic propositions: that the impunity problem can be managed out of existence, that global 
injustice and violence are best treated via law and legal institutions, and that the Rome Statute 
system is capable of realising ‘justice’ however defined. Whether it is through the high-minded 
mission statement or the core competencies model, the managerial discourse forecloses the 
possibility of articulating a different sort of justice project and the possibility of acknowledging 
the ‘dark sides’ of ICJ in its technocratic form.1200 Such practices leave the court’s image as a 
force for good intact but also make its less attractive features – a possible selectivity bias, a 
Western-oriented complementarity regime, a limited conception of violence – impenetrable. 
Thus, in order to confront those effects, one is forced to adopt the kind of ‘SMART’ analysis 
of events which already takes the points of contention as given.  
To counteract this discursive closure, contemporary discussion as to the ICC’s 
challenges and possible solutions must not only widen the aperture to consider more 
fundamental problems, but must also seek to challenge the very notion that there is always an 
ICC-shaped solution to those problems. The rare counter-narratives which have surfaced 
throughout this thesis reveal just such a sentiment, however sporadically articulated. I have 
occasionally sought to open up the fissures in the comprehensive vocabulary of management 
to expose the alternative imaginaries of ICJ which management crowds out, and the alternative 
 
1200 On dark sides, see D. Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton UP 2004). 
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ways of thinking about the ICC’s position and function as a means to breaking the court’s 
monopoly on global justice-seeking efforts. Actors ranging from African states parties 
disillusioned with the ICC project to NGOs concerned about the position of victims have posed 
questions of a more foundational character than ICC reformists have dared to ask. These 
questions, alongside the insights gained from this thesis, prompt us to ask: is it desirable to 
make a court which has only prosecuted Africans more cost-effective? Do we wish to make the 
lawyer whose job it is to ignore structural violence more productive? Is it our aim as lawyers 
to make a contested system of justice more streamlined?1201 
Although the ‘evidence’ suggests that the ICC is unable to address these issues, one 
need not even accept a critical diagnosis of the court to be concerned about the perils of 
streamlining, targets, and management consultants. It suffices that any consideration of the 
ICC’s basic objectives, its in-built contradictions, and its underlying assumptions are 
epistemologically cast off in the quest for ever-greater optimisation. One could, like many 
African states parties have done, launch an attack on the very colonialist architecture of the 
ICC. But one need not even go this far. It is equally plausible that more conventional scholars 
would wish to rekindle the debate on the ICC’s foundational aims and the conflicts they 
engender but are muted because the line from the ICC is that such conflicts do not inhibit the 
court’s work. The argument is that the court has a range of goals, each being pursued in 
cooperation, and as efficiently and effectively as possible. Yet claims of an African bias persist 
and anxieties about the court’s raison d’etre recur perennially despite (or because of) all this 
management talk. 
At the very least, the fact that deep problems persist should prompt reflection on the 
limits of the managerial mindset as a way of approaching the complex issue of global injustice. 
At most, it might direct us to consider how non-legal practices of institutional management are 
themselves implicated in the reproduction of those very conditions of injustice, violence, and 
inequality. The same old outcomes are produced not in spite of management, but because of it. 
Hence the unsustainable nature of the mainstream stance towards the ICC and its present crisis. 
To call for more and better management is to demand an ever-more recalcitrant stance in 
relation to the anxieties voiced about an impoverished ICJ project while continuing on a path 
to managerialisation.  
 
1201 Phrase taken from C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn, ‘Introduction’, in C. De Vos and S. Kendall (eds), 
Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP 2015) 18.  
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Although it is customary to end more critically-oriented theses by answering Lenin’s 
question of ‘what is to be done’, the preceding study leaves me ill-inclined to do so.1202 When 
ICJ practitioners and scholars have already asked and answered this question a hundred times, 
indulging in a solution seems both too much and too little, both too soon and too late. Should 
the ICC stop relying on managerial tools and experts? It might give those inside the institution 
room to formulate the organisation beyond the managerial boilerplate. But the effect of such 
an abrupt stoppage would not be quickly felt in an institution that has spent the better part of 
two decades convincing itself and the world that institutionalised and professionalised 
solutions are the best way to tackle mass atrocities. Instead of looking at the macro level, then, 
perhaps the micro level is the answer: should ICC lawyers perform acts of micro-resistance to 
managerialism by not completing an appraisal form, or by attempting to reinject substantive 
concerns into technical procedures? Such acts might reignite a sense of professional or even 
political responsibility but would do little to challenge the logic of efficiency which permeates 
many of ICJ’s spaces. If anything, such managerial disobedience might reinforce the division 
of the optimal and sub-optimal human resource on which the efficiency discourse runs. 
This is not to say that nothing can be done. At various stages in the managerialisation 
of the ICC, we have seen ways of approaching the court’s work which challenge the tendency 
to optimise. Early in the court’s life some officials defined efficiency in terms of adequate 
funding, rather than budgetary restraint. Had this line continued to be adopted after the 2008 
financial crisis, the focus of the court’s efficiency efforts today might have been to ensure all 
states parties complied with their financial obligations. With the court looking externally rather 
than internally for financial stability, considerable time and resources might have been freed 
up to allow the court to embark on a more comprehensive and modest reflection of its 
capabilities and limitations. The studies on the Presidency and Registry offer a similar glimpse 
into alternative organisational arrangements which could have prompted a realignment and 
regression of the ICC’s hegemonic tendencies. Had the court internalised the critiques made 
by FIDH and others, it might have recalibrated its organs from mechanisms of ICC 
entrenchment to optional tools of engagement for those suffering mass atrocities, should they 
so desire. These alternatives to the dominant managerial mode do not prevent the court from 
reproducing injustice and violence, but do provide the beginnings of a ‘provincialised’ 
 
1202 V.I. Lenin, ‘What Is To Be Done?: Burning Questions of our Movement’, in V.I. Lenin, Collected Works 
(Vol. 5, Foreign Languages Publishing House 1961, trans. J. Fineberg and G. Hanna) 347.  
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understanding of the ICC and the technocratic ICJ project.1203 They also remind the ICJ 
community that all is not well in the project and that no amount of managerial tweaking will 
change this fact. 
In mapping how ICJ is governed through institutional practices of management, this 
thesis has sought to make the familiar artefacts of justice-seeking appear strange and to make 
the strange objects of management look more familiar as parts of a well-established knowledge 
apparatus. Placing peripheral practices at the centre of analysis, it becomes clear that the more 
the ICC changes, by implementing efficiency measures and restructuring its organs, the more 
it stays the same as a narrow response to some of the most complex global events. Failure to 
appreciate that fundamental limitation has drawn the ICJ community into a practical and 
intellectual quagmire bereft of ideas. Today, debates about ICC reform is where aspirations 
about international justice go to seed, and they do so in the interminable recommendations for 
managerial reform, proposals for expert panels, and the incessant documentation of 
institutional and professional life. 
  
 
1203 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton UP 
2008). 
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